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Abstract 
The paper confronts different aspects of decentralization: fiscal decentralization, post-
constitutional regulatory decentralization, and constitutional decentralization – using a single 
dataset from Russian Federation of the Yeltsin period as a politically asymmetric country and 
a variety of indicators. It finds no robust correlation between different decentralization 
aspects; moreover, three processes of devolution appearing in the same country at the same 
time seem to be driven by different (though partly overlapping) forces. Hence, a specific 
aspect of decentralization is hardly able to serve as a proxy for another one or for the overall 
decentralization process.   
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1. Introduction 
One of the main problems for the empirical literature on decentralization, its driving 
forces  and  economic  impacts,  is  that  decentralization  is  really  difficult  to  measure.  The 
traditional indicators like retention rates or subnational share of public expenditures have all 
been discussed in the literature and thoroughly criticized. There are at least two aspects able 
to  cause  trouble  while  brining  theory  on  fiscal  federalism  to  data.  First,  it  is  crucial  to 
distinguish among the  constitutional and the post-constitutional stages  of decentralization. 
Allocation  of  authorities  as  specified  in  the  fundamental  acts  of  the  federation  does  not 
necessarily map into the allocation of de-facto authorities and, even more, of fiscal flows. 
Second, at the post-constitutional level there is always a gap between fiscal decentralization 
and regulatory decentralization; since both aspects are crucially important for the performance 
of federations, any empirical approach ignoring one of them is likely to face problems while 
identifying the ceteris paribus effect of devolution.
1 The aim of this paper is to explicitly 
confront different concepts of decentralization using a single dataset. The objective is rather 
positive than normative: first,  I try to establish a correlation between different aspects of 
decentralization,  and  second,  look  at  the  driving  forces  determining  the  decentralization 
outcomes. From this point of view the paper aims to contribute to the growing empirical 
endogenous  decentralization  literature  (e.g.  Panizza,  1999;  Cerniglia,  2003;  Arzaghi  and 
Henderson, 2005; Letelier, 2005; Stegarescu, 2006; Feld et al., 2008), attempting to perform a 
positive analysis of factors determining (various) degrees of decentralization  
It  is  difficult  to  find  a  reasonable  empirical  playground  for  this  exercise,  mostly 
because decentralization beyond simple allocation of revenues and expenditures is very hard 
to  quantify.  This  paper  takes  advantage  of  the  process  of  asymmetric  devolution  in  the 
Russian Federation in the 1990s, and uses Russia as the laboratory for comparing different 
aspects of decentralization. Russian Federation  in the late 1990s is probably the  classical 
example of what one may call asymmetric federalism. Individual regions achieved different 
levels of devolution through both bargaining with the federal center and unilateral activities, 
including  introduction  of  legal  norms  directly  contradicting  federal  legislation  and 
manipulations  with  tax  collection.  On  the  other  hand,  it  remained  formally  a  highly 
centralized  federation,  with  exclusive  authority  on  the  federal  level  in  many  areas  of 
regulation, as well as in fiscal affairs. In this paper I use nine proxies to measure the degree of 
asymmetric devolution achieved by individual regions. First, a more traditional indicator of 
                                                           
1 In this paper I use the terms “devolution” and “decentralization” as synonyms, what is probably slightly sloppy 
if one looks at precise definitions applied in political sciences, but is reasonable for a study of asymmetrically 
decentralized country.   4  
 
the tax retention rates is applied to measure the degree of fiscal decentralization; this standard 
variable is supplemented by a number of modified indicators to capture some of its problems. 
Second, I use the data of the Federal Register to obtain the share and the number of regional 
acts directly contradicting federal law, thus accounting for regulatory decentralization at the 
post-constitutional level. Finally, I construct two indices to obtain the degree of autonomy 
incorporated  in  regional  constitutions  (using  their  version  as  of  in  late 1990s)  and  in  the 
power-sharing treaties signed by the federal  government and the regional administrations, 
therefore measuring the constitutional decentralization.  
The  main  finding  of  the  paper  is  that  fiscal  decentralization,  post-constitutional 
regulatory decentralization and constitutional decentralization seem to be largely unrelated to 
each other; moreover, different factors identified in the theory are at work for different aspects 
of decentralization. The only robust correlation I find is between regulatory decentralization 
and degree of devolution in regional constitutions; however, even this result is simply driven 
by  a  small  group  of  ethnic  republics.  It  is  necessary  to  point  out  that  it  does  not  follow 
unambiguously from the theoretical reasoning that different dimensions of devolution should 
be correlated. On the one hand, different preferences and rents in different policy areas are 
likely to result in different levels of decentralization. On the other hand, correlation is likely 
to occur as a consequence of bargaining, where different aspects of decentralization become 
subject to package deals and therefore the outcomes turn out to be interdependent. The results 
of  this  paper,  nevertheless,  are  relevant,  first,  because  our  knowledge  of  interrelation  of 
dimensions of decentralization is limited (and hence it is difficult to confront any theoretical 
result with reality), and second, because of somewhat simplistic treatment of decentralization 
in many empirical papers using just one “true” measure of decentralization. The latter could 
be  justified  if  the  dimensions  of  decentralization  are  correlated  –  so,  an  empirical 
investigation seems to be of interest. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  next  section  I  discuss  the  problem  of 
measuring the degree of decentralization in the literature. The third section briefly considers 
the design of the Russian federalism, presents different dimensions of decentralization and 
looks  at  their  correlation.  The  fourth  section  focuses  on  determinants  of  endogenous 
decentralization in Russia and the econometric problems of the analysis. The fifth section 
reports  the  main  results  with  respect  to  the  driving  forces  of  decentralization.  The  sixths 
section summarizes and discusses the results, and the last section concludes.  
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2. Measuring the degree of decentralization 
  Since decentralization seems to be one of the main concepts for economic and political 
reforms in both developing and developed countries, there exists a multitude of intersecting 
and  diverging  theoretical  and  empirical  approaches  to  defining  and  measuring 
decentralization, often applied as “proxies” for one another (Sharma, 2006). To start with, the 
main  problem  of  the  literature  is  actually  not  the  choice  between  “centralized”  and 
“decentralized” governments, but rather between political, or constitutional (which in turn 
may refer to the autonomy of decision-making, autonomous appointment of governments and 
their  ability  to  participate  in  federal  decision-making),  and  administrative  (which  mostly 
refers  to  the  construction  of  public  administration,  i.e.  deconcentration  of  bureaucracy) 
decentralization (Hutchcroft, 2001). For a large country (in terms of population or territory) 
administrative decentralization is unavoidable and undisputable simply because of technical 
reasons of governability. Hence, the question of the optimal degree of decentralization usually 
refers to the decision-making autonomy of regional governments (although in a world with 
agency  problems  and  power  asymmetries  administrative  decentralization  may  “turn  into” 
political autonomy of regional governments through the informal migration of authority). 
A further distinction should be made, as already noticed, between the (already defined) 
constitutional  decentralization  and  the  post-constitutional  decentralization.  In  this  case  I 
follow the Buchanan and Tullock’s (1962) distinction of constitutional and post-constitutional 
decisions:  the  post-constitutional  decentralization  reflects  the  outcomes  of  the  political 
process,  once  the  constitutional  rules  are  set,  rather  than  the  rules  themselves.  Or,  stated 
otherwise, the constitutional decentralization describes the ability of regional administrations 
to  make  independent  decisions,  or,  as  Schneider  (2003:33)  puts  it,  “the  degree  to  which 
central government allows non-central government entities to undertake the political functions 
of governance”, while the post-constitutional decentralization describes the consequences of 
this allocation of authority for financial flows and regulations. In what follows I will use the 
notion  of  the  “regulatory”  and  the  “fiscal”  decentralization  just  to  describe  the  post-
constitutional level. In the literature both levels are often “merged”: and hence, for example, 
fiscal decentralization can refer to both rules and outcomes. However, if one intends to test 
the link between two levels empirically, an analytical distinction can be helpful. 
Let  me  elaborate  on  the  specifics  of  constitutional  and  post-constitutional 
decentralization in individual policy areas studied in what follows. The difference between 
these two aspects is particularly simple in fiscal matters: the constitutional decentralization 
implies the right of regions to independently decide on revenues and expenditures of their 
budgets; the post-constitutional decentralization, however, means just the allocation of funds 6  
 
between center and regions. In countries like Germany states receive substantial portion of tax 
revenue, but have virtually no right to decide on bases and rates for taxes (which are then 
federal or joint responsibility). In what follows fiscal decentralization refers exclusively to 
these post-constitutional outcomes (as it is the case in almost all empirical studies, though not 
all of them acknowledge it). The situation is slightly more complicated, if one looks at the 
regulations. The constitutional decentralization, once again, means the allocation of decision-
making rights on standards and norms for economic activity. However, this allocation may be 
different from the “real” significance of regional and federal regulations for economic agents. 
For example, it is possible that one of the parties (either center or states) is more active in 
filling their “regulatory niche” with acts and norms, than the other. Once again, regulatory 
decentralization in this paper refers to the post-constitutional “relative importance” of federal 
and  regional  law  for  economic  agents.  Obviously,  it  is  a  vague  concept,  which  I  will, 
however,  operationalize  in  what  follows.  This  paper  therefore  looks  at  three  aspects  of 
decentralization: constitutional and two post-constitutional (regulatory and fiscal) dimensions 
of devolution. 
2 
  The  literature  on  fiscal  decentralization  usually  relies  on  indicators  like  share  of 
subnational (tax) revenues and / or expenditures, which are, in spite of common usage, also 
very  often  criticized  both  because  of  measurement  problems  (impact  of  tax  and  non-tax 
revenues, spatial allocation of federal expenditures, influence of interbudgetary transfers) and 
especially because they ignore the degree of autonomy (i.e. constitutional decentralization) in 
the decision-making with respect to the fiscal matters (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). Hence, there 
have  been  a  number  of  attempts  to  correct  the  data  incorporating  the  degree  of  fiscal 
autonomy in the analysis (Stegarescu, 2005).  The regulatory decentralization is obviously 
much harder to measure, since the variety of policy aspects to be considered may be huge. On 
the other hand, it is also more difficult to come to data for the international analysis, and the 
intranational  variation  may  be  insufficient.  Therefore  scholars  usually  focus  on  specific 
aspects  of  regulation  providing  a  suitable  basis  for  the  analysis.
3  The  constitutional 
decentralization has been subject to a great variety of studies. The most popular approach is to 
construct an index, incorporating several aspects of decentralization as well as may be several 
                                                           
2  The  constitutional  level  is  usually  more  stable,  than  the  post-constitutional  outcomes,  although  in  the 
developing countries it may also become quite volatile and even determined by individual personnel decisions. 
The  list  of  post-constitutional  dimensions  may  be  expanded  to  include  further  aspects  of  governance  (say, 
allocation of personnel between levels of political system, cf. Treisman, 2002); however, even measuring three 
main dimensions of devolution is a non-trivial task. 
3  For  example,  Strumpf  and  Oberholzer-Gee  (2002)  test  the  impact  of  preference  heterogeneity  on 
decentralization  by  studying  the  liquor  control  rules  in  the  U.S.  municipalities.  Traub  and  Sigman  (2007) 
examine the “voluntary decentralization” in the area of several health and safety laws in the United States. 7  
 
outcome  measures.
4  An  alternative  could  be  to  measure  the  actual  policy  interconnection 
between  different  levels  of  government.
5  Finally,  special  political  situations  may  provide 
source for analysis of constitutional decentralization.
6  
  In spite of the obvious importance of the topic, the literature explicitly comparing 
different  dimensions  of  decentralization  is  very  small  (Treisman,  2002;  Schneider,  2003; 
Blume  and  Voigt,  2008;  Martinez-Vazquez  and  Timofeev,  2009)  and  mostly  focuses  on 
international  settings.
7  Treisman  (2002)  and  Blume  and  Voigt  (2008)  also  consider  the 
correlation of different  forms of decentralization and socioeconomic and political country 
characteristics, including country size, ethnic division, colonial origin, economic development 
and  level  of  democracy.  However,  data  compatibility  across  nations  adds  an  additional 
dimension to the measurement problem. Hence it is reasonable to look at different dimensions 
of  decentralization  and  their  origin  using  the  intra-national  variation  of  decentralization, 
which, however, to my knowledge have never been considered empirically before for this 
problem. 
  Once the subnational variation in taken into account, a further distinction should be 
made.  First,  one  can  focus  on  the  decentralization  within  subnational  units,  if  they  are 
different enough.
8 Second, however, the degree of devolution achieved by each region versus 
the central government is often heterogeneous, implying the development of what one may 
call “asymmetric federalism”. While asymmetries in terms of outcomes of economic policies 
(say, retention rates) are always present in federations (but may have substantially different 
origin),  the  asymmetry  at  the  level  of  constitutional  decentralization  is  a  more  rare 
phenomenon, which is, however, observed in a variety of countries.
9 Asymmetry is also a 
feature of the Russian federalism, which, combined with a large number of regions, provides 
us  with  substantial  intra-national  variation  for  a  reasonable  statistical  analysis  and  makes 
Russia an attractive laboratory – however, it is important to remember that it is not a “unique” 
feature of Russia and hence may generate more generally applicable results. 
                                                           
4 Marks et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive review of these indices (as well as construct their own one). 
5  Sheng  (2007)  studies  the  biographies  of  party  secretaries  in  China  to  understand  the  logic  of  political 
decentralization, and Landry (2004) looks at the tenure duration and promotion patterns of local officials as 
response to formal decentralization. 
6 For example, Hennessey (2008) discusses a specific experiment of home rule establishment for American 
municipalities. 
7  A  related  study  is  done  by  Liu  (2007),  who  performs  a  cluster  analysis  of  different  dimensions  of 
decentralization in order to identify the typical combinations empirically observed, and Falleti (2004) in a case 
study  of  Latin  American  countries,  who  investigates  the  dynamic  interaction  of  different  decentralization 
aspects. 
8 For example, Feld et al. (2008) perform an analysis of fiscal decentralization within the cantons of Switzerland, 
using the extreme heterogeneity of their financial constitutions. 
9  The  best  example  may  be  Spain,  where  each  region  (“communidad  autonoma”)  determines  the  scope  of 
autonomy from the “menu” offered by the federal government individually, but asymmetry is incorporated in 
political systems of countries like United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium or India. 8  
 
 
3. Dimensions of decentralization in Russia 
3.1. Russian asymmetric federalism and decentralization 
  The development of the Russian asymmetric federalism has already been subject to 
numerous studies in both economics and political science. First, the basic elements of the 
asymmetry  were  already  inherited  from  the  Soviet  period:  the  federation  still  consists  of 
national republics, administrative units (oblast or krai) and autonomous okrugs. Although in 
the  early  1990s  the  situation  was  quite  different,  the  currently  valid  constitution  of  1993 
proclaimed an identical status of all “subjects of the Federation” (the official designation of 
all  regions  regardless  of  their  status).  However,  previous  norms,  as  well  as  informal 
bargaining processes granted the national republics special privileges. Second, the asymmetric 
federalism in the 1990s appeared from the bilateral and multilateral bargaining between the 
regions and the center, partly initiated by the regions (Stoner-Weiss, 1998). Third, the federal 
law (acts of the parliament and also presidential decrees) was also used to give additional 
authorities to regions. Finally, the key component of asymmetry were the unilateral activities 
of the regions: manipulations with the tax retention rates and the so-called “war of laws”, i.e. 
introduction of regional legislation (including regional constitutions) directly contradicting 
the federal acts (and also the constitution of Russia). As a result, Russian regions obtained 
significantly different degree of autonomy, resulting into substantial differences of regional 
legal regimes and economic policies (Polishchuk, 2001).  
Fiscal decentralization: As already mentioned, this paper looks at three dimensions 
of decentralization in Russia. To start with, the fiscal decentralization is measured by the 
traditional variable of the tax retention rate (share of regional government in the overall tax 
revenue collected from its territory, including federal and regional taxes). Although the data is 
published by the Federal Statistical Authority (Goskomstat) on the annual basis, in order to 
ensure compatibility with other data, which are available only in a cross-section, I take the 
average over 1995-1999 (with 1995 being the first year after the reform of the federalism in 
1994, establishing the existing system of interbudgetary relations in Russia, and 1999 being 
the  last  year  of  the  Yeltsin’s  presidency  before  the  re-centralization  attempts  under  Putin 
started). The advantage of this variable is that it is consistent with the previous literature on 
asymmetric federalism and Russia, which often applied this indicator as both a dependent and 
an independent variable in various settings (for example, Treisman, 1999 or Desai et al., 
2005). However, it also has several disadvantages. A formal indicator of the tax structure does 
not cover the high variety of financial flows between the center and the regions and between 
the regions and the economic actors (e.g. transfers, non-monetary transactions, barter, and 9  
 
redistribution  of  property  rights,  see  Eckardt,  2002).  Even  despite  relatively  high 
centralization in the field of taxation, regional governments still have sufficient additional 
powers  via  related  business  groups  and  banks  etc  (Rosefielde  and  Vennikova,  2004). 
Moreover, the use of off-budget funds was quite common in the 1990s  - in this case I refer to 
both “off-budget funds” - public entities formally not included in the regional budget, but 
established according to the federal or regional law (for example, road funds), and quasi-legal 
formally private entities, which forced the contributions through the pressure of governors.
10 
To put it differently, tax retention rates may have little in common with the actual ability to 
produce public goods. 
Hence, I have also used several modified variables to capture the potential drawbacks 
of the retention rate. As I will demonstrate in what follows, however, almost all variables of 
this group have their own clear disadvantages: and, what is even more important, they are 
inconsistent with the existing literature, which mostly relies on the retention rate. So, they will 
just be applied as supplementary indicators. The first ratio relates the sum of the own tax 
revenue and federal transfers obtained by the regional budget to the overall tax collection 
from the region’s territory. The idea is simple: it is possible that the retention rate as such is 
not informative, because through its strong bargaining power the regional administration was 
able to force the federal government to provide it with substantial transfers. Hence, in this 
ratio in the numerator one has the actual “flow of money” to the regional budget, which is 
then compared to the “flow of money” the regional territory was able to generate for the 
whole budgetary system.
11 The disadvantage of this indicator is, however, that the degree of 
control of the regional administration over the share of the tax revenue and the transfers from 
the federal budget is very different. In Russia the problem is may be less pronounced, because 
tax  collection  during  the  period  discussed  in  this  paper  was  anyway  done  by  the  federal 
agencies (which have however often been captured by regions, see Lavrov, 2005): but even in 
this case the decision-making mechanism for the re-allocation of tax revenue and for the 
federal  transfers  is  different,  and  thus  two  components  of  the  numerator  could  measure 
different things. For example, while a large retention rate is usually treated as an indicator of 
autonomy, large transfers could indicate both strong bargaining power of the region able to 
“coerce” the federal administration to provide financing, but also high dependence of the 
region from the federal budget (if, for instance, its own tax revenues are small).  
                                                           
10 For example, in Kalmykiya, one of the Russian republics in the Southern region, companies after registration 
paid a special “registration fee” to a so-called “Fund of Presidential Programs”. Even in the modern Russia, 
where  the  degree  of  federal  control  over  these  schemes  is  significantly  higher,  regional  governments  have 
enough opportunities to let the businesses “voluntary” pay for some regional projects, creating an additional tax, 
which is not covered by official statistics. 
11 Certainly, the variable can exceed one, if the region receives substantially more than it is able to generate. 10  
 
The second modification I apply looks at the retention rate for an “extended” regional 
budget, which includes not just regional budget as such, but also territorial off-budget funds: 
social security (pension, social insurance, unemployment and medical insurance) and other 
funds  (roads,  reproductions  of  natural  resources,  environment).  Most  of  these  funds 
mentioned were established by the federal law (though often providing regional governments 
with discretion as to whether they are willing to create a particular fund) and financed through 
mandatory contributions of the population (employers and employees) and businesses divided 
between territorial and “central” funds (although the latter than once again often provided 
additional funding to the territorial funds). This measure covers at least a fraction of the off-
budget fiscal flows in the Russian regions (although, of course, is unable to capture the “semi-
private” funds “affiliated” with the regional governors – for the latter, however, no reasonable 
statistical data is present). However, this indicator also suffers from two problems. First, once 
again, the degree of control over the financial flows added up in this variable by the regional 
government is very different – and partly even different from region to region (for example, 
for the territorial social security funds one once again faces the problem of the “capture” of a 
territorial federal agency by the regional administration). Second, the data for this “extended 
budget” is available just for one year in my sample (1999), thus creating a variety of questions 
regarding stability over time and compatibility to other indicators. I calculate the measure 
using the information reported by the East-West Institute (2001). 
The data of the East-West Institute (2001) also provides me with an opportunity to use 
a  fourth  indicator  of  the  fiscal  decentralization,  which  measures  the  expenditure 
decentralization.  Basically,  for  an  asymmetric  federal  design  variation  of  the  expenditure 
decentralization is often impossible to calculate: while we are aware of the particular territory 
the  tax  revenue  originated  from  (with  certain  caveats),  we  often  do  not  know  the  spatial 
allocation of the federal expenditures (and that is why an analogue of the “retention rate” for 
expenditures  is  impossible).  East-West  Institute  (2001)  calculates  the  so-called  “direct” 
federal  expenditures’  allocation  over  regions  for  1998  and  1999.  Then  the  measure  of 
expenditure decentralization I use is the share of regional expenditures in the sum of regional 
expenditures and “direct federal expenditures” for a particular territory; and I use the average 
over 1998-1999. This indicator is interesting, first, for the sake of completeness of the general 
argument, but also because it represents the “other side” of fiscal decentralization in Russia, 
which has been rarely studied before (although, for example, it is known that the allocation of 
expenditure and revenue authorities has been very different in Russia). A problem of this 
indicator  is  that,  first  of  all,  even  the  “direct”  expenditures  do  not  cover  all  federal 
expenditures: for example, we have little information about military expenditures, which are 11  
 
often quite important for some regions. Second, once again, I can use only a very short time 
period of two years. 
Regulatory decentralization: A unique advantage of the Russian dataset is that one 
can  use  a  specific  measure  for  the  regulatory  decentralization  encompassing  multiple 
dimensions of economic regulation. As already mentioned, the regional legislation in the late 
Yeltsin  period  included  a  large  number  of  significant  contradictions  to  the  federal  law. 
Although  the  federal  law  existed,  regional  courts  and  regional  police,  captured  by  local 
governments, usually enforced the local law – so, the federal acts simply did not matter for 
economic agents. After the start of the Putin’s presidency, one of the first steps of the new 
government was to revise the regional law in order to ensure the predominance of the federal 
legislation. As part of this effort, the Ministry of Justice established the so-called Federal 
Register (federal’nyi registr), or catalogue of regional acts (both of the legislatures and of 
executive bodies, but incorporating legal norms) in power at that moment. The acts included 
in  the  Register  should  pass  an  examination  by  the  expert  commission  established  by  the 
Ministry of Justice, which determines their compatibility with the federal law. As a result, a 
statement is published, which is then included in the file in the Federal Register as well. The 
acts contradicting federal law should be abolished or changed; however the file in the Register 
remains, even if the act is not valid any more. Although originally the Register was unable to 
cover all regional acts (a revision process certainly takes time), after several years one can be 
sure that most acts passed by the regions were included in the Register.  
The idea is to use the information on the number of acts contradicting the federal law 
as a proxy for the regulatory decentralization. In order to understand this variable, one should 
recall, that de-jure Russian Federation has been an extremely centralized political entity in 
terms of regulatory authorities, mostly vested in the central government. However, due to its 
weakness  regions  basically  received  the  option  to  “re-design”  the  federal  law  simply  by 
making own acts. Nevertheless, even in this situation ignoring federal law could result into 
punishments from the federal administration (for example, through a reduction of transfers). 
Hence, one can in fact treat the resulting share or number of “illegal laws” as an outcome of 
an implicit contract between the federal and the regional government, depending upon the 
preferences  of  the  regional  administrations  for  the  different  law  than  the  federal  one 
(whatever  could  be  driving  these  preferences)  and  the  costs  of  violating  the  federal  law 
(potential federal punishments). However, from this point of view the violations of the federal 
law  in  the  regional  law  seem  to  be  very  similar  to  the  traditional  notion  of  the 
decentralization, which represents an explicit contract between the regional and the federal 
governments.  If  this  contract  specifies  high  decentralization  (because  of  preference 12  
 
heterogeneity  and  costs  trade-off;  cf.  Congleton  et  al.,  2003),  it  implies  that  the  regional 
government  makes  different  law  than  the  federal  one  (of  course,  in  certain  settings  both 
governments produce exactly identical policies – but then the debate on decentralization is 
meaningless).  In  the  same  way,  through  the  implicit  contract  in  the  Russian  Federation 
determined  by  the  same  heterogeneity-costs  trade-offs  some  regions  should  have  “re-
designed” federal legislation to a greater extent: then high number of violations shows the 
regional policies are really different (and, in particular, “more different” than for regions with 
a small number of violations) from the federal standards. 
I use the Register statistics as published by the Ministry of Justice on December 31, 
2006  and  calculate  three  indicators.  To  start  with,  I  take  the  share  of  acts,  which  were 
assessed as contradicting the federal law, in the total number of acts for which an expert 
opinion is present (which is, as one should mention, smaller, than the overall number of acts 
included in the Register), as indicator of the degree of regulatory devolution achieved by a 
particular region. This measure is intuitive, but may, however, face two problems. First, it 
may be too small because of the acts passed after 2001 in the Putin’s period (when the war of 
laws was reduced significantly)  and included in the Register. A solution were to take an 
earlier date for the Register; but in this case one runs into a problem of potentially neglected 
“old” acts, which may still be under revision by the panels of experts. Second, it is possible 
that the acts are more likely to be passed in general if the region is willing to violate the 
federal law: if it does not desire it, it just remains silent over a certain area of regulation, 
which  is  then  covered  by  the  federal  acts.  Hence,  I  also  use  the  total  number  of  acts 
contradicting the federal law as a proxy for regulatory decentralization. As shown below, both 
values are significantly correlated, but it is still necessary to look at both to establish the 
robustness of the results. In addition, I also use a logarithm of the number of contradicting 
acts as a separate proxy. The advantage of the log is that I reduce the impact of strong outliers 
through a concave transformation.
12 
Certainly, this approach to measuring the regulatory decentralization could also be 
flawed. The indicator may be distorted by the fact, that federal controllers of the Ministry of 
Justice were not entirely impartial in terms of allocating their effort among regions (though a 
relatively late data of the Federal Register status employed here should guarantee that all 
regions have had enough time to be thoroughly controlled) and the decisions on compatibility 
                                                           
12 Using both total number of acts and log total number of acts is not interesting for establishing the correlation 
between indicators, but becomes more important for the analysis of driving forces of decentralization: for the log 
total number I have a continuous dependent variable and can apply OLS, while the total number is a count 
variable and requires a Poisson or a negative binomial estimator. Looking at both dependent variables separately 
ensures that I check the influence of the estimator used on the results. 13  
 
with the federal law. However, it still seems interesting to look at it given the lack of any 
econometric empirical evidence regarding regulatory decentralization in general and Russian 
“war of laws” in particular. 
Constitutional decentralization: The devolution at the constitutional level in Russia 
is, as usually, a relatively tricky part for an empirical study. The approach used in this paper 
combines two variables, constructed through the analysis of the text of legal acts. The first 
variable is based on the content of the regional constitutions passed by (almost all) Russian 
regions during the 1990s. The rules and norms of the regional constitution mostly refer to the 
authorities of the regional governments rather than policy actions and therefore are a better 
proxy for the constitutional-level institutions, as specified above.
13 Once again, the use of this 
indicator  relies  on  the  idea  of  an  implicit  contract:  specific  provisions  of  a  regional 
constitutions,  although  formally  passed  unilaterally  by  the  regional  parliaments,  de-facto 
depend upon the preference for higher political autonomy and potential costs of the “federal 
punishment” (which in this case at least once took an extreme form of military intervention 
for Chechnya). 
I use seven main dimensions of divergence in term of center-region relations for the 
republican constitutions (as they were valid in 1999) in order to construct the index. The 
dimensions include control over natural resources, right to sign international agreements, right 
to declare the state of emergency, restrictions on regional branches of federal government, 
independent monetary policy, restrictions on validity of the federal acts and special rules for 
the interbudgetary relations (Appendix A provides a detailed description of all dimensions).
14 
Naturally, many of these provisions have never been implemented in practice. But it is exactly 
what this paper intends to test: is there any relation between “higher autonomy” declared in 
the constitution and the outcomes of the decentralization process as measured by the fiscal 
and regulatory decentralization? I construct the index as follows: the region with respective 
provision  receives  1,  otherwise  0.  Hence,  the  index  may  vary  from  7  (all  provisions 
contradicting federal law implemented) to 0 (no provisions implemented). The components of 
                                                           
13 In the Soviet times, all union and autonomous republics already obtained a constitution, mostly built according 
to the same scheme. After the collapse of the USSR, most republics adopted new constitutions. Moreover, other 
regions (without the status of republics) also passed their articles (ustav). The constitutions were quite similar in 
terms of guarantees and rights declared to their citizens, with may be the only exception of the agricultural land 
private property.  However, they varied quite substantially in terms of the design of political system and also the 
distribution of power between the federal government and the region. 
14 The list is based on research in legal sciences, which, however, mostly focused on ethnic republics, and hence 
may be more accurate for the latter (see Zolotareva, 1999; Bartsiz, 2001) 14  
 
the index are reported in the Appendix A. The index is calculated for all Russian regions but 
Chechnya and Vladimir (which passed its “ustav” only in 2001).
15  
  Although the idea to look at an implicit contract could be interesting given the lack of 
data, for the Russian case the constitutional decentralization could also be studied using the 
“explicit contracts” made by the regional and the federal government through the power-
sharing agreements. There is a certain literature addressing this problem by examining the 
reasons for establishment and for the duration of power-sharing agreements (Dusseault et al., 
2005;  Söderlund,  2006;  Obydenkova,  2008).  Obviously,  the  existence  of  a  power-sharing 
agreement may be treated as an indicator for higher constitutional devolution. However, there 
is very little research looking at the content of the treaties (e.g. OECD, 2000; Crosston, 2004), 
although the differences between them were substantial.
16  
In  this  paper  I  have  made  an  attempt  to  provide  a  systematic  quantitative 
characterization of the power-sharing agreements. Specifically, all agreements are evaluated 
according  to  eleven  dimensions:  alternative  conscription  rules;  law  enforcement  and 
migration; power of pardon; monetary policy; control over the regional taxation and budget; 
control  over  the  natural  resources;  control  over  the  conversion  for  military  industries; 
international  relations,  trade  and  customs;  requirements  of  co-decisions  of  regional 
administrations  for  the  appointments  of  federal  bureaucrats  in  these  regions  and  priority 
treatments for specific regions in the federal law (see Appendix A for the discussion of the 
dimensions, as well as for the values of the indicator). For each dimension I assign the value 
of 0 (if it is not mentioned), 1 (if it is attributed to the joint responsibilities of the regions and 
the federal government) and 2 (if it is attributed to the unique responsibilities of the regional 
government), and then sum op over all eleven dimensions (hence, the indicator varies from 0 
to  22).  The  sample,  once  again,  excludes  Chechnya,  but  also  the  so-called  “autonomous 
okrugs”, since for these units establishing the exact power allocation under the treaty is more 
                                                           
15  For  this  variable  one  could  probably  treat  it  as  partly  overlapping  with  the  measure  of  the  regulatory 
decentralization developed so far. However, the constitution is but one act, so, unlikely to heavily influence the 
regulatory  decentralization  (with  usually  hundreds  or  thousands  of  violations);  on  the  other  hand,  regional 
constitutions  represent  to  a  greater  extent  how  decision-making  is  done  rather  than  individual  rules.  It  is 
interesting  though  that  the  only  relatively  robust  correlation  of  the  dimensions  of  decentralization  I  find  is 
between the index of regional constitutions and the regulatory decentralization. 
16 There are several reasons for that: first, the “observed” set of “main” power-sharing treaties represents just the 
top of an iceberg of numerous agreements between regional and federal agencies, which are often not published 
and not available for researchers. Second, power-sharing treaties are often much more region-specific, than the 
constitutions, and attempt to solve particular problem of, say, individual industries (for example, a special treaty 
on hop-growing or on military industry), population groups (kosaks), borders to particular neighbors (China, 
Kazakhstan) and environment (Chernobyl, Baikal). From this point of view the power-sharing treaties, in spite of 
their title, often include a lot of information on particular policies rather than decision-making: so, they are post-
constitutional in nature, and also very difficult to quantify and to compare. 15  
 
difficult.
17 I use the “main agreement” (which is always public), but at least attempt to utilize 
information from the “supplementary agreements” if they are available – certainly, however, 
fail to do so for many “hidden” acts, which have never been published. From this point of 
view regional constitutions index is superior (since the complete content of the constitution is 
publicly available).
18 
  To  conclude,  the  paper  was  able  to  obtain  nine  indicators  for  three  aspects  of 
decentralization in Russia. Four of them look at the fiscal decentralization; three are different 
modifications  of  the  regulatory  decentralization variable;  and  two  study  the  constitutional 
decentralization. It should be noted that the relation between variables for each dimension of 
decentralization is different. For the fiscal decentralization three variables are related to the 
revenue decentralization (and thus essentially attempt to measure the same thing): I treat the 
traditional retention rate as a “basic” variable and use two extensions. The fourth variable 
measures expenditure decentralization, although for a significantly shorter time period and 
with  strong  data  deficits  (and  hence  measure  a  different  aspect).  For  the  regulatory 
decentralization all three indicators are simply adjustments of the same basic variable. For the 
constitutional decentralization, finally, I look at two very different aspects of the allocation of 
authorities,  which  cannot  be  reduced  to  each  other.  All  variables  used  have  certain 
disadvantages, but the status of the data is still better than in most other cases, and hence one 
can  at  least  try  to  establish  statistical  regularities  in  terms  of  the  interrelation  between 
different aspects of decentralization. 
 
3.2. Interrelations of dimensions of decentralization 
The first problem to be considered in the framework of this paper is whether different 
dimensions  of  decentralization  are  related  to  each  other.  Table  1  reports  simple  pairwise 
correlations between nine indicators used in this paper for the full sample of regions. To start 
with,  I  find  significant  correlation  among  almost  all  pairs  of  indicators  of  fiscal 
decentralization and among the indicators of regulatory decentralization. The second result is 
not  really  surprising,  since  all  three  variables  are  based  on  the  same  data.  For  the  fiscal 
decentralization  the  results  are  more  interesting:  first,  the  retention  rate  is  significantly 
                                                           
17 Autonomous okrugs are a subgroup of Russian regions, which are simultaneously part of the federation and of 
other regions. Hence, the agreements signed were trilateral, and not bilateral, and the division of powers between 
autonomous okrugs and “their” higher-order regions was often not entirely clear (and in fact resulted into very 
different allocations in practice). 
18  However,  both  constitutional  decentralization  measures  are  also  not  free  of  problems.  The  constitutions 
discussed rarely address directly the issues of fiscal and regulatory decentralization; the index applied is rather 
an indirect measure. In the same way, the rules of power-sharing treaties for fiscal and regulatory matters are 
often difficult to interpret; in many cases my interpretation (as it is specified in the Appendix A) is not entirely 
unquestionable (as it is, probably, always the case with quantifying legal acts).  16  
 
positively  correlated with both other proxies of the revenue decentralization (this is good 
news, since in this case the measurement problems for each of the indicators could be small 
enough – although all variables face problems, these are, as demonstrated, different problems 
associated with (also) different advantages) and with the expenditure decentralization. The 
expenditure decentralization, however, exhibits negative correlation with the retention rate 
including transfers. The key driving force seems to be transfers, which, as I will show, are 
negatively correlated with expenditure decentralization. Both dimensions of the constitutional 
decentralization are not correlated: so, the motivation for changing the regional constitutions 
and for drafting the power-sharing treaties was different.
19  
Now consider the correlation across various dimensions of decentralization. Since I 
have  a  multitude  of  alternative  variables  measuring  essentially  the  same  aspect  of 
decentralization,  I  will  usually  focus  on  what  I  will  refer  to  as  robust  results:  when  the 
correlation exists regardless of how one measures, say, regulatory or fiscal decentralization 
(so, the correlation between regulatory  and fiscal decentralization is robust if one finds a 
significant correlation between each measure of the fiscal decentralization (at least the three 
measures  of  the  revenue  decentralization)  and  each  measure  of  the  regulatory 
decentralization). The results of the Table 1 are striking. The retention rate is not correlated 
with  any  of  the  constitutional  or  regulatory  decentralization  measures.  For  three  other 
variables one does find correlation with individual indicators of regulatory decentralization in 
several (rare) cases, but it is never robust. None of the variables of the fiscal decentralization 
is  correlated  with  the  index  of  regional  constitutions;  there  is  some  correlation  with  the 
power-sharing treaties, but, once again, not robust to the indicator of fiscal decentralization 
used. For the interrelation between constitutional and regulatory decentralization, however, 
the situation is different: one finds that all three proxies of regulatory decentralization are 







                                                           
19 If one looks at the correlation of the index of power-sharing treaties and of constitutions just for the subsample 
of regions with power-sharing treaties, the correlation is still not significant. 
20  Only  the  share  of  contradicting  acts  is  significantly  correlated  with  both  aspects  of  the  constitutional 
decentralization – however, the signs of the correlation coefficients are different: while the number of violations 
seems to be larger in regions with higher autonomy in their constitutions, it is smaller in regions with more 
“advanced” power-sharing treaties. The simplest explanation is that if power-sharing treaty is advanced enough, 
there is no need to violate the federal law: one has enough free space for own decisions. However, in reality 
things are more difficult: when the Putin’s commission evaluated the content of the acts, they often ignored the 
treaties and looked just at the federal law. 17  
 
Table 1: Correlation matrix: aspects of decentralization 
  Fiscal decentralization  Regulatory decentralization 
Constitutional 
decentralization 
  Revenue 
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Notes: p-values in parentheses. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
Significant results are marked bold.  
 
 
So, the main result so far is that regional constitutions and contradictions to the federal 
law could be driven by a similar logic, while it is unlikely for the fiscal decentralization and 
the power-sharing treaties design. However, the approach used has been too simplistic in two 
aspects, which should be explored in what follows. First, it ignores the existence of outliers. It 
is possible that the absence of correlation I have observed is caused just by few influential 
observations,  which  perform  differently  than  the  rest  of  the  Russian  Federation.  On  the 
opposite, the observed correlation can be driven by the presence of a small group of regions. 
The  simple  “eyeball  econometrics”  from  the  correlation  graphs  suggests  that  outliers 
sometimes do play a role, but not necessarily. For example, consider the retention rate as my 
“main”  proxy  for  the  fiscal  decentralization.  Excluding  four  outliers  -  regions  Ingushetia, 
Kalmykiya, Altai Republic and Taimyr from the sample, one obtains strong and significant 
positive correlation between fiscal and regulatory (share) decentralization (see Figure 1).
21 
For  the  regulatory  decentralization  measured  by  number  of  negative  conclusions  of  the 
                                                           
21 Three regions  mentioned belong to the  so-called  “tax havens”, i.e. regions pursuing  an internal offshore 
strategy in order to attract capital, partly due to abovementioned special regulations. Taimyr is a difficult case 
from the point of view of the fiscal decentralization; the tax revenue is strongly dependent upon the activity of 
the largest company, Norilski Nikel, which has actively implemented tax optimization schemes (for example, in 
2000 and 2001 the activity of this company from the point of view of VAT optimization effectively led to 
negative tax revenue of the regional budget). Note that just excluding Taimyr and Ingushetiya is not enough to 
obtain correlation. 18  
 
experts of the Ministry of Justice, the result is robust to outliers. On the opposite, if one looks 
at the correlation between the regulatory (share) and constitutional (regional constitutions) 
decentralization, the observed correlation is almost exclusively driven by a small subset of six 
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Figure 1: Correlation of fiscal decentralization (retention rate) and regulatory decentralization; 
red line – total sample, green line – excluding four outliers 
 
 
Figure 2:  Correlation of constitutional decentralization (regional constitutions) and regulatory 
decentralization; red line – total sample, green line – excluding republics 
 
However, this approach is too ad-hoc for a systematic analysis. Hence, in what follows 
I have looked at the correlation matrices for three particular samples. First, I have excluded all 
ethnic republics. The reason is that the devolution of ethnic republics is very much driven by 
their past status (which has been reinforced by their special role in the negotiations between 
the president and the parliament in Russia in the early 1990s), thus if the correlation (or 
absence  thereof)  is  determined  by  the  ethnic  republics,  the  results  is  most  difficult  to 
generalize and could just represent the special Russian experience (the problem of external 
validity of this study). Second, I have excluded several “outlier regions”: Ingushetia and all 
autonomous okrugs with the exception of Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets. The reason is 
that these territories usually exhibited a less developed government structure than other parts 
of Russia. For Ingushetia its special situation is driven by the proximity to Chechnya (which, 
once again, is excluded from the sample anyway due to the lack of data). For the autonomous 
okrugs it is the combination of their subordinate status in the federation (for example, many 
acts passed by their “higher-order” regions are valid in autonomous okrugs as well) and very 
small population size. For two autonomous okrugs I do not treat as outliers (Khanty-Mansi 20  
 
and Yamalo-Nenets) the situation is different: they concentrate a dominant share of the oil 
and gas resources of Russia and were able to achieve higher autonomy from their “mother 
region” (Tyumen).
22 Third, I exclude “outlier regions” and republic simultaneously. 
The results of this experiment are reported in Tables A3-A5 in Appendix A. Excluding 
ethnic  republics  does  indeed  make  the  correlation  of  constitutional  and  regulatory 
decentralization insignificant.
23 On the other hand, the fiscal decentralization measured by the 
retention  rate  now  exhibits  correlation  with  individual  measures  of  regulatory  and 
constitutional decentralization, but the result is not robust across various indicators of each 
aspect. Excluding “outlier regions” does not influence the correlation between constitutional 
and  regulatory  decentralization,  but  provides  more  pairs  of  variables,  where  fiscal 
decentralization is correlated with other dimensions of decentralization (though still no robust 
results).
24 Finally, excluding “outlier regions” and republic simultaneously results in almost 
absent correlation between all dimensions of decentralization. 
Second,  I  also  look  at  the  conditional  correlations  controlling  for  a  set  of  other 
variables (Tables A6 and A7 in Appendix A). I start with controlling for the standard key 
socioeconomic and geographical characteristics of the region: population, average per capita 
income,  territory  and  educational  background  and  find  almost  no  robust  effect  on  the 
significance of the correlation coefficients. The situation changes, if one controls for three 
further variables: the legal status (dummy autonomous okrug and dummy republic) and the 
distance from Moscow. The use of the legal status is important because, as demonstrated 
above, excluding or including autonomous okrugs and republics does influence the results of 
the analysis. Distance from Moscow is an attempt to account for the spatial heterogeneity of 
Russia due to its large size (in terms of territory). In this case one finds no evidence of any 
correlation  across  different  dimensions  of  decentralization  whatsoever,  with  very  few 
exception of indicator pairs. 
To conclude, one could probably summarize the results obtained so far as follows. 
First, I do not find any significant correlation between the fiscal decentralization and two 
other dimensions of decentralization. This result changes depending upon the set of outliers 
and  of  variables  controlled  for  for  individual  indicators  of  the  fiscal  decentralization: 
                                                           
22 In addition, I also do not treat Chukotka as an outlier. Formally, Chukotka has the status of an autonomous 
okrug, however, unlike all other autonomous okrugs, it has no “mother region” it is subordinated to, and hence, 
it is more similar in its status to a standard region (oblast).  
23 If one just takes the sample of republics, there is also no correlation between autonomy in constitutions and 
regulatory  decentralization;  so,  the  effect  does  not  hold  in  both  subsamples  (republics  and  not  republics), 
although is present in the whole sample of regions. It should be noted that the evidence for the subsample of 
republics is very weak because of a small number of observations. 
24  For  the  retention  rate  including  transfers  I  once  again  observe  correlation  with  both  dimensions  of  the 
constitutional decentralization, which, however, has a different sign. 21  
 
however, the correlation, though sometimes present, is never robust in a sense that it exists 
regardless  of  how  I  measure  the  fiscal  decentralization  and  the  regulatory/constitutional 
decentralization. In particular, the correlation is more often (but not always) present for the 
share of contradicting acts than for the number of contradicting acts and for the index of 
power-sharing treaties than the index of constitutions. However, in the last case I observe, if 
any,  a  negative  correlation:  devolution  paths  seem  to  go  in  opposite  directions.  The 
correlation is also more likely to be observed if one drops autonomous okrugs and Ingushetiya 
– but even in this case no robust results are established. With respect to the regulatory and 
constitutional decentralization, I find significant and positive correlation between all measures 
of regulatory decentralization and the index of constitutions (but not of the power-sharing 
treaties), which is, however, driven just a small group of ethnic republics.  
 
4. Endogenous decentralization in Russia: data and empirical strategy 
4.1. Factors of decentralization 
  Although so far I have focused on measuring decentralization in Russia, the aim of 
this  exercise  is  to  empirically  identify  the  factors  determining  the  degree  of  devolution 
achieved by individual regions according to different dimensions. From this point of view it is 
necessary to find out the variables able to serve as proxies for the main theoretical factors 
influencing devolution. Simplifying a lot, one could probably distinguish among five main 
hypotheses regarding the process of decentralization. First, decentralization depends upon the 
trade-off between the preference heterogeneity (or other forms of heterogeneity, which may 
be easier to measure, like income) and the benefits from centralized public goods provision 
and insurance (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). For an asymmetric federation it basically implies 
that regions with higher “preference distance” from the rest of the country are likely to be 
more  decentralized.  Second,  federations  design  specific  redistribution  schemes  between 
regions, which may influence the resulting demand for decentralization (on both rule and 
policy level) (Buchanan and Faith, 1987). Third, decentralization may result from the rules 
(both  written  and  unwritten)  regulating  the  bargaining  process  between  the  federal 
government and the regions and from the relative bargaining power of the parties (Filippov et 
al., 2004). Fourth, political system (dictatorship vs. democracy; parliament vs. referendum; 
presidential vs. parliamentary republic) may be important for determining the structure of the 
decentralization (Feld et al., 2006). Fifth, outcome of decentralization could be impacted by 
the interest groups on the federal and the regional level (Ruta, 2007). One should, however, 
not forget that the decentralization could simply result from the persistence in policies and 
politics, and hence, be  an outcome of the  path dependence. Thus it is necessary for find 22  
 
variables  to  measure  all  factors  mentioned  above  in  the  particular  case  of  the  Russian 
asymmetric federalism. 
Bargaining power: First, it is reasonable to assume that the bargaining power is related 
to  the  region’s  economic  endowment.  I  apply  four  indicators  to  measure  these  factors: 
territory,  population,  average  income  per  capita  and  share  of  oil  and  gas  extraction 
(particularly important for Russia). The choice of variables seems to relatively straightforward 
given the economic structure of Russia and the availability of data. Second, bargaining power 
could come from the region’s ability to secede, which seems to play an important role in the 
design of the Russian federalism in the 1990s (Dombrovsky, 2006). This effect is captured by 
two variables: dummy for border region
25 and geographical distance between the regional 
capital and Moscow. Third, one more variable in this selection could be the share of urban 
population (higher bargaining power of metropolitan areas), which, however, may also reflect 
the preference heterogeneity. One should also notice that although oil and gas extraction is an 
important characteristic, it does not cover the whole variety of natural resources potentially 
used  in  the  bargaining  process:  for  example,  diamonds  (Sakha)  or  non-ferrous  metals 
(Taimyr) may also matter a lot. Unfortunately, the Russian statistical authority did not report 
the  overall  share  of  the  extracting  industry  until  mid-2000s.
26  However,  Vainberg  and 
Rybnikova (2006) summarize two other indicators for the resource endowment of Russian 
regions. The first one ranks all regions according to their coal, oil, gas and gold deposits. The 
second estimates the total value of the whole set of mineral deposits in the region based on the 
reports of the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources.
27  
Bargaining rules: The main problem for measuring this indicator is that Russia at least 
formally  is  characterized  by  a  uniform  political  system.  Nevertheless,  I  use  two  types  of 
proxies:  formal  status  of  the  region  –  dummy  for  republics  and  dummy  for  autonomous 
okrugs - and degree of tensions between the federal center and the region: the Russian Union 
of  Industrialists  and  Entrepreneurs  RUIE  index  of  tensions  is  applied  to  account  for  this 
                                                           
25 Specifically, I include two dummies for border regions at the former “internal” Soviet borders (dummy border 
region CIS) and at the “old” external Soviet borders. Former borders between Soviet republics are often more 
transparent and  subject to conflicts; in addition, border regions often influence (and are influenced) by the 
changes in the neighboring states (for example, Russian Northern Caucasus was partly involved in the conflict in 
Georgian Abkhazia). On the other hand, the ability of the central Russian government to influence the regimes 
established in the new independent states is often also different from that in relations to, say, China. Hence, one 
could expect regions at Soviet and post-Soviet borders to behave differently – as I will show, at least in one case 
it is indeed what one observes in the data. 
26 Moreover, share of extracting industry can be misleading: if a very small region is dominated by the extracting 
industry of a not really important commodity, the indicator is high, but the bargaining power is low. That is why 
I look at the share of oil and gas in the total Russian output rather than on the share in the regional economy. 
27 Both indicators are labeled in what follows “Resources I” and “Resources II” and are highly correlated. 23  
 
effect.  Moreover,  I  test  the  results  for  robustness  applying  a  different  index  of  tensions 
developed by MFK Renaissance.  
Preferences: In a semi-authoritarian country like Russia in the 1990s the impact of 
public preferences may be significant, but should not be over-estimated. Gel’man and Popova 
(2003) describe the differences of preferences in terms of a “market for symbolic goods”, 
where regional governments act as the “supply side” and play the crucial role. I use two 
variables to measure potential differences in preferences: (1) the preference difference could 
result from the ethnic composition of the region, which is measured by the share of ethnically 
Russian population
28 and (2) the “distance” of the average income per capita in the region 
from the average over the whole Russian Federation. 
Political institutions: Since Russian regions are characterized by a wide variety of 
political arrangements, it is also reasonable to look at the specifics of the regional politics. I 
apply two indicators: the level of democracy, estimated by an index of Carnegie Center, and 
the  power  concentration  within  the  office  of  the  regional  governors  (using  the  index  of 
Jarocinska, 2004). As a robustness check I looked at two alternative indices of powe reported 
by the RUIE and the Urban Institute respectively. 
Redistribution: The most obvious way to capture this effect is to include a measure of 
the federal transfers in the regressions, though one, once again, could run into significant 
endogeneity problem. 
Lobbying  is  measured  by  the  index  of  regulatory  capture,  developed  by  Slinko, 
Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2005). In addition, I use a number of further variables potentially 
related  to  the  lobbying  activity  and  to  the  instruments  used  by  influential  actors.  First,  I 
control for the industrial concentration in the region, assuming that if it is high, so is the 
power of the interest groups. Second, I apply two indicators of corruption developed by the 
Transparency International in cooperation with INDEM measuring, first, the perception of 
corruption in the regions, and then the actual level of corruption estimated by INDEM.
29  
                                                           
28 For the Russian Federation this indicator makes more sense than, say, religion or language. First, in Russia the 
ethnic identification is very important, partly because it was enforced through the government for the last eight 
decades – from the establishment of national republics by the Communist Party to the requirements to put ethnic 
origin (‘nacional’nost’) in passports abolished only recently. Second, religious and linguistic self-identification is 
usually  highly  correlated  with  ethnicity  (of  course,  there  are  deeper  differences  like  more  or  less  “active” 
participation  in  the  religious  affairs,  or  degree  of  command  of  a  language,  but  they  are  also  much  more 
problematic to measure). 
29 Although corruption is certainly likely to be important factor influencing the decentralization patterns, the 
TI/INDEM measure has two shortcomings. First, it was estimated in 2002, i.e. after the period of observation 
and the first wave of Putin reforms, which could have influenced the structure of political relations in the region. 
Second, it is available just for 40 regions, i.e. less than a half of my sample and probably too few regions to 
achieve robust econometric evidence. 24  
 
Path dependence could be most simply measured by the status of the region (for the 
period of the mature Russian federalism after adoption of the constitution in 1993). Hence, 
significant  results  for  dummy  republic  and  dummy  autonomous  region  have  a  double 
interpretation in terms of rules of bargaining and path dependence. However, for this study I 
use a specific indicator of the declarations of regional elites (based on the event count by 
Dowley (1998) for the early 1990s
30). The declarations of the first year of independence seem 
to be a good proxy for the orientation of regional elites, which could be preserved in the 
future. 
The variables of bargaining power, bargaining rules and preferences are expected to 
have a positive sign, i.e. increase the degree of devolution; the variables of redistribution, on 
the contrary, should have a negative sign, decreasing the desire of the region to achieve higher 
autonomy. It is more difficult to make predictions for political institutions and lobbying, since 
the  literature  is  inconclusive.  Moreover,  the  path  dependence  variable  is  likely  to  have  a 
positive sign, since the active declarations of the regions in the early 1990s could in fact map 
into higher devolution. Details on the variables are reported in Appendix A. 
One can immediately see that this broad selection of variables faces three problems: 
multicollinearity, endogeneity and measurement error. On the one hand, many of the variables 
are  highly  correlated  with  each  other,  partly  by  construction  (i.e.  power  indices  include 
natural resources etc.). The problem of collinearity is especially important for the income per 
capita and distance from the average income per capita (although one should notice, that the 
second is not a linear transformation of the first; so, collinearity is not perfect). It is also acute 
for  dummies  republic  /  autonomous  region  and  share  of  Russians  (since  the  autonomous 
territories are in fact per construction of the Soviet territorial design regions where the share 
of Russians is usually smaller). However, it is not restricted to these variables. 
The  endogeneity  problem  is  always  present  in  the  research  on  determinants  of 
decentralization. For Russia the situation is ambiguous. On the one hand, one can disregard 
several  “traditional”  dimensions  of  endogeneity  like  mobility  of  population  (as  a  factor 
influencing both ethnic composition and population size), partly because of the short time 
horizon  of  the  analysis,  but  partly  because  of  Russian  specifics  (like  low  population 
migration).  However,  there  are  also  dimensions  where  endogeneity  may  be  of  greater 
                                                           
30 This variable does not represent the current power and aspirations of governor, first, because of the time lag, 
and second, because of the shift to less public political environment in the second half of the 1990s (as opposed 
to the early period of Russian independence). 25  
 
importance. For example, retention rates obviously depend on federal transfers, if one takes 
the effect on tax effort into account.
31  
Finally, measurement errors are particularly important for what one may call “expert 
opinion” variables: democracy, tensions, regulatory capture, declarations of regional elites, 
Transparency International corruption measures, but also the industrial concentration and both 
additional “resources variables” of Vainberg and Rybnikova (2006) – although the latter do 
measure more “tangible” objects, they still are at least partly based on the expert evaluation, 
which can be disputed. One should notice that “expert opinion” variables are particularly 
problematic from the point of view of endogeneity and multicollinearity problems as well.  
 
4.2. Econometric strategy 
I attempt to partly fix these problems by using the following procedure. In the first 
step  I  estimate  the  “basic”  specification,  which  does  not  include  the  “expert  opinion” 
variables. Since most decentralization indicators do not vary over time, I estimate a cross-
section for 88 Russian regions (i.e. all regions including Chechnya) and average time-varying 
variables  over  1995-1999.
32  The  choice  of  the  period  is,  as  already  mentioned, 
straightforward:  the  reforms  of  1994  established  the  basic  structure  of  modern  Russian 
federalism, and in 2000 the reforms of Putin significantly reduced the ability of regions for 
asymmetric  devolution  (for  example,  the  regional  legislation  and  constitutions  were 
standardized according to the federal law).  
For all fiscal decentralization variables and the share and the log number of negative 
conclusions as indicators of regulatory decentralization the simple OLS could be applied. The 
number  of  negative  conclusions  is  a  count  variable,  and  hence  a  Poisson  or  a  negative 
binomial model should be applied. Because the data are characterized by overdispersion, I 
estimate the negative binomial model (although I have also estimated the Poisson model and 
did not find any significant differences). Index of regional constitutions is measured by a 
discrete  ordered  variable.  A  usual  approach  to  estimate  is  the  ordered  logit;  I  check  for 
proportional odds assumption, and if it is violated also estimate the generalized ordered logit, 
analyzing marginal effects at the mean.  Finally, for the index of power-sharing treaties I use 
tobit regressions, since the variable is censored from below (about half of the regions in the 
sample did not sign any reported treaties with the central government). 
                                                           
31 The problem may be even greater because of time-invariant dependent variables, which prevent me from 
exploiting  the  time  variation  of  controls.  In  several  cases  (constitutional  decentralization)  I  just  “fixed”  a 
particular moment in time, when the variables were measured, what is, of course, a huge simplification, which is 
unavoidable given the quality of data. 
32 If the dependent variable is available for a shorter period of time (expenditure decentralization, retention rate 
and off-budget funds), I, respectively, average the dependent variables over a shorter period of time. 26  
 
In order to solve the multicollinearity problem, I estimate two “basic” specifications 
for each dimension of decentralization: with distance from average income and with average 
income per capita. I also exclude the share of Russians at this stage, since it is highly collinear 
with dummy republic, in all regressions.
33 For the fiscal revenue decentralization indicators I 
also include two variables measuring the structure of the tax base, since the composition of 
tax revenue may as well have an impact on the outcome: volume of retail trade and net profits 
of the enterprises.
34 For the retention rate including transfers I exclude fiscal transfers from 
the set of covariates in order to avoid the “endogeneity by design”: i.e. when the same value is 
by construction influencing a covariate and the dependent variable. For the number and log 
number of negative conclusions I also control for the total number of acts in the Federal 
Register: it is possible that the regions with larger number of acts also have more negative 
conclusions.
35  
The next step aims to look at the measurement error and multicollinearity problems 
more closely. First, I re-estimate the regressions by adding the “expert opinion” variables one 
by one. Second, as a “limiting case” for this analysis I take a completely agnostic view on the 
validity of variables and theories and perform an extreme bounds analysis. At this stage I also 
introduce several “specific” variables, which are more difficult to interpret in terms of the 
theory,  but  can  be  relevant  given  the  quantitative  indicators  of  decentralization  I  have 
introduced in the paper; I also look at the impact of the “outlier regions”, as defined in the 
previous section (Ingushetiya and autonomous okrugs with the exception of Khanty Mansi 
and Yamalo Nenets) on the robustness of my results. 
The  third  step  of  the  analysis  finally  focuses  on  the  endogeneity  problem.  It  is 
important  to  notice,  that  an  unambiguous  solution  of  this  issue  is  hardly  possible  in  the 
framework of this study. First of all, there is no clear set of “hypothesis-driven” variables 
extended by a set of controls. In fact, almost all variables I use (with the exception of tax base 
variables for fiscal decentralization) are driven by hypotheses. Hence, however, one requires a 
                                                           
33 It is an interesting question whether it makes more sense to include share of Russians or dummies autonomous 
okrug and republic in the analysis. From the theoretical point of view share of Russians is easier to explain, 
because the link to the preference heterogeneity is obvious. However, for the Russian Federation it seems more 
suitable to focus on institutional variables. First, the effect of ethnic composition of the population on policies in 
the short run automatically goes through the specifics of political institutions - in this case, republican status. 
Second, since Russia is a semi-autocracy at best, public preferences may be less important than preferences of 
political elites – and for the latter republican status is very important (cf. Obydenkova, 2008). Finally, since the 
status of a republic was usually granted by the Soviet government (all current republics were either republics or 
autonomous oblast in the RSFSR), it is not subject to reverse causality problem at all. 
34 It should be noted that I take logs of population and retail trade (as well as number of total acts and total tax 
revenue in other specifications to be discussed in what follows) to reduce the impact of potential outliers through 
a concave transformation. 
35 I have also estimated regressions for the share of negative conclusions with this covariate, but did not find any 
difference from the reported results, while total number of acts was insignificant. Controlling for total number of 
conclusions (instead of acts in the Register) does not change the results.  27  
 
large list of instruments to achieve at least exact identification in the first stage – a task 
certainly  beyond  any  reasonable  research  exercise.  Moreover,  cross-sectional  data  with 
relatively small sample exacerbate the problem of low efficiency of IV estimator. Hence, what 
I am doing in what follows is in fact only a partial solution: I restrict my attention to results, 
which remain robust at the second step of the econometric strategy; therefore I ignore the 
problem of endogenous controls (the usual way to deal with this issue – exclusion of potential 
endogenous controls and analysis of robustness of results with and without them – is per 
construction performed at the second step). As I will show, most of the “suspicious” variables 
actually turn out to be insignificant, thus “resolving” me from the endogeneity problem, so, 
part of the problem disappears “by default” (although even then, as it will be discussed in 
greater  detail,  caution  may  be  necessary).  There  are  however  situations  when  two-stage 
estimation techniques are required. Of course, in this case the results are based on the “hope” 
that the omitted variable bias through the exclusion of endogenous controls and the bias from 
reverse causality from endogenous controls do not run in the same direction (and hence the 
results become not robust in these two settings). Anyway, the results of this paper in terms of 
endogeneity analysis should be treated with great caution.  
 
5. Endogenous decentralization in Russia: results 
5.1. Basic regressions 
  As the first step in the analysis I consider the “basic” specifications without “expert 
opinion” variables. The results are reported in Tables 2 (fiscal decentralization) and 3 (other 
aspects of decentralization). As usually, for the OLS specifications I check the distribution of 
residuals using the Jarque-Bera test; if it is significant, I exclude regions with large residuals 
until  the  test  becomes  insignificant  and  re-estimate  the  regressions.  A  reasonable 
interpretation  is  possible  only  for  results,  which  are  robust  to  this  modification.  In  what 
follows hence I refer to two types of outliers: (1) outliers determined through the Jarque-Bera 
test and (2) “outlier regions” set ex ante (autonomous okrugs and Ingushetiya). The former 
are troublesome because they make statistical inference problematic; the latter may cause 
problems because of their impact on the slope. In this paper I always specifically describe 
which “outliers” I am considering. 
There  are  several  results  interesting  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  theoretical 
predictions. Fiscal decentralization seems to be particularly driven by the bargaining factors, 
although their set is somewhat different for four variables considered. For the “basic” variable 
of  the  retention  rate  I  find  strong  and  positive  effect  of  the  distance  from  Moscow  and 
territory on the degree of autonomy achieved. Distance from Moscow is among few variables 28  
 
which matters for two of four measures of fiscal decentralization. If one looks at the retention 
rate including transfers, the degree of decentralization decreases if urbanization goes up. It 
may, however, reflect the fact that relatively poor regions (i.e. those with low urbanization) 
are major recipients of the federal grants – or, at least that in this case grants are too large as 
opposed to their own fiscal revenue (however income per capita and distance from average 
income are insignificant). There is no evidence that transfers flow mostly to metropolitan 
regions. For the retention rate including off-budget funds population seems to have a negative 
and significant impact on the degree of devolution, though hardly because of its role as a 
bargaining  power  factor:  the  size  of  population  is  important  for  social  security  funds 
contributions, and therefore the negative sign could just reflect the allocation of revenues 
between territorial and federal funds.  
Interestingly enough, I find a negative impact of both income per capita and distance 
from average income per capita on the degree of fiscal devolution (for the retention rate – 
although this result is not robust to outliers according to Jarque-Bera test - and the retention 
rate including off-budget funds). The results for the income per capita seem to contradict the 
common prediction of the literature on cross-national comparisons, where richer countries are 
also more likely to be decentralized.  However, it is similar to that reported by Freinkman and 
Plekhanov (2009) for the decentralization within Russian regions (i.e. for municipalities) and 
could be explained, as in that paper, by an analogue to the Popitz’ law: rich jurisdictions seem 
to  have  stronger  demand  for  large-scale  public  goods  programs  provided  by  the  federal 
administration. It is possible to suggest a “bargaining power” explanation as well: the desire 
of the federal government to control rich regions and to limit their autonomy – logic similar to 
the appointment policy of the Chinese government (see Sheng, 2007). Regarding the distance 
from average income per capita, the story is more interesting: my results suggest that regions 
with  higher  preference  distance  are  likely  to  have  lower  retention  rates.  One  possible 
interpretation  could  be  that  not  only  the  size  of  the  distance,  but  also  its  sign  matters: 
relatively poor and relatively rich regions have different expectations towards federation (for 
example, for poor regions lower retention rates may be associated with expectation of higher 
redistribution through the federation).
36  
For the expenditure decentralization three variables seem to matter. First, it decreases 
with higher fiscal transfers. This observation is interesting (although very likely to be subject 
to the endogeneity problems): it indicates that federal transfers to the regional budgets and 
                                                           
36 Replacing the measure of distance by the simple difference between average income in the federation and the 
regional  income  once  again  negative  and  significant  result  –  as  one  could  expect,  since  it  is  just  a  linear 
transformation of income per capita. 29  
 
“direct  expenditures”  are  positively  correlated.  Hence,  the  federal  government  uses  both 
indirect financial flows to the regional budgets and own spending in order to redistribute 
financial  resources  in  favor  of  the  same  regions.  Second,  expenditure  decentralization  is 
higher for regions with substantial oil and gas resources (also because for this regions it is 
feasible to increase its own spending) and for autonomous okrugs (they partly often have 
significant natural resources, which are incompletely captured by the oil and gas variable, – 
like ferrous metals in Taimyr - but partly just seem to receive only limited attention  of the 
federal government resulting in smaller federal expenditures – like the smaller Ust Ordyn 
Buriatski, Koriakski and Aginsk Buriatski autonomous okrugs). 
If one looks at two other dimensions of decentralization (Table 3), the strongest effect 
observed for all dependent variables is that republics are on average able to achieve higher 
degree of devolution. This is consistent with the existing literature on Russian devolution and 
can represent a strong and significant effect of the rules of bargaining / path dependence 
factors. It is worth noticing however that the dummy republic has never been significant for 
the fiscal decentralization – what is somewhat unexpected if one looks at the usual debates on 
Russian experience. Second, distance from Moscow is also significant and positive for almost 
all dependent variables, but it is partly non-robust to outliers according to Jarque-Bera test.
37 
For the constitutional decentralization  I  also find a positive and significant impact of the 
population.  For  the  power-sharing  treaties  urbanization  and  dummy  border  region  for  the 
“new”  post-Soviet  borders  are  significant.  While  for  urbanization  the  result  could  indeed 
reflect  stronger  preference  heterogeneity  and  bargaining  power  of  urbanized  regions  (for 
example, the City of Moscow, which has a relatively high score), dummy border region CIS is 
more unusual – particularly because the second dummy for the border regions at the “olds” 
Soviet  borders  is  insignificant  (and  even  has  a  different  sign).  It  could  be  driven  by  the 
regions in Northern Caucasus (i.e. at the Georgian border), which often have a high score in 
the  power-sharing  treaties  rating  (also  because  of  their  strong  involvement  in  the  very 
complicated international affairs in this region, which influences their bargaining position). 
Finally, for the regulatory decentralization I find strong significant positive impact of the 
number of total acts on the degree of devolution.
38  
                                                           
37 The reason could be the presence of Primorski krai – a region extremely far from Moscow (at the Pacific 
Ocean) with very high share of contradicting acts. This is a territory with a very specific “warlordist” political 
system (Kirkow, 1995) may have generated an over-proportionally high number of violations of federal law, but 
may  as  well  be  especially  “interesting”  for  federal  officials  of  the  early  Putin  period  responsible  for  the 
construction of the Federal Register. 
38 So, the regions, which pass more acts, also pass more acts violating the federal law. It is worth noticing that 
including the total number of acts may in fact influenced the outcomes of regression for other covariates: for 
example, number of acts issued is highly correlated with the population. 30  
 
Let me summarize the findings obtained at this stage. To start with, there is just one 
variable  relevant  simultaneously  for  all  three  dimensions  of  decentralization,  which  is 
distance from Moscow (that is, ignoring its non-robustness to outliers according to the Jarque-
Bera test for the regulatory decentralization). Second, for the regulatory and the constitutional 
decentralization dummy republic is a strong predictor for the level of devolution: it does not, 
however, matter for the fiscal decentralization. All other variables are either relevant just for 
one dimensions (or, usually, one measure of a particular dimension) of decentralization, or 
(like population) have different signs for fiscal and constitutional decentralization. What I 
find is therefore that there seem to be significant differences in terms of driving forces for the 
three aspects of decentralization studied in this paper.  It corroborates  and strengthens the 
result reported in the previous section of the paper. 31  
 
Table 2: Determinants of fiscal decentralization, 1995-1999 








































Territory  0.037**  0.033**  -0.084  -0.075  0.014  0.014  0.041  0.040 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.060)  (0.057)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Population  -0.113  -0.082  -0.047  -0.021  0.008  0.008  -0.166*  -0.156** 
 
(0.079)  (0.061)  (0.281)  (0.236)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.088)  (0.073) 
Oil and gas  0.099  0.102  -0.418  -0.487*  0.120***  0.129***  -0.130  -0.123 
 
(0.098)  (0.092)  (0.266)  (0.272)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.098)  (0.097) 
Income per capita  -0.088*    0.003    -0.002    -0.102**   
 
(0.049)    (0.168)    (0.010)    (0.046)   
Distance from average 
income    -0.094**    0.068    -0.006    -0.120*** 
 
  (0.044)    (0.161)    (0.008)    (0.042) 
Dummy autonomous 
okrug  0.081  0.089  0.045  0.006  0.108***  0.112***  0.140  0.175 
 
(0.084)  (0.081)  (0.290)  (0.269)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.103)  (0.108) 
Dummy republic  0.040  0.042  0.125  0.110  0.030  0.031  0.075  0.080 
 
(0.028)  (0.028)  (0.128)  (0.125)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.052)  (0.050) 
Distance from Moscow  0.009**  0.007*  0.059***  0.058***  0.002  0.002  0.010  0.010 
 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Dummy border region 
non-CIS  -0.002  -0.000  -0.037  -0.032  -0.024  -0.024  -0.027  -0.035 
 
(0.031)  (0.031)  (0.137)  (0.138)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.049)  (0.049) 
Dummy border region 
CIS  0.004  0.005  0.042  0.041  -0.022  -0.023  0.016  0.015 
 
(0.024)  (0.023)  (0.091)  (0.090)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.039)  (0.036) 
Urbanization  0.912  0.682  -14.388**  -14.559***  -0.653  -0.611  3.126  3.421* 
 
(1.112)  (1.109)  (5.721)  (5.401)  (0.705)  (0.678)  (1.954)  (1.913) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.081  -0.019      -0.192***  -0.185***  -0.199  -0.153 
 
(0.125)  (0.126)      (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.154)  (0.152) 
Retail trade  0.096  0.073  -0.084  -0.106      0.131  0.123* 
 
(0.085)  (0.068)  (0.218)  (0.178)      (0.087)  (0.072) 
Net profit  -0.003*  -0.003*  0.008  0.007      0.000  0.000 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.007)      (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant  0.491***  0.497***  1.928***  1.959***  0.868***  0.863***  0.361*  0.265 
 
(0.127)  (0.116)  (0.423)  (0.366)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.204)  (0.210) 
Observations  88  88  88  88  88  88  88  88 
R
2  0.317  0.334  0.622  0.623  0.514  0.515  0.279  0.320 
J.-B. test  56.19***  42.72***  519.4***  492.8***  9.744***  9.997***  1.981  0.286 
Notes: for OLS, negative binomial and ordered logit – robust standard errors in parentheses; for tobit – robust standard errors 
in parentheses. * significance at 10% level, ** significance at 5% level, *** significance at 1% level. Significant results are 
marked bold. Outliers are: Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Altai Rep., Aginsk Buriat, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Taimyr, Vologda in 
regressions  (1)  and  (2);  Dagestan,  Ust  Ordyn  Buriatski,  Evenkia,  Tyva,  Kabardino-Balkaria  in  regressions  (3)  and  (4); 
Briansk, Rostov and Tula in regressions (5) and (6). After exclusion of outliers income per capita in regression (1) becomes 
insignificant, but holds its sign; distance from average income per capita in regression (2) becomes insignificant, but holds its 
sign; oil and gas in regression (4) becomes insignificant, but holds its sign. Outliers in notes to all tables refer to the outliers 
according to Jarque-Bera test 32  
 
 
Table 3: Determinants of regulatory and constitutional decentralization, 1995-1999 
 
Regulatory decentralization  Constitutional decentralization 








































Treaties  Treaties 
Territory  0.003  0.002  0.048  0.050  0.048  0.044  0.553  0.515  2.314  2.142 
 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.082)  (0.080)  (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.714)  (0.713)  (2.049)  (2.015) 
Population  0.003  0.004  0.064  0.065  0.073  0.079  0.877**  0.902***  2.686*  2.708* 
 
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.074)  (0.073)  (0.344)  (0.350)  (1.407)  (1.417) 
Oil and gas  0.022  0.021  0.433  0.523  0.376  0.396  -2.698  -2.837  -23.526  -24.087 
 
(0.046)  (0.044)  (0.647)  (0.654)  (0.424)  (0.413)  (1.687)  (1.754)  (17.413)  (17.452) 
Income per capita  -0.014    0.012    -0.053    -0.394    -1.544   
 
(0.012)    (0.138)    (0.105)    (0.363)    (2.144)   
Distance from 
average income    -0.014    -0.033    -0.073    -0.354 
  -1.377 
 
  (0.014)    (0.167)    (0.121)    (0.462) 
  (2.435) 
Dummy 
autonomous okrug  0.044  0.044  -0.122  -0.080  0.074  0.089  1.377  1.328 
   
 
(0.030)  (0.031)  (0.316)  (0.315)  (0.244)  (0.246)  (1.010)  (1.062) 
   
Dummy republic  0.050***  0.051***  0.503***  0.509***  0.498***  0.502***  2.253***  2.247***  5.951***  5.934*** 
 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.132)  (0.133)  (0.113)  (0.113)  (0.651)  (0.649)  (2.179)  (2.183) 
Distance from 
Moscow  0.006*  0.005  0.059**  0.060**  0.056***  0.054***  0.167*  0.151*  -0.106  -0.153 
 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.095)  (0.089)  (0.419)  (0.419) 
Dummy border 
region non-CIS  0.017  0.017  -0.043  -0.047  0.050  0.047  -0.456  -0.446  -0.502  -0.529 
 
(0.021)  (0.021)  (0.182)  (0.182)  (0.166)  (0.165)  (0.774)  (0.781)  (2.858)  (2.861) 
Dummy border 
region CIS  0.008  0.008  0.005  0.003  0.133  0.134  0.381  0.394  3.767*  3.771* 
 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.207)  (0.209)  (0.116)  (0.117)  (0.584)  (0.583)  (1.979)  (1.979) 
Urbanization  -0.674  -0.766  -7.795  -7.163  -4.184  -4.298  -18.316  -21.413  331.145***  313.394*** 
 
(0.470)  (0.466)  (5.655)  (5.158)  (4.226)  (4.085)  (20.027)  (20.321)  (108.111)  (100.419) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.010  0.002  0.188  0.211  0.246  0.311  -0.586  -0.272  -1.162  -0.405 
 
(0.040)  (0.041)  (0.427)  (0.431)  (0.382)  (0.390)  (2.081)  (2.047)  (8.280)  (8.563) 
Total acts      0.536***  0.552***  0.620***  0.625***         
 
    (0.179)  (0.178)  (0.183)  (0.181)     
   
Constant  0.125***  0.124***  1.330  1.173  0.509  0.448      -23.061***  -22.572*** 
 
(0.035)  (0.037)  (1.527)  (1.510)  (1.493)  (1.483)      (8.159)  (8.083) 
Observations  88  88  88  88  88  88  87  87  79  79 
R
2  0.401  0.400  0.276  0.276             
Pseudo R
2          0.040  0.040  0.101  0.101  0.085  0.086 
Wald Chi-stat          3728.92***  3728.937***         
LR proportional 
odds              68.34**  71.12**     
J.-B. test  45.25***  47.66***  1578***  1594***             
Notes: see Table 2. Outliers are Primorski in regressions (9) and (10), Saratov in regressions (11) and (12). After exclusion of 
outliers  distance  from  Moscow  in  regression  (9)  becomes  insignificant,  but  holds  its  sign.  Wald  Chi-stat  refers  to  the 
goodness-of-the-fit  test  for  the  Poisson  regression;  LR  proportional  odds  refers  to  the  test  for  the  proportional-odds 




The list of outliers according to Jarque-Bera test for the different dimensions of fiscal 
and  of  regulatory  decentralization  differs  dramatically:  while  for  the  regulatory 
decentralization the outliers are Saratov and Primorski krai, for the retention rate the list of 
outliers includes tax havens (like Altai Republic, Kalmykia or Ingushetia), several Siberian 
autonomous  regions  (Taimyr  and  Aginsk  Buriat),  as  well  as  republics  of  Tatarstan,  and 
Bashkortostan which received a special tax regime through a power-sharing agreement. For 
the  retention  rate  including  transfers  the  set  of  outliers  almost  exclusively  covers  poorer 
republics and autonomous okrugs, which are significant recipients of central transfers. For the 
expenditure decentralization the set of outliers consists mostly of some non-ethnic regions in 
Central Russia. Difference in the list of outliers may also confirm that the regulatory and 
fiscal  decentralization  (and  even  different  aspects  of  the  latter)  were  driven  by  different 
factors. 
Several robustness tests can be implemented at this stage. To start with, in the previous 
subsection I have shown that the results partly differ for the case when ethnic republics are 
included and when they are dropped. In order to check for this problem I have re-estimated 
the regressions for the set of Russian regions excluding ethnic republics and for the set of 
ethnic republics separately. The results are reported in Appendix B. Excluding ethnic republics 
produces several minor changes in the significance of the variables. However, one still can 
show that the only variable simultaneously affecting different dimensions of decentralization 
is the distance from Moscow. In addition, dummy border region for the “new” post-Soviet 
borders is significant for one of the retention rate variables and for the power-sharing treaty 
index, but in the first case it is not robust to outliers according to Jarque-Bera test. What is 
probably the most interesting finding for this sample is that territory has a significant and 
positive  impact  on  the  retention  rates  (as  above),  but  negative  and  significant  impact  on 
regional constitutions (the change is due to the fact that I have now excluded “huge” republics 
like Sakha, which is the largest region of Russia in terms of territory). It is possible to claim 
that  different  dimensions  of  decentralization  serve  as  “substitutes”  in  the  center-region 
bargaining. For example, implementing a less “aggressive” constitution is “rewarded” by a 
higher retention rate (i.e. tolerance to the manipulations with the tax collection). In the same 
way, urbanization is negative and significant for several fiscal decentralization indicators, but 34  
 
positive  and  significant  for  the  power-sharing  treaties  index,  suggesting  a  similar 
interpretation.
 39 
Second, I implement a number of adjustments to the basic specification.
40 I estimate 
all regressions including both distance from average income and average income per capita. 
In this case both variables are insignificant, probably because of the multicollinearity. So, the 
sign and significance of distance from average income and average income per capita is not 
robust. Then I have estimated regressions where both share of Russians and dummies republic 
/ autonomous okrug are included, and also those only with share of Russians. If the dummy 
republic  was  significant  and  positive  in  the  initial  specification,  after  it  is  dropped  and 
replaced by the share of Russians, the latter becomes significant and negative. If all three 
variables  are  included,  share  of  Russians  is  almost  never  significant  (although  dummy 
republic may remain significant – the exception is the power-sharing treaties index, where the 
situation is exactly the opposite). There are almost no changes in other results. Then I account 
for the fact that dependent variables in specifications (1) – (2) and (7)-(10) are bounded from 
above  by  performing  log-odds  transformation  (Log  (Variable  /  (1-  Variable))  and  re-
estimating the regressions.
41 Once again, almost nothing changes (just territory in regressions 
(7)-(8) becomes significant and positive).  
The final three modifications are based on using different estimation techniques. To 
start with, for the regional constitutions regression I was able to reject the proportional odds 
assumption, therefore using generalized ordered logit becomes necessary. For the marginal 
effects at the mean population and dummy republic are still significant and positive; one also 
finds a significant and positive effect of the dummy autonomous okrug and of territory. What 
is more interesting, however, that distance is now significant and negative – there is once 
again an indication of using different dimensions of decentralization as substitutes. Finally, 
fiscal  transfers  are  significant  and  positive,  suggesting  that  regions  with  high  autonomy 
incorporated  in  their  constitutions  also  received  large  federal  funding  (it  seems  to  be 
particularly  influenced  by  regions  like  Tatarstan,  Sakha  and  Bashkortostan,  which,  as 
mentioned, received a special federal funding program).   
                                                           
39 For the sample of republics the results are difficult to interpret, because the sample size is extremely small. For 
the  fiscal  decentralization  there  are  almost  no  significant  variables.  For  the  regulatory  and  constitutional 
decentralization there seems to be a strong impact of urbanization and of dummy CIS border region, which, 
however, once again has different signs for different dimensions of decentralization. Hence, in this case one also 
has some indication that different dimensions of decentralization serve as substitutes. 
40 The regressions are not reported, but can be made available on request. 
41  The  actual  retention  rate  including  off-budget  funds  sometimes  exceeds  one,  but  this  is  due  to  special 
situations for some territorial funds which received huge transfers from the central fund and is not a common 
case. 35  
 
Moreover, so far I have estimated just the cross-section for all dependent variables. 
For almost all measures of decentralization it is also the only approach possible, because the 
dependent variable does not vary over time. The situation is different for the “basic” measure 
of the fiscal decentralization (the retention rate), for which annual observations are available. 
Estimating panel data is problematic even in this case, since almost all “interesting” variables 
are  time-invariant  or  almost  time-invariant  (like  population  or  oil  and  gas  extraction). 
However, a fixed effects estimator could be highly advantageous to cope with the unobserved 
heterogeneity. Hence, as a robustness check I apply the approach suggested by Besley and 
Coate (2003): I estimate a two-way fixed effects panel data specification, including just time-
varying income per capita (or distance from average income), fiscal transfers, net profits and 
retail trade; then I predict the fixed effects and regress them (in a cross-section) on the time-
invariant and almost time-invariant variables: dummy republic, dummy border region CIS and 
non-CIS, territory, distance from Moscow, population, oil and gas and urbanization. In this 
estimation I find significant and positive impact of distance from Moscow and territory, as in 
the  basic  specification;  in  addition,  there  is  also  a  significant  and  negative  impact  of 
population.  Other  variables  are  insignificant.  Therefore  at  least  the  key  results  of  the 
regressions reported so far (for distance from Moscow, territory and dummy republic) survive 
the panel-data estimation. 
Finally, since the variables might be determined jointly, I also use the SURE approach 
for different combinations of OLS regressions.
42 Specifically, I estimate all possible pairs of 
regressions, where the first variable is a measure of the fiscal decentralization, and the second 
either share or log number of contradicting acts; each pair is estimated controlling for average 
income  per  capita  and  distance  from  average  income  per  capita.  Since  expenditure 
decentralization is in fact a different characteristic and not just another proxy for the retention 
rate, I also estimate systems of three equations, including one of the measures of revenue 
decentralization, expenditure decentralization and log number or share of contradicting acts, 
and also systems of two equations of a measure of a retention rate (or its two modifications) 
and the expenditure decentralization indicator. Overall I find almost no changes in the results 
of the regressions: territory for the retention rates often becomes insignificant, and distance 
from  Moscow  for  this  dependent  variable  is  also  sometimes  marginally  insignificant 
(especially if controlled for distance from average income). 
 
                                                           
42 For regressions, which are estimated by non-linear techniques looking at systems of equations is unreasonable; 
it is impossible to use linear- and non-linear models in one system, and reducing all models to linear form 
guarantees misspecification of at least one equation, and therefore, of the whole system. 36  
 
5.2. Expert opinion variables and EBA 
  The  next  step  of  my  analysis  is,  as  mentioned,  to  look  at  the  variations  of 
specifications of regressions, and also at potential impact of expert opinion variables. First, I 
estimate a set of regressions adding expert opinion variables to the covariates and also varying 
the set of controls. The results are reported in Appendix C. To start with, almost all results 
reported so far are robust to the variation of specifications and inclusion of expert opinion 
variable (although in some cases not in all specifications, as, for example, for distance from 
Moscow  in  the  retention  rate  regressions).  The  latter  are  mostly  insignificant.  There  are, 
however, several interesting exceptions, which should be discussed in what follows. 
1. For the retention rate I find a significant and negative impact of the Transparency 
International corruption indices on the level of decentralization. This observation is difficult 
to  interpret  because  of  an  extremely  small  sample  of  40  regions  and  potential  reverse 
causality, but it looks like higher corruption is at least correlated with lower decentralization. 
This is consistent with the Albornoz and Cabrales (2010), who claim that corruption is easier 
under  high  level  of  centralization  because  in  this  case  it  is  more  difficult  for  citizens  to 
identify the corrupt bureaucrats and politicians; it is also possible that in regions with low 
retention rates federal bureaucracy is more relevant than the regional one, and the ability of 
regional population to influence its development given a sophisticated hierarchy directed from 
Moscow is lower. The result is also present for the retention rate including off-budget funds. 
2. For the expenditure decentralization I find a strong positive impact of the industrial 
concentration. For the 1990s it is likely that the industrial structure was (still) inherited from 
the Soviet past, and therefore the reverse causality problem in this case is less likely. From the 
results  of  the  regressions  one  could  infer  that  powerful  regional  lobbies  support  stronger 
decentralization. It can however represent rather the increase of regional expenditures as such 
than the re-allocation of the structure of the expenditures: if the interest groups focus on 
influencing regional spending and the federal spending is kept constant, the results of the 
regression would hold. However, for other indicators of the lobbyists activity (like regulatory 
capture) no significant impact was observed. In a similar way, I find that stronger power of 
the  regional  governors  according  to  one  of  three  indicators  results  in  larger  expenditure 
decentralization; the result does not hold for other indicators of power. 
3. Regardless of the measure of the regulatory decentralization, there seems to exist a 
strong negative correlation between the level of tensions in the relations between the regional 
and the federal government and the regulatory decentralization. Once again, reverse causality 
is possible, but the result is surprising: one would probably expect the federal government to 
be more aggressive towards regions with higher number or share of violations of the federal 37  
 
law (or, on the contrary, conflicts should cause regions to violate federal law more actively). 
On the contrary, it looks like violating federal law is correlated with more “peaceful” relations 
with the federal government. In fact, this result could be interpreted as an indirect support of 
interpreting the results of the “war of laws” as an “implicit contract” between the center and 
the regions. Regions increase the number of violations only if they know that they are not 
“punished”  for  it  in  terms  of  stronger  conflicts  between  the  regional  and  the  federal 
government. This punishment, however, should take other forms than transfers (because fiscal 
transfers are mostly insignificant). 
4.  If  one  looks  at  the  retention  rate  including  off-budget  funds  and  the  index  of 
regional constitutions, there is a highly robust negative impact of democracy on the level of 
decentralization.
43 Once again, here I cannot exclude reverse causality, but even if interpreting 
the finding as simple correlation it looks like more democratic regions have been also more 
centralized in terms of center-region relations. For the off-budget funds, since the effect is not 
observed for the “standard” retention rate, the results could be related to the functioning of the 
territorial  funds.  One  possible  interpretation  is  that  non-democracies  are  more  likely  to 
establish control over territorial funds, therefore re-directing the overall revenue of the off-
budget funds on the territorial level. For the regional constitutions one could expect non-
democracies to be more likely to incorporate greater autonomy to ensure the stability of the 
regional regime from any federal intervention (since during the period studied in this paper 
federal political system was often more competitive that many regional autocracies). 
5. For the index of power-sharing treaties I find significant and positive impact of 
declarations  of  regional  elites.
44  In  this  case  one  can  exclude  the  reverse  causality  by 
construction  (most  of  the  treaties  were  signed  in  the  second  half  of  the  1990s,  while 
declarations measure the activity of the regional governors in the early 1990s); the result 
seems to at least partly explain the reasons for absent correlation between the constitutional 
and post-constitutional decentralization observed in this paper. It is possible that the actions at 
the level of power-sharing treaties were rather designed as “symbolic claims” of the regional 
governors never intended to influence the real political decisions. This is an interesting aspect, 
which is worth analyzing if one looks at the constitutional allocation of authorities in general: 
setting  particular  rights  and  obligations  of  the  regional  government  the  basic  acts  of  the 
federations could rather transfer a “symbolic statement” of the relevance of the regional level 
than indeed empower it with real decision-making authorities. 
                                                           
43 The result for the index of regional constitutions is also present in the generalized ordered logit estimations. 
44 It is interesting to notice that the tensions are insignificant, although these variables by construction take the 
existence of a power-sharing treaty into account. This is once again an important indicator that looking just at the 
existence or the duration of the power-sharing treaties may not be enough. 38  
 
In addition, I also look at two further modifications of the set of controls (Appendix 
D). To start with, I include education in the set of covariates. The impact of the education 
(measured  by  the  share  of  population  with  university  degrees  or  incomplete  university 
education – this is a reasonable approach for Russia, where high school is mandatory) can be 
related to two factors. First, it can be interpreted as yet another “preference heterogeneity” 
variable:  higher  education  then  should  result  in  stronger  demand  for  decentralization. 
However, even more important is to recognize that implementing many tools of “de-facto” 
decentralization like violations of federal law depends not just on the position of the federal 
government, but also is influenced by the attitude of the population. If people have better 
education,  they  can  be  more  difficult  to  “fool”  by  the  regional  bureaucrats.  In  addition, 
violations in acts can also be a simple result of mistakes, and in this case human capital of the 
bureaucracy is crucial. So, one has two potentially contradicting effects, and in the regressions 
I include the level of education and its square, and, indeed, find a non-linear relation between 
decentralization  and  education  for  various  dimensions  of  decentralization.
45  Generally 
speaking, the results suggest that increasing the level of education first results in a reduction 
of the level of decentralization; however, once the educational background of the population 
is  good  enough,  the  effect  is  reversed.  Nevertheless,  interpreting  this  result  requires 
significant caution: the “upward arm” of the parabola includes just a small number of regions 
with very high share of university education. So, for the lion’s share of the sample education 
does reduce the level of decentralization.
46 It cannot be explained just by the difficulty to 
“fool” people with regional acts, because the effect is also observed for (some dimensions of) 
the fiscal decentralization (although probably for a higher education level of the taxpayers 
manipulating tax collection also becomes more problematic for the tax authorities).  
The second modification replaces the income per capita by the (log of the) overall tax 
revenue in a region. Income per capita is obviously endogenous, also because the variable 
includes transfers. On the other hand, in many cases the debate over decentralization was 
concentrated on the re-allocation of the tax revenue and the power asymmetry between the 
donor and the recipient regions in the Russian fiscal equalization scheme. However, the tax 
revenue variable can also cause some problems: particularly because it depends upon the tax 
                                                           
45 Once again, since education is (still) mostly determined by the Soviet past, one can exclude reverse causality. 
Generally speaking, almost all other results hold when including education (although regressions become highly 
susceptible to outliers according to Jarque-Bera test). 
46 The small group of regions with high overall education level is also very heterogeneous: it includes Moscow 
and St. Petersburg – the traditional centers of university education and studies in Russia – but also Northern 
Ossetia, where proliferation of higher education can be explained by a high level of corruption in the university 
system of Northern Caucasus, effectively turning many local universities in “diploma mills”. This reflects also a 
general  problem  of  the  variable  of  education  used  in  the  inter-regional  comparison  for  Russia:  identical 
university degree can be associated with very different level of human capital. 39  
 
effort of the regional tax authorities (officially controlled by the federal administration, but 
de-facto often captured by the regional governments). In this case the size of the tax collection 
is endogenous to the marginal retention rate (Weingast, 2009). The results of the estimations 
are reported in Appendix D. The overall fiscal revenue is indeed significant for five of nine 
measures of decentralization: however, the sign of the coefficient is negative for the fiscal 
decentralization and positive for the regulatory decentralization. So, once again, there is some 
evidence  that  similar  factors  cause  the  opposite  effects  for  different  dimensions  of  the 
decentralization, which could then serve as substitutes in bargaining. The positive relation for 
the regulatory decentralization seems to be relatively simple to explain: tax revenue is in fact 
one of the bargaining power variables, and from this perspective strengthens the position of 
the donor regions in the negotiations. The situation is different for the fiscal decentralization: 
one possible interpretation could be that the federal government puts more effort to prevent 
capturing the tax authorities in regions generating significant fiscal flows – however, this 
interpretation is very much speculative and difficult to support by empirical evidence. 
Given the fact than many effects observed seem to depend on the set of covariates, I 
turn to a more formal way to approach the problem of robustness of specifications, which 
becomes  crucial  in  a  small  sample  environment,  by  implementing  the  extreme  bounds 
analysis. Once again, this method has its merits and demerits. On the one hand, it is a more 
systematic analysis of effect of specification on estimation outcomes. However, on the other 
hand, while so far my selection of specifications was at least partly driven by the structure of 
the theories, the EBA simply looks at all possible combinations of regressors. Theoretically, it 
is possible that the “true” result is reflected just by one specification, which is “lost” in the 
endless combinations of EBA. Hence, it is important to interpret the results of EBA in a 
conservative fashion: while they are unlikely to give evidence against the influence of certain 
parameters  on  decentralization,  if  the  covariates  survive  the  EBA,  it  provides  additional 
argument in favor of the influence. 
This paper uses two versions of EBA. The original suggestion of Levine and Renelt 
(1992) was to estimate the upper and the lower bounds by taking all possible combinations of 
regressors and to look at the smallest estimate minus two standard errors and at the largest 
estimate plus two standard errors. If the null is within the interval formed by the upper and the 
lower bounds, the impact is not robust. Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes a less extreme version 
of  the  approach,  considering  the  entire  distribution  of  the  coefficient.  In  this  case  the 
coefficient is robust if the CDF(0) statistics is sufficiently high. Most applications of the EBA 
in the literature assume some variables to be present in all regressions (mostly because of the 
theoretical  results  or  research  traditions)  and  vary  the  rest.  The  literature  on  endogenous 40  
 
decentralization  is  too  young  to  develop  similar  assumptions.  So,  I  take  all  possible 
combinations  for  all  possible  variables  (from  bivariate  regression  to  regression  with  all 
possible covariates). Unfortunately, in this setting the multicollinearity can impose very high 
volatility of coefficients over regressions; however, there is no better theoretically motivated 
alternative.  
The EBA is performed for usually 22 variables: territory, population, share of oil and 
gas, income per capita, distance from average income, dummy autonomous okrug (dropped 
from  the  EBA  for  index  of  power-sharing  treaties)  and  dummy  republic,  education  and 
education squared (always included simultaneously), dummy border region CIS and non-CIS, 
tax revenue, industrial concentration, one of the additional resource variables (including both 
of them is meaningless since they are highly correlated), distance from Moscow, urbanization, 
fiscal  transfers  (dropped  from  regressions  for  EBA  for  retention  rate  including  transfers), 
tensions (RUIE), power (Jarocinska), democracy, declarations and regulatory capture:
47 Since 
industrial concentration and resources are not reported for autonomous okrugs, number of 
regressions estimated is different for different variables and in fact regressions include from 1 
to  21  covariates  (because  22  covariates  would  mean  simultaneously  including  dummy 
autonomous  okrug  and  industrial  concentration  –  and  in  this  specification  dummy 
autonomous  okrug  is  dropped  because  of  the  lack  of  observations).  As  a  robust  result  I 
consider only variables with CDF(0) > .95 as in Sala-i-Martin (1997). Then I estimate the 
regressions  for  the  determinants  of  the  decentralization,  using  only  robust  variables:  only 
those of them which remain significant could be claimed to have finally “passed the test”. 
The results are reported in Table 4. From the point of view of the original Levine and 
Renelt approach, there is not a single variable with both upper and lower bounds strictly 
larger (or smaller) zero. This is hardly surprising and quite typical for empirical research. 
However, the Sala-i-Martin approach yields some robust variables, mostly identical to those 
reported above. For different dimensions of fiscal decentralization the most robust variables 
seems to be tax revenue. Distance from Moscow and territory for the retention rate, distance 
from Moscow for the retention rate including transfers, industrial concentration and fiscal 
transfers  for  the  expenditure  decentralization  also  remain  robust.  For  the  regulatory 
decentralization robust variables are, once again, dummy republic and distance from Moscow. 
Finally, for both dimensions of the constitutional decentralization the set of robust variables is 
very different: it includes dummy republic, oil and gas and population for the constitutions 
                                                           
47 Unfortunately, I cannot include the Transparency International indicators, because the sample size is in this 
case  too  small  and  the  results  will  be  inconsistent  with  other  regressions  estimated  throughout  the  EBA 
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and  urbanization  and  declarations  for  the  power-sharing  treaties.  Thus,  almost  all  results 
discussed in Tables 2 and 3 so far seem to survive the EBA. Total tax revenue is also often 
robust, as are several expert opinion variables; education, however, is not robust. 
The final regression, including just the robust variables, is reported in Table 5. To start 
with, it provides strong evidence in favor of the main claim of this paper: I find very few 
variables, which are simultaneously significant for several measures of different aspects of 
decentralization.  The  most  pronounced  are  distance  from  Moscow,  which  is  relevant  for 
regulations and taxes, and dummy republic, which influences regulatory decentralization and 
index of regional constitutions (there is also urbanization, which matters, however, just for 
one dimension of the fiscal decentralization and the index of power-sharing treaties). The 
strongest  predictor  for  the  regulatory  decentralization  –  dummy  republic  –  is  even  never 
robust according to the EBA for the fiscal decentralization. Thus, if one systematically checks 
the  influence  of  different  specifications,  the  certain  similarity  between  the  results  of  the 
regressions of Tables 2 and 3 seems to become smaller or even disappear.
48 
 
Table 4: Results of the extreme bounds analysis 
 







Upper bound  CDF(0)  No. 
regressions 
Fiscal decentralization:  
retention rate 
Territory  0.042  0.016  -0.037  0.159  0.995  655,360 
Population  0.007  0.056  -0.360  0.386  0.548  655,360 
Oil and gas  0.221  0.124  -0.573  1.114  0.963  655,360 
Average income per capita  0.104  0.063  -0.323  0.704  0.951  655,360 
Distance from average income   -0.109  0.069  -0.801  0.321  0.947  655,360 
Dummy autonomous okrug  -0.022  0.064  -0.426  0.381  0.636  262,144 
Dummy republic  0.032  0.035  -0.196  0.253  0.816  655,360 
Distance from Moscow  0.009  0.004  -0.013  0.033  0.991  655,360 
Dummy border region non-CIS  -0.008  0.033  -0.157  0.121  0.596  655,360 
Dummy border region CIS  0.005  0.018  -0.107  0.076  0.611  655,360 
Urbanization  1.245  1.773  -3.847  7.176  0.923  655,360 
Fiscal transfers  -0.140  0.116  -0.950  0.447  0.887  655,360 
Tax revenue  -0.100  0.040  -0.378  0.128  0.991  655,360 
Education  -1.557  1.213  -8.804  5.985  0.900  655,360 
Education squared  1.504  2.850  -18.865  19.980  0.701  655,360 
Tensions (RUIE)  0.001  0.012  -0.068  0.090  0.533  655,360 
Power  -0.011  0.018  -0.142  0.104  0.732  655,360 
Democracy  -0.003  0.002  -0.011  0.007  0.969  655,360 
Regulatory capture  -0.017  0.056  -0.274  0.281  0.618  655,360 
Industrial concentration  0.001  0.001  -0.003  0.004  0.832  524,288 
Declarations  0.027  0.044  -0.116  0.181  0.950  655,360 
Resources II  -0.000  0.001  -0.004  0.004  0.738  524,288 
                                                           
48 Almost all significant results of the Table 5 have been significant in Tables 2 and 3 and Appendix C. There are 
just two exceptions: oil and gas for the index of regional constitutions and urbanization for the retention rate 
including off-budget funds. The reason for the latter can be that urbanization in Russia is correlated with the size 
of  the  population  (which  has  been  significant  for  this  variable  in  Table  2),  so  one  was  dealing  with  a 
multicollinearity problem.  42  
 







Upper bound  CDF(0)  No. 
regressions 
Fiscal decentralization:  
retention rate and transfers 
Territory  0.037  0.070  -0.374  0.472  0.703  327,680 
Population  -0.374  0.281  -1.080  2.663  0.908  327,680 
Oil and gas  -0.376  0.378  -1.989  3.722  0.840  327,680 
Average income per capita  -0.390  0.234  -2.838  3.183  0.952  327,680 
Distance from average income   0.541  0.404  -2.456  3.855  0.909  327,680 
Dummy autonomous okrug  -0.012  0.286  -2.391  2.329  0.517  131,071 
Dummy republic  0.210  0.253  -0.619  1.635  0.796  327,680 
Distance from Moscow  0.043  0.018  -0.029  0.143  0.993  327,680 
Dummy border region non-CIS  0.088  0.125  -0.504  0.513  0.757  327,680 
Dummy border region CIS  0.113  0.093  -0.349  0.510  0.887  327,680 
Urbanization  -13.355  7.260  -35.987  16.088  0.967  327,680 
Tax revenue  -1.333  0.463  -2.086  0.072  0.998  327,680 
Education  -5.381  5.689  -30.052  36.005  0.827  327,680 
Education squared  14.420  12.608  -91.222  72.667  0.874  327,680 
Tensions (RUIE)  0.107  0.090  -0.268  0.609  0.883  327,680 
Power  -0.051  0.081  -0.818  0.511  0.736  327,680 
Democracy  -0.012  0.007  -0.034  0.036  0.968  327,680 
Regulatory capture  -0.738  0.190  -1.002  1.665  0.999  327,680 
Industrial concentration  -0.005  0.002  -0.015  0.010  0.981  262,143 
Declarations  -0.010  0.138  -0.936  0.527  0.528  327,680 
Resources II  -0.000  0.005  -0.024  .011  0.521  262,143 
Fiscal decentralization:  
expenditure decentralization 
Territory  0.016  0.015  -0.059  0.088  0.864  655,360 
Population  -0.017  0.019  -0.245  0.100  0.815  655,360 
Oil and gas  0.076  0.052  -0.386  0.497  0.928  655,360 
Average income per capita  0.018  0.021  -0.148  0.094  0.807  655,360 
Distance from average income   -0.018  0.020  -0.185  0.101  0.813  655,360 
Dummy autonomous okrug  0.120  0.026  -0.102  0.325  0.999  262,144 
Dummy republic  0.015  0.025  -0.152  0.133  0.724  655,360 
Distance from Moscow  -0.004  0.003  -0.024  0.011  0.887  655,360 
Dummy border region non-CIS  -0.033  0.023  -0.141  0.048  0.928  655,360 
Dummy border region CIS  -0.015  0.017  -0.089  0.051  0.817  655,360 
Urbanization  -0.333  0.901  -4.292  4.611  0.644  655,360 
Fiscal transfers  -0.125  0.057  -0.397  0.435  0.985  655,360 
Tax revenue  0.041  0.017  -0.084  0.265  0.991  655,360 
Education  0.586  0.962  -4.221  5.538  0.729  655,360 
Education squared  -2.451  2.132  -13.743  10.029  0.875  655,360 
Tensions (RUIE)  -0.006  0.010  -0.068  0.045  0.728  655,360 
Power  0.007  0.017  -0.081  0.111  0.671  655,360 
Democracy  -0.001  0.002  -0.007  0.006  0.783  655,360 
Regulatory capture  0.024  0.054  -0.213  0.243  0.671  524,288 
Industrial concentration  0.001  0.000  -0.000  0.003  0.999  655,360 
Declarations  0.032  0.021  -0.059  0.156  0.938  655,360 
Resources II  0.000  0.001  -0.003  0.003  0.598  524,288 
Fiscal decentralization:  
retention rate and off-budget funds 
Territory  0.029  0.028  -0.109  0.221  0.833  655,360 
Population  -0.043  0.083  -0.527  0.470  0.700  655,360 
Oil and gas  0.061  0.150  -0.946  1.095  0.657  655,360 
Average income per capita  0.137  0.101  -0.762  1.214  0.913  655,360 
Distance from average income   -0.146  0.097  -1.210  0.703  0.933  655,360 
Dummy autonomous okrug  0.102  0.077  -0.206  0.559  0.905  262,144 
Dummy republic  0.042  0.056  -0.295  0.325  0.773  655,360 
Distance from Moscow  0.007  0.006  -0.020  0.048  0.889  655,360 43  
 







Upper bound  CDF(0)  No. 
regressions 
Dummy border region non-CIS  -0.049  0.053  -0.282  0.148  0.827  655,360 
Dummy border region CIS  0.001  0.030  -0.150  0.126  0.516  655,360 
Urbanization  3.753  1.810  -4.579  11.685  0.981  655,360 
Fiscal transfers  -0.271  0.135  -1.277  0.424  0.977  655,360 
Tax revenue  -0.113  0.046  -0.442  0.157  0.993  655,360 
Education  -3.097  1.912  -12.202  6.286  0.947  655,360 
Education squared  3.178  4.722  -20.944  24.622  0.750  655,360 
Tensions (RUIE)  -0.004  0.020  -0.112  0.149  0.581  655,360 
Power  -0.016  0.029  -0.232  0.167  0.716  655,360 
Democracy  -0.007  0.003  -0.020  0.009  0.987  655,360 
Regulatory capture  -0.016  0.111  -0.408  0.467  0.559  524,288 
Industrial concentration  0.000  0.001  -0.004  0.005  0.619  655,360 
Declarations  0.076  0.051  -0.171  0.281  0.930  655,360 
Resources II  -0.002  0.001  -0.007  0.004  0.907  524,288 
Regulatory decentralization: 
share of contradicting acts 
Territory  0.004  0.011  -0.051  0.063  0.651  655,360 
Population  -0.006  0.014  -0.157  0.113  0.658  655,360 
Oil and gas  0.033  0.035  -0.233  0.301  0.826  655,360 
Average income per capita  -0.013  0.030  -0.310  0.222  0.673  655,360 
Distance from average income   0.010  0.034  -0.273  0.300  0.620  655,360 
Dummy autonomous okrug  -0.009  0.027  -0.239  0.139  0.631  262,144 
Dummy republic  0.058  0.018  -0.035  0.150  0.999  655,360 
Distance from Moscow  0.006  0.004  -0.008  0.021  0.951  655,360 
Dummy border region non-CIS  0.031  0.032  -0.060  0.153  0.837  655,360 
Dummy border region CIS  0.009  0.013  -0.052  0.053  0.766  655,360 
Urbanization  -0.807  0.518  -3.094  2.242  0.941  655,360 
Fiscal transfers  0.062  0.055  -0.250  0.452  0.868  655,360 
Tax revenue  0.011  0.013  -0.106  0.169  0.789  655,360 
Education  0.215  0.897  -2.914  4.586  0.594  655,360 
Education squared  -0.521  1.919  -11.348  7.359  0.607  655,360 
Tensions (RUIE)  -0.015  0.011  -0.071  0.028  0.914  655,360 
Power  0.005  0.013  -0.058  0.082  0.634  655,360 
Democracy  -0.001  0.001  -0.006  0.004  0.695  655,360 
Regulatory capture  -0.029  0.045  -0.214  0.128  0.746  655,360 
Industrial concentration  -0.000  0.000  -0.002  0.001  0.690  524,288 
Declarations  0.013  0.014  -0.062  0.069  0.834  655,360 
Resources II  -0.001  0.001  -0.003  0.001  0.877  524,288 
Regulatory decentralization: 
log of number of contradicting acts 
Territory  0.093  0.106  -0.561  0.709  0.809  655,360 
Population  -0.056  0.168  -1.762  1.569  0.629  655,360 
Oil and gas  0.807  0.641  -3.276  6.947  0.896  655,360 
Average income per capita  0.092  0.363  -3.163  3.575  0.598  655,360 
Distance from average income   0.114  0.390  -3.517  3.547  0.615  655,360 
Dummy autonomous okrug  -0.639  0.291  -2.937  0.845  0.986  262,144 
Dummy republic  0.591  0.222  -0.522  1.867  0.996  655,360 
Distance from Moscow  0.058  0.031  -0.090  0.222  0.971  655,360 
Dummy border region non-CIS  0.086  0.252  -1.018  1.113  0.633  655,360 
Dummy border region CIS  0.070  0.208  -0.929  0.838  0.631  655,360 
Urbanization  -10.111  6.776  -48.243  21.078  0.932  655,360 
Fiscal transfers  1.138  0.619  -2.789  5.367  0.967  655,360 
Tax revenue  0.129  0.161  -1.574  1.696  0.789  655,360 
Education  -4.411  10.472  -45.717  41.329  0.663  655,360 
Education squared  10.186  23.924  -101.520  112.758  0.665  655,360 
Tensions (RUIE)  -0.157  0.129  -0.702  0.459  0.888  655,360 
Power  -0.021  0.233  -1.345  0.985  0.536  655,360 44  
 







Upper bound  CDF(0)  No. 
regressions 
Democracy  0.005  0.015  -0.049  0.075  0.618  655,360 
Regulatory capture  -0.078  0.497  -1.938  2.117  0.562  655,360 
Industrial concentration  0.001  0.007  -0.021  0.030  0.580  524,288 
Declarations  0.211  0.186  -0.769  0.959  0.871  655,360 
Resources II  -0.011  0.009  -0.057  0.022  0.892  524,288 
Regulatory decentralization: 
number of contradicting acts 
Territory  0.059  0.086  -0.386  0.603  0.753  655,360 
Population  -0.012  0.127  -1.332  1.052  0.538  655,360 
Oil and gas  0.533  0.390  -2.398  4.071  0.914  655,360 
Average income per capita  -0.102  0.250  -2.753  2.155  0.658  655,360 
Distance from average income   0.227  0.281  -2.263  3.106  0.790  655,360 
Dummy autonomous okrug  -0.592  0.232  -2.844  0.862  0.995  262,144 
Dummy republic  0.550  0.173  -0.359  1.513  0.999  655,360 
Distance from Moscow  0.053  0.025  -0.078  0.160  0.985  655,360 
Dummy border region non-CIS  0.190  0.213  0.538  1.118  0.813  655,360 
Dummy border region CIS  0.184  0.121  -0.396  0.627  0.935  655,360 
Urbanization  -6.373  4.636  -29.886  21.325  0.915  655,360 
Fiscal transfers  1.064  0.530  -1.798  4.565  0.978  655,360 
Tax revenue  0.127  0.125  -1.089  1.578  0.846  655,360 
Education  2.207  8.135  -32.347  43.738  0.607  655,360 
Education squared  -5.657  17.956  -101.791  85.463  0.624  655,360 
Tensions (RUIE)  -0.153  0.095  -0.723  0.245  0.945  655,360 
Power  0.100  0.136  -0.580  0.994  -0.769  655,360 
Democracy  -0.000  0.010  -0.042  0.044  0.505  655,360 
Regulatory capture  -0.141  0.406  -1.824  1.358  0.631  655,360 
Industrial concentration  -0.001  0.005  -0.019  0.018  0.592  524,288 
Declarations  0.184  0.135  -0.631  0.750  0.913  655,360 
Resources II  -0.007  0.005  -0.034  0.014  0.884  524,288 
Constitutional decentralization: 
power-sharing treaties 
Territory  0.519  2.011  -6.507  8.440  0.602  524,288 
Population  1.576  2.591  -30.784  14.992  0.728  524,288 
Oil and gas  -29.822  23.428  -380.109  222.630  0.898  524,288 
Average income per capita  -2.782  4.753  -51.571  24.567  0.721  524,288 
Distance from average income   2.488  5.592  -29.450  47.433  0.672  524,288 
Dummy republic  0.224  3.188  -20.572  12.823  0.528  524,288 
Distance from Moscow  0.005  0.414  -2.241  1.876  0.505  524,288 
Dummy border region non-CIS  -2.867  3.111  -14.758  7.260  0.822  524,288 
Dummy border region CIS  2.875  1.986  -5.024  12.707  0.926  524,288 
Urbanization  247.080  107.150  -144.467  728.959  0.989  524,288 
Fiscal transfers  2.367  10.073  -40.884  72.324  0.593  524,288 
Tax revenue  2.321  2.407  -12.384  33.885  0.833  524,288 
Education  -8.092  143.546  -492.905  471.670  0.522  524,288 
Education squared  10.117  337.093  -1162.534  1214.543  0.512  524,288 
Tensions (RUIE)  -0.606  1.342  -8.177  3.565  0.674  524,288 
Power  2.285  1.905  -4.866  13.693  0.885  524,288 
Democracy  0.019  0.172  -0.607  0.750  0.545  524,288 
Regulatory capture  7.990  6.503  -23.754  30.042  0.890  524,288 
Industrial concentration  0.085  0.066  -0.147  0.333  0.900  524,288 
Declarations  5.001  2.425  -4.180  17.572  0.980  524,288 
Resources II  -0.035  0.080  -0.335  0.315  0.672  524,288 
Constitutional decentralization: 
regional constitutions 
Territory  0.726  0.921  -3.081  5.012  0.785  655,360 
Population  1.195  0.703  -6.033  6.967  0.955  655,360 
Oil and gas  -3.427  1.875  -16.110  8.093  0.966  655,360 45  
 







Upper bound  CDF(0)  No. 
regressions 
Average income per capita  -0.662  1.235  -14.229  9.514  0.704  655,360 
Distance from average income   0.290  1.315  -9.905  13.168  0.587  655,360 
Dummy autonomous okrug  0.463  1.183  -9.579  8.322  0.652  262,144 
Dummy republic  1.682  0.981  -3.599  6.524  0.956  655,360 
Distance from Moscow  0.115  0.110  -0.440  0.795  0.852  655,360 
Dummy border region non-CIS  -0.378  0.942  -5.323  3.895  0.656  655,360 
Dummy border region CIS  0.077  0.570  -2.800  1.940  0.554  655,360 
Urbanization  -29.560  25.861  -148.041  79.902  0.873  655,360 
Fiscal transfers  0.020  3.132  -17.527  14.189  0.503  655,360 
Tax revenue  0.160  0.711  -5.862  7.203  0.589  655,360 
Education  15.673  38.958  -154.798  190.319  0.656  655,360 
Education squared  -55.200  86.126  -522.489  359.223  0.739  655,360 
Tensions (RUIE)  0.233  0.420  -1.402  3.078  0.711  655,360 
Power  -0.520  0.621  -5.691  2.082  0.799  655,360 
Democracy  -0.080  0.055  -0.270  0.169  0.926  655,360 
Regulatory capture  0.538  1.642  -6.440  7.753  0.628  655,360 
Industrial concentration  -0.018  0.022  -0.099  0.053  0.781  524,288 
Declarations  0.752  0.720  -2.868  4.409  0.852  655,360 
Resources II  -0.044  0.031  -0.173  0.087  0.919  524,288 
 
Notes: all regressions estimated with OLS (fiscal decentralization, regulatory decentralization as share and log 
number of contradictions), negative binomial (regulatory decentralization as number of contradictions), ordered 
logit  (regional  constitutions)  and  tobit  (power-sharing  treaties).  All  estimates  use  robust  standard  errors,  if 
possible. Average indicators weighted by the value of log likelihood. CDF(0) calculation approach assuming 
normal distribution (case 1 by Sala-i-Martin, 1997) is used. Robust variables are marked bold. Retail trade and 
net profit, as well as total number of conclusions included in the respective regressions 
 
 
The  results  of  the  estimations  suggest  that  the  retention  rate  is  almost  exclusively 
determined by the bargaining power variables (territory and distance from Moscow). If one 
adds transfers, one still has a strong and positive effect of the distance from Moscow, but in 
this  case  regulatory  capture  seems  also  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  decentralization 
measure. This is a new result I have not observed in the previous specifications: it could be 
interpreted as the ability of influential business groups to extract concessions on the regional 
level (regulations), but also influence the federal decision-making (transfers). However, the 
significance of regulatory capture is not robust to outliers according to Jarque-Bera test, and 
therefore cannot be interpreted in a reasonable way (since normality of residuals cannot be 
supported) and is likely to be driven just by two regions: Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. 
Both of them are located in Northern Caucasus, are relatively poor and receive substantial 
transfers,  but  are  also  notorious  for  high  level  of  corruption  and  intervention  of  local 
politicians in the business activity – so, it is not surprising that they are driving the results, 
which otherwise would disappear. 
 
 
 46  
 
Table 5: Determinants of decentralization, only regressors robust to EBA, 1995-1999 















































Territory  0.055**                   
  (0.021)                   
Population                   0.379***   
                  (0.143)   
Oil and gas  0.110                -2.126***   
 
(0.133)   
         
 
(0.665)   
Income per 
capita  0.020  -0.157 
         
 
   
 
(0.030)  (0.116) 
         
 
   
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug     
 
0.128*** 
   
-0.046  -0.088 
   
 
   
 
(0.012) 
   
(0.158)  (0.492) 
   
Dummy 
republic     
     
0.055***  0.545***  0.492***  1.823***   
 
   
     
(0.011)  (0.142)  (0.108)  (0.514)   
Distance 
from Moscow  0.007**  0.054*** 
     
0.006***  0.050***  0.046** 
   
 
(0.003)  (0.017) 
     
(0.002)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
   
Tax revenue  -0.067  -0.679**  0.010  0.012  -0.074***           
 
(0.041)  (0.287)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
(0.026)     
 
   
Fiscal 
transfers      -0.093**  -0.123***  0.398*** 
 
0.338  0.347 
   
 
    (0.044)  (0.037) 
(0.139)   
(0.318)  (0.298) 
   
Urbanization    -4.070      3.715***          252.511*** 
 
  (4.564)     
(1.339)   
   
  (71.896) 
Declarations  0.025                  3.486* 
 
(0.024)   
         
 
  (1.706) 
Democracy  0.001  0.003      -0.006           
 
(0.002)  (0.008) 
    (0.004)     
 
   
Regulatory 
capture    0.510* 
         
 
   
 
  (0.302) 
         
 
   
Industrial 
concentration    -0.000  0.001*** 
       
 
   
 
  (0.001)  (0.000) 
       
 
   
Retail trade  0.063  0.476                 
 
(0.041)  (0.286) 
         
 
   
Net profit  -0.004*  0.027**                 
 
(0.002)  (0.011) 
         
 
   
Total acts              0.558***  0.618***     
 
   
       
(0.160)  (0.146) 
   
Constant  1.398***  10.374***  0.638***  0.635***  1.863  0.073***  0.633  0.295    -25.347*** 
 
(0.513)  (3.858)  -0.144  -0.117 
(0.377) 
(0.006)  1.288  (1.204) 
  (7.800) 
Observations  88  72  79  88  88  88  88  88  87  79 
R
2  0.283  0.615  0.334  0.432  0.129  0.288  0.252       
Pseudo R
2                0.035  0.066  0.042 
Wald Chi-
stat         
 
    4074.555*** 
   
LR 
proportional 
odds         
 
     
29.35**   
J.-B. test  112.7***  1798***  10.83***  13.42***  25.84***  33.43***  1346.0***       
 
Notes: see Tables 1 and 2. Outliers in regression (EBA1) are Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Altai Republic, Aginsk Buriatski, Vologda, 
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Taimyr, Karelia, Khakassia, (EBA2) are Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria, (EBA3) and (EBA4) are 47  
 
Rostov,  Tula,  Briansk,  Novosibirsk,  Tatarstan,  Bashkortostan,  (EBA5)  are  Taimyr,  Ingushetia,  Bashkortostan,  Tatarstan, 
Aginsk Buriat, Kalmykia, Altai Rep., (EBA6) are Primorski and Ust Ordyn Buriatski, (EBA6) is Saratov. All significant 
variables remain significant and keep their sign after exclusion of outliers. Re-estimating (EBA6), (EBA7) and (EBA8) just 
excluding Primorski krai, just excluding Saratov and excluding both of these regions simultaneously does not change the 
results, with the exception of regulatory capture in regression (EBA2), which becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign. Re-
estimating (EBA10) just excluding Moscow and St. Petersburg (or just Moscow) does not change the results for urbanization. 
Since in (EBA9) the proportional-odds assumption was rejected, the regression was re-estimated using generalized ordered 
logit. For marginal effects at the mean population and dummy republic still have a significant and positive impact, while oil 
and gas is insignificant. Excluding  from (EBA2) just regulatory capture or just  industrial concentration  to check  for the 
changes of sample size (because of the data availability) does not change the results 
 
For  the  expenditure  decentralization  I  run  two  regressions,  because  industrial 
concentration is unavailable for the autonomous okrugs: the variables that matter are still the 
same as discussed in the previous specifications (the the exception of oil and gas). Finally, for 
the retention rate including off-budget funds, one has the negative impact of the tax revenue, 
positive  influence  of  preferences  (urbanization),  but  also  a  positive  correlation  between 
decentralization  and  fiscal  transfers  –  so,  once  again,  it  is  possible  that  strong  regions 
simultaneously  force  a  large  retention  rate  and  large  federal  transfers.  Regulatory 
decentralization, as above, is determined exclusively by dummy republic and distance from 
Moscow.  For  the  constitutional  decentralization  I  first  find  that  both  indices  seem  to  be 
influenced by a completely different set of variables, mostly already discussed before: the 
most interesting finding is that dummy republic is even not robust after EBA for the power-
sharing  treaties  (in  fact,  republics  are  among  regions  with  the  highest  (Tatarstan  and 
Bashkortostan) and lowest (Buryatia) values of the indicator). 
 
5.3. Outlier regions 
In addition, I re-estimate the regressions from Tables 2 and 3 excluding outlier regions 
with “weaker” public governance systems, as defined in the section 3. To start with, almost all 
results reported so  far survive this approach (which is reported in Appendix E), although 
sometimes are only marginally significant and do not remain robust if one excludes further 
outliers according to Jarque-Bera test to ensure normal distribution of residuals (like distance 
from  Moscow  for  the  fiscal  decentralization).  However,  in  this  case  one  obtains  several 
additional significant variables. For the fiscal decentralization dummy autonomous okrug is 
now often significant (although it has different signs for different proxies). However, this 
result is probably to be attributed to the strong effect of the only two autonomous regions still 
in the sample: Khanty Mansi and Yamalo Nenets (the main source of Russian oil and gas 
extraction). One finds in addition a significant impact of the dummy republic on the retention 
rate – the effect, however, does not survive if one excludes outliers to ensure not significant 
Jarque-Bera test and is therefore difficult to interpret. For the regulatory decentralization and 
constitutional  decentralization  oil  and  gas  becomes  significant,  but,  once  again,  it  has 48  
 
different signs for regulatory and for the constitutional decentralization (measured for regional 
constitutions).  
 
5.4. Endogeneity   
The last part of the analysis, finally, directly considers the problem of endogeneity. As 
mentioned, I focus on variables significant in Table 5. Although it was expected to generate 
substantial problems, actually, most variables used in the specifications are either stable over 
time  or  time-invariant  and  therefore  unlikely  to  be  subject  to  reverse  causality  (territory, 
population, distance from Moscow naturally, dummy republic or dummy autonomous okrug 
because  they  were  completely  pre-determined  by  the  Soviet  territorial  organization)  or 
insignificant. Obviously, time-invariance solves the reverse causality problem, but still calls 
for caution in terms of possible common cause for the covariate and the dependent variable, 
which  may  create  endogeneity  bias.  This  common  cause  could  be  rooted  deeply  in  the 
historical development, and therefore difficult to control for statistically. One could probably 
cautiously claim that for the Russian data and nine variables mentioned above this problems 
are less pronounced because the center-region bargaining for autonomy is an extremely recent 
phenomenon (due to the political structural break in Russian development in 1990-1991), but 
even in this case an unambiguous clarification is difficult. As already mentioned, the results 
which remain robust in most specifications one should also hardly be worrying about the 
problem of endogenous controls: obviously, exclusion of variables may create an omitted 
variable problem, but it is unlikely to run in the same direction as the reverse causality (and in 
the EBA approach various combinations of controls were tested). One should finally notice 
that  it  is  impossible  to  make  any  claims  with  respect  to  the  results  for  which  the  null 
hypothesis  was  actually  not  rejected  or  happened  to  be  rejected  in  a  non-robust  fashion 
through  different  specifications:  for  this  variables  endogeneity  bias  may  make  me  ignore 
actually existing effects – once again, a reason for caution. 
There  are  several  cases  when  the  endogeneity  problem  may  be  driving  the  robust 
results. For the retention rate, all three measures of regulatory decentralization and indices of 
regional constitutions and power-sharing treaties there seems to be no problem with reverse 
causality among significant (Table 5) variables.
49 The results are more troubling for three 
other measures of fiscal decentralization. In the expenditure decentralization the questionable 
                                                           
49 There can be a problem with the Transparency International indices not included in EBA; but in this case a 
very small sample size of just 40 regions (even less if one attempts to look at possible outliers according to 
Jarque-Bera test for some of the specifications) precludes any reasonable instrumentation strategy. Moreover, 
recall that declarations or regional elites are endogenous by design: determined for the early 1990s before almost 
all agreements were signed. 49  
 
variable is the industrial concentration; however, at least during the 1990s it is still likely to 
reflect the Soviet allocation of industrial assets (since during this period there was almost no 
construction  of  new  production  centers)  and  therefore  could  be  treated  as  endogenous 
(although this argument may be questionable, for example, for the services like the retail 
trade, which have however been still very deconcentrated in the 1990s before the emergence 
of the large trade chains). For the retention rate including transfers one could be concerned 
about the regulatory capture, but the variable is not robust to outliers to ensure non-significant 
Jarque-Bera  test  and  hence  cannot  be  interpreted  properly.  However,  for  the  tax  revenue 
(retention rate with transfers and retention rate with the off-budget funds) and fiscal transfers 
(expenditure  decentralization  and  retention  rate  with  the  off-budget  funds)  the  reverse 
causality is very possible, and the variables are robust – so, this case should be considered 
more carefully.
50  
In what follows I will attempt to check the robustness of the results in an instrumental 
variables estimation. To start with, in order to instrument for the tax revenue, I use past (1985 
and 1990) values of income per capita. The logic is the following: tax revenue is larger in 
jurisdictions with large income per capita. However, current income per capita suffers from 
the same reverse causality problem as the tax revenue. Nevertheless, I can instrument the 
endogenous control by the lagged (by 5 and 10 years respectively) income per capita of the 
pre-reform period. To be more precise, I include both income per capita 1995-1999 and tax 
revenue 1995-1999 in the regressions and instrument both variables (otherwise, since current 
income is correlated with the past income and with the tax revenue, the instruments were not 
exogenous).  For  the  fiscal  transfers  the  same  approach  is  applied.
51  Unfortunately,  it 
precludes me from simultaneously including both variables in one regression (since I always 
have to control for income per capita as well, it would make my regression under-identified). 
The  empirical  properties  of  this  estimation  technique  are  relatively  good  (F-statistics  for 
almost all first-stage regressions are well above 10). However, the theoretical justification can 
be  problematic,  as  it  is  the  case  with  almost  all  instrumentation  strategies  using  lagged 
variables (although they are quite popular). Hence, the results I report in what follows should 
be treated with caution. 
                                                           
50 For example, there is a substantial literature linking interbudgetary grants to loyalty of Russian regions to the 
center (Treisman, 1996, 1998; Solanko, 1999; Popov, 2004; Jarocinska, 2004; Dombrovsky, 2006): the question 
is whether it is the “loyal” or the “secessionist” regions receiving higher amount of funds, but for the purposes of 
this paper it is sufficient that the link might exist. 
51  The  literature  on  the  determinants  of  fiscal  transfers,  which  has  been  used  as  a  basis  for  similar 
instrumentation strategies so far (Desai et al., 2005), usually relies on the variables I have used as part of this 
study (like population or status of the autonomous okrug) to determine the extent of the decentralization and 
hence is not applicable. However, since fiscal transfers are also correlated with income per capita, one can apply 
the same approach as for the tax revenue. 50  
 
I will consider each dimension of decentralization where endogeneity can be present 
one by one.  In the  regressions  I exclude  all insignificant variables (as well as regulatory 
capture for retention rates with transfers to ensure strict exogeneity of all controls). In Table 6 
column (IV1) reports the results of the TSLS estimations for the retention rates with transfers. 
Tax revenue in the TSLS estimation is insignificant, and therefore the findings of the Table 5 
could not be confirmed. However, distance from Moscow remains significant.
52 The next 
column  reports  the  results  for  expenditures  for  the  specification  including  dummy 
autonomous  okrug  (which  is  obviously  endogenous).  Here  TSLS  strongly  supports  the 
previously  obtained  results  of  the  OLS:  fiscal  transfers  remain  significant.  Dummy 
autonomous okrug is significant and positive. In (IV3) and (IV4) I provide estimations for the 
retention rate with off-budget funds – including fiscal transfers and tax revenue as controls 
respectively. Unfortunately, in this case the statistical properties of the instruments are much 
worse  (hence,  suggesting  the  possibility  of  weak  instruments).  In  both  regressions  the 
significance and sign of the potentially endogenous regressors are confirmed as opposed to 
the findings of Table 5; urbanization also remains significant and positive. 
To  conclude,  the  instrumentation  strategy  confirmed  almost  all  potentially 
“endogenous” results, with the exception of the tax revenue for the retention rate including 
transfers. This is, however, an outcome which should be treated with utmost caution, given 
the imperfections of the instrumentation strategy. 
 
Table 6: Determinants of decentralization, problems of endogeneity 
























Moscow  0.084***       
  (0.025)       
Dummy autonomous 
okrug    0.102***     
    (0.017)     
Urbanization      35.012***  32.384*** 
      (10.771)  (6.576) 
Income per capita  -0.072  0.004  -1.180  -0.106 
  (0.115)  (0.010)  (0.122)  (0.096) 
Fiscal transfers    -0.117***  2.818**   
    (0.032)  (1.184)   
Tax revenue  -0.037      -0.425*** 
 
(0.058)      (0.117) 
Constant  1.418*  0.807***  -2.095**  5.173*** 
 
(0.770)  (0.022)  (0.863)  (1.448) 
Observations  88  88  88  88 
F-stat first stage 
income per capita  50.52***  59.98***  15.52***  15.52*** 
F-stat fist stage tax  64.70***      8.90*** 
                                                           
52 Including regulatory capture would also make the distance from Moscow marginally insignificant 51  
 
revenue 
F-stat first stage fiscal 
transfers    66.97***  5.70***   
 
Notes: see Table 2. In (IV1) and (IV4) instrumented variables are income per capita and tax revenue, in (IV2) 
and (IV3) fiscal transfers and income per capita. Instruments are income per capita 1985 and 1990 
 
6. Discussion 
  The main results of the previous sections could be summarized as follows. First, no 
robust  correlation  between  dimensions  of  decentralization  was  found.  Second,  after  all 
refinements  the  set  of  determinants  of  individual  dimensions  of  decentralization  is  also 
substantially  different,  although  for  two  variables  (dummy  republic  and  distance  from 
Moscow)  one  does  find  an  effect  for  several  decentralization  dimensions.  It  is  probably 
interesting  to  consider  these  results  from  two  perspectives:  first,  our  general  knowledge 
regarding the decentralization process, and second, the Russian specifics.  
If one looks at the existing research on determinants of decentralization, the results I 
obtained for the Russian Federation seem to be consistent with claims made in several papers 
(Blume  and  Voigt,  2008;  Martinez-Vazquez  and  Timofeev,  2009)  that  reducing  different 
dimensions of decentralization to each other results in significant loss of information and that, 
as  Treisman  (2002)  puts  it,  “different  types  of  decentralization  may  have  quite  different 
causes”. However, this paper puts this result into an “extreme” situation: the decisions are 
made simultaneously for all dimensions of decentralization within a relatively short period of 
time  within  one  country.  Treisman  (2002)  provides  clear  evidence  that  long-term  path 
dependent factors (associated with the colonial heritage or geographic location in different 
world  regions)  have  strong  influence  on  the  patterns  of  decentralization.  Even  if  one 
eliminates all these differences, as in this paper, dimensions of decentralization are still not 
robustly  correlated.  Probably,  the  most  pronounced  result  of  this  paper  is  the  absent 
correlation between fiscal and regulatory decentralization (which has not been established in 
other papers): while fiscal aspects have been subject to detailed studies in the economics of 
federalism since its onset, we know much less about regulatory decentralization: so, the paper 
suggests  that  focusing  on  this  dimension  could  generate  very  different  insights  for  the 
determinants of decentralization. 
However, simply stating the absent correlation of the dimensions of decentralization 
does not seem to be enough. The real puzzle could be the reasons for the differences. Here 
three explanations could be discussed. To start with, differences can be caused, as mentioned 
in  the  introduction,  by  differences  in  preferences.  This  is  an  “easy”  explanation,  since 
preferences are per definition not observable. However, one important aspect in this case is 
the difference between constitutional and post-constitutional outcomes. It is possible that the 52  
 
constitutional decentralization should be interpreted as a “status claim” on the side of the 
regional or central governments, or a “threat” in their bargaining rather than its outcome. 
Then it is not surprising that there is no clear correlation between regulations and fiscal flows 
on the one hand and constitutions and treaties on the other: the latter could have been intended 
to be just a “symbol” of the autonomy, or just a preliminary point in the negotiations process. 
For example, as demonstrated above, the power-sharing treaties could be strongly influenced 
by  the  declarations  of  regional  governors  rather  than  by  any  economic  or  social 
considerations: from this point of view treaties could in fact be interpreted as an “extended” 
declaration.  But  then  relying  on  the  constitutional  decentralization  to  understand  the 
allocation of influence in a federation could be insufficient, since at this level real authority 
could be mixed up with “symbolic claims” – at least in countries without strong rule of law, 
like Russia. In addition, both central and regional government can have preferences regarding 
these symbolic actions as well, and not just regarding the “tangible” outcomes, and then an 
exchange of “real autonomy” for “lower status claims” is possible. 
Second,  differences  in  decentralization  could  follow  from  different  mechanisms 
implemented. In the Russian Federation, as already mentioned, the tax collection is done by 
the regional agencies of the federal tax collection service; hence, in order to manipulate the 
retention rate, regional governors have to “capture” this agencies by providing benefits to 
their  bureaucrats  and  to  design  “schemes”  allowing  manipulations  with  tax  revenue  (for 
example, by manipulating the tax auditing effort). Yet another approach could be lobbying on 
the federal level: changing tax rates and bases the central parliament automatically generates 
advantages or disadvantages for different regions with different economic structures. For the 
regulatory decentralization and the index of autonomy in regional constitutions, as mentioned, 
one could interpret the results as outcomes of an “implicit contract”, while the power-sharing 
treaties are based on an “explicit contract”, and direct bilateral bargaining could be more 
important. For the regulations it could also be important to capture federal agencies, but rather 
regional  law  enforcement  structures  (specifically,  procurators)  and  judges  than  the  tax 
collectors.  For  the  power-sharing  treaties  the  key  federal  agency  is  the  presidential 
administration (which in fact prepared many agreements). So, the same regional governments 
achieve different results using different channels of influence. 
Finally,  there  is  some  relatively  weak  evidence  that  different  dimensions  of 
decentralization could have been used as substitutes in the bargaining process. If that is the 
case,  one  receives  yet  additional  argument  in  favor  of  separate  analysis  of  different 
dimensions of decentralization: it is possible that the country which seems “decentralized” 
according to one dimension is in fact “highly centralized” according to the other one. Then 53  
 
any empirical result obtained could be driven either by “decentralization” or “centralization” 
and  is  difficult  to  interpret.  To  be  more  precise,  in  this  case  one  can  look  just  at  one 
dimension of decentralization (and thus interpret other dimensions as well), but only with a 
clear understanding on how this dimension is related to the other ones. 
With respect to the individual determinants of decentralization, probably, the results of 
this  paper  are  more  interesting  in  the  Russian-specific  context.  It  is  however  still  worth 
mentioning that I find a very strong and pronounced impact of the geographical determinants 
on different dimensions of decentralization: territory (for the retention rate) and distance from 
Moscow.  Since  almost  all  papers  in  economics  define  “size  of  the  nation”  in  terms  of 
population (cf. Alesina and Spolaore, 2003), this result is particularly important: probably, 
geographical territory is an aspect which is worth thinking about. Since Russia is a relatively 
well developed country (and does not have the “classical” problems of developing world, 
where certain parts of the territory may be simply cut off from the central administration), this 
result is especially interesting. Other robust determinants of decentralization (Table 5) seem 
mostly to be consistent with the theoretical predictions in terms of sign: the only difference is 
for  tax  revenue  (as  discussed  above;  the  result  is  partly  not  sustained  if  controlled  for 
endogeneity) and oil and gas for regional constitutions (probably representing the fact that the 
main oil and gas provinces of Russia – Khanty Mansi and Yamalo Nenets – did not attempt to 
achieve high constitutional autonomy; it could once again represent the “symbolic” nature of 
claims of regional constitutions, irrelevant for territories with a “real” bargaining instrument).  
It is interesting though that in the studies of the determinants of retention rates in 
Russia in 1993-1994 Treisman (1999) reports several factors to be significantly influencing 
the retention rate (dummy republic, population) that have no (robust) influence in my sample 
(1995-1999). For some variables (like GRP per capita) the sign turns around (although in my 
sample they are not robust). It could represent the changes in the Russian Federalism after 
1994:  while  in  the  early  1990s  the  bargaining  was  influenced  by  the  coalition  of  ethnic 
republics, after 1994 it was gradually replaced by bilateral bargaining between regions. There 
are certain changes in mechanisms as well: in the early 1990s retention rates were negotiated 
on the regular basis and were more similar to the “explicit contract” of the power-sharing 
treaties (or an “implicit contract”, since the decision to withhold tax payments to the center 
was often unilateral) than to the “capturing the local tax authorities” approach of the late 
1990s. In a similar way, the results of this paper in terms of determinants of power-sharing 
treaties  are  quite  different  from  the  literature  operating  just  with  a  dummy  for  these 
agreements:  Söderlund  (2003)  reports  distance  from  Moscow,  share  of  non-Russian 
population and dependence on federal subsidies to determine the signing of an agreement; if 54  
 
one looks at the content of the agreement, almost all these factors turn out to be insignificant. 
Thus, there is one more confirmation of high heterogeneity of agreements. Finally, as already 
discussed, there are interesting analogies between the logic of the retention rate formation and 
the decentralization “within” regions (between regions and municipalities), for example, in 
terms of the influence of GDP per capita.
53  
  As it has been discussed in the previous part of the paper, differentiating among the 
aspects  of  the  decentralization  is  important,  because  different  aspects  of  decentralization 
could  generate  different  effects  for  the  economic  performance.  It  goes  well  beyond  the 
framework of this paper to provide a detailed study of this problem; however, at this stage it is 
possible to look at least at some simple correlation analysis of the problem. For this purpose I 
correlate the nine decentralization indicators of this paper with two performance variables: 
gross  regional  product  growth  rate,  as  included  in  the  dataset  of  Berkowitz  and  DeJong 
(forthcoming), and growth rate of industrial output as reported by Goskomstat. For the growth 
rate I also look at the conditional correlation controlling for the initial level of the GRP and 
education (once again using data from the same source). It should be noted that the theory on 
impact of decentralization on growth is not entirely conclusive, and this interrelation has been 
subject to a long discussion and numerous speculations (see e.g. Baskaran and Feld, 2009, 
Feld and Schnellenbach, 2010). 
The results are reported in Table 6. To start with, different aspects of decentralization 
indeed seem to provide different correlations with the performance indicators. Probably the 
most pronounced results are obtained for the industrial output growth. Here, looking at the 
constitutional  decentralization  (measured  by  regional  constitutions)  one  would  see  a 
significant and positive relation between growth and decentralization. However, for the fiscal 
decentralization indicators, the situation is more difficult: there is still a positive correlation 
between industrial output growth and the expenditure decentralization, but the retention rate 
with transfers is negatively correlated with this variable. Regulatory decentralization does not 
matter  in  any  of  the  columns  of  Table  7.  For  the  growth  of  the  GRP  results  differ  for 
conditional  and  unconditional  correlation,  but  in  this  case  one  can  still  come  to  different 
conclusions  regarding  the  correlation  between  the  decentralization  and  growth  looking  at 
different dimensions. Basically, for the conditional correlation the only determinant which 
seems to matter is the expenditure decentralization, which has a negative sign.
54 Anyway, at 
                                                           
53 Libman (2010) reports, by the way, that the retention rate and the share of regional budget in the consolidated 
tax revenue of the regional and municipal budgets are positively correlated in Russia. 
54 In several cases (expenditure decentralization, retention rate and transfers) signs of correlation coefficients are 
the opposite for the GRP and industrial output growth rate: there is, however, no contradiction, since the latter 55  
 
this stage the important message is not the signs of the coefficients as such, but rather the fact 
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Notes: numbers are correlation coefficients; numbers in parentheses are p-values 
 
7. Conclusion 
  Decentralization encompasses multiple aspects with partly sophisticated connection to 
each other. This paper tried to look at both interrelation of different aspects of decentralization 
and the factors of the endogenous devolution using the example of the Russian Federation. In 
an  asymmetric  setting  with  weak  rule  of  law  and  public  hierarchy  different  forms  of 
devolution became subject to bargaining between the federal government and the regions. 
However, identical agents seem to generate very different outcomes for different components 
of the decentralization process. In particular, I looked at decentralization at the rules level, i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
also measures the structural shifts in the Russian economy towards a greater importance of services, which could 
be associated with better GRP performance. 56  
 
allocation of authorities set by regional constitutions, as well as at the decentralization at the 
outcomes level, i.e. split of tax revenue and the regulation authority. Indeed, constitutional 
and both post-constitutional level forms of decentralization are not robustly correlated to each 
other, with the only exception of regulatory decentralization and decentralization in regional 
constitutions (where, however, the correlation appears because of a small group of Russian 
regions). The results depend upon the set of controls and the set of regions excluded from the 
analysis.  It  is  important  to  notice,  that  the  paper  does  not  attempt  to  reveal  a  “true”  or 
“correct” measure of decentralization: all three dimensions may be relevant depending upon 
the particular policy and research question – one should just carefully identify what one is 
looking for. 
Moreover, different aspects of decentralization are driven by different sets of factors. 
The only two robust factors influencing several dimensions of decentralization are distance 
from  Moscow  (a  measure  of  bargaining  power:  relevant  for  fiscal  and  regulatory 
decentralization) and dummy republic (bargaining rules and / or path dependence: relevant for 
regulatory and constitutional decentralization). However, even for these variables the impact 
is  not  robust  and  depends  on  how  regulatory,  fiscal  or  constitutional  decentralization  is 
measured. Dummy republic fits the predictions for the Russian federalism, the importance of 
distance from Moscow is less expected. In addition, for different dimensions of the fiscal 
decentralization  I  find  an  important  role  of  territory  (bargaining  power),  industrial 
concentration (lobbying) and fiscal flows (fiscal transfers and tax revenue – in this case some 
of the results seem to be driven by the endogeneity). It is interesting to notice that the sign of 
the fiscal flows variables is often contradicting the theory, while the signs of other variables 
are  theory-consistent:  that  is  probably  because  both  small  transfers  from  the  federal 
government and large fiscal revenue of the region represent both a sign of their strength (in 
terms of greater survival potential without any central support) and weakness (inability to 
lobby for larger grants from the center and higher redistributional appetites of the central 
administration). Urbanization often turns out to be significant in the fiscal decentralization 
regressions, but is not robust to specification and partly changes sign. For the power-sharing 
treaties I find a strong and robust impact of the declarations of regional elites, suggesting that 
this dimension of decentralization was of a rather “symbolic” nature. Autonomy incorporated 
in regional constitutions increases for regions with large population (and strong bargaining 
power). 
  There  are  a  number  of  limitations  for  the  study  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
generalization of results. First, all indicators have limited ability to measure the underlying 
decentralization  concepts.  Second,  the  contradiction  between  unilateral  and  bilateral 57  
 
devolution and formally highly symmetric design of the Russian federalism may influence the 
results. Third, I am considering a relatively short time period in an unstable institutional, 
economic and political environment. For example, the data includes the period of economic 
crisis in 1998, which had a profound impact on the behavior of all bargaining parties. Finally, 
this paper has only limited ability to resolve the endogeneity problem (as usually); hence, the 
results  should  be  treated  rather  like  correlations  than  causal  links.  Nevertheless,  it  still 
provides additional evidence in favor of the suspicion that different aspects of decentralization 
are really different from each other in terms of determinants and outcomes, what may be quite 
important for the empirical studies of the factors and impact of decentralization.  
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Appendix A: Data 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Constitutional decentralization (power-sharing treaties)  79  4.291  4.426  0.000  15.000 
Constitutional decentralization (regional constitutions)  87  2.230  1.336  0.000  6.000 
Declarations  88  2.821   0.498   1.600   4.330  
Democracy  88  27.568   6.238   14.000   45.000  
Distance from Moscow  88  2.639   2.925   0.000   12.866  
Distance from average income  88  0.466   0.492   0.244   3.191  
Dummy autonomous okrug  88  0.102   0.305   0.000   1.000  
Dummy border region CIS  88  0.295  0.459  0.000  1.000 
Dummy border region non-CIS  88  0.114  0.319  0.000  1.000 
Dummy republic  88  0.227   0.421   0.000   1.000  
Education  88  0.169  0.038  0.069  0.360 
Education squared  88  0.030  0.016  0.005  0.129 
Fiscal decentralization (expenditures)  88  0.790  0.073  0.611  0.982 
Fiscal decentralization (retention rate and parafiscal funds)  88  0.709  0.143  0.208  1.272 
Fiscal decentralization (retention rate and transfers)  88  1.032  0.570  0.456  3.437 
Fiscal decentralization (retention rate)  88  0.643  0.096  0.213  0.920 
Fiscal transfers  88  0.235   0.179   0.008   0.749  
Income per capita  88  0.908   0.649   0.258   4.056  
Industrial concentration  79  10.357  14.016  0.000  61.033 
Industrial production index  88  97.406  4.790  77.600  106.300 
Net profit  88  3.036  7.264  -1.532  42.082 
Oil and gas  88  0.020   0.103   0.000   0.786  
Population  88  0.028  1.203  -3.963  2.144 
Power (Jarocinska)  88  6.999  0.686  5.700  8.500 
Power (RUIE)  88  2.341   0.676   1.000   3.000  
Power (UI)  81  2.136   0.833   1.000   3.000  
Regulatory capture  73  0.000   0.137   -0.306   0.416  
Regulatory decentralization (log number)  88  5.422  0.656  1.609  6.682 
Regulatory decentralization (number)  88  267.330  152.317  5.000  798.000 
Regulatory decentralization (share)  88  0.102  0.055  0.002  0.314 
Resources I  78  33.077  12.669  3.000  42.000 
Resources II  78  5.397  1.061  2.000  6.000 
Retail trade  88  1.568  1.428  -2.421  5.581 
Share of Russians  88  0.746   0.238   0.012   0.966  
Tax revenue  88  14.808  1.449  11.131  18.612 
Tension (MFK)  88  3.330   1.460   1.000   5.000  
Tension (RUIE)  88  2.170   0.834   1.000   3.000  
Territory  88  0.233   0.460   0.000   3.103  
TI perceived  40  0.587  0.208  0.000  1.000 
TI real  40  0.443  0.297  0.000  1.000 
Total acts  88  7.989  0.352  7.144  9.044 
Urbanization  88  0.067   0.016   0.019   0.100  
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Table A2: Description of data 
Name  Description  Period  Source 
Bargaining power 
(RUIE) 
Index of bargaining power of the region vis-à-vis 
the federation, ranging from 1 to 3, higher value 
indicates higher bargaining power  
1996  Russian Union of 
Industrialist and 
Entrepreneurs 
Bargaining power (UI)  Index of bargaining power of the region vis-à-vis 
the federal centre, ranging from 1 to 3, higher 
values indicate higher bargaining power. 
Components of index: violations of federal law by 
regional legislation, natural resources, vote against 
federal policies at national elections  






Index of autonomy incorporated in power-sharing 
treaties (see table A9) 
1999  Own estimation, based 





Index of autonomy incorporated in regional 
constitutions (see table A8) 
1999  Own estimation, based 
on data from Garant 
Declaration  Index of declaration of regional elites in 1991-
1995 based on count of events, e.g. statements of 
sovereignty of the region, requests to reallocate 
powers in the federation etc.  The higher value of 
index represents a greater support of 
decentralisation 
1995  Dowley, 1998 
Democratisation  Index of democratisation of the region, estimated 
by the experts of the Carnegie Centre in Moscow. 
The higher value of index represents a higher 
degree of democratisation 
1991-2001  Carnegie Centre and 
Independent Institute 
for Social Policy 
Distance from 
Moscow 
Distance between the capital of the region and 
Moscow, thousands of km, 0 for Moscow and 
Moscow oblast, identical for St. Petersburg and St. 
Petersburg oblast 
n.a.  Goskomstat 
Distance of the 
average income 
Absolute value (Average income per capita in the 
Russian Federation – Average income per capita in 
the region) 
1995-1999  Goskomstat 
Dummy autonomous 
okrug 
1 if the region has the status of an autonomous 
okrug but Chukotka (which is not part of any other 
region), 0 otherwise 
n.a.  Own estimation 
Dummy border region 
CIS 
1 if the region has a border to any state outside the 
Russian Federation, which belongs to the CIS 
(Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan)  0 otherwise 
n.a.  Own estimation 
Dummy border region 
non-CIS 
1 if the region has a border to any state outside the 
Russian Federation, which does not to the CIS 
(Norway, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Mongolia, China, Korea and Japan)  0 otherwise 
n.a.  Own estimation 
Dummy republic  1 if the region has the status of a republic, 0 
otherwise  
n.a.  Own estimation 
Education  Share of population of the region with a university 
degree or incomplete university education 
2002  Russian Census 
Fiscal decentralization 
(expenditures) 
Average share of regional fiscal expenditures over 
the sum of the regional fiscal expenditures and the 
direct federal expenditures 
1998-1999  East-West Institute, 
2001 
Fiscal decentralization 
(retention rate and 
parafiscal funds) 
Average tax revenue of the regional budget and 
territorial parafiscal funds over the total tax 
collection and revenue of parafiscal funds from the 
territory of the region 
1999  As in retention rate, as 
well as East-West 
Institute (2001) for the 
extended budget 
Fiscal decentralization 
(retention rate and 
transfers) 
Average sum of tax revenue of the regional budget 
and total transfers to the regional budget over the 
total tax collection on the territory of the region 
1995-1999  As in retention rate and 
fiscal transfers 62  
 
Name  Description  Period  Source 
Fiscal decentralization 
(retention rate) 
Average tax revenue of the consolidated regional 
budget executed over the total tax collection on the 
territory of the region  
1995-1999  Until 1997:  
Freinkman, Treisman 
and Titov, 1999 
Since 1998: Ministry of 
Finance (for budget 
data), State Tax Service 
and Goskomstat (for 
tax collection data) 
Fiscal transfers  Average fiscal transfers from other budgets over 
total expenditures of the region’s consolidated 
budget 
1995-2003  Until 1997:  
Freinkman, Treisman 
and Titov, 1999 
Since 1998: Ministry of 
Finance 
Income per capita  Average income per capita of the region, 
thousands of RUR
55 
1995-1999  Goskomstat  
Industrial 
concentration 
Average share of dominant enterprises, as defined 
by the Russian antitrust law, in the total industrial 
output 
1995-1999  Goskomstat 
Industrial production 
index 
Average growth of industrial production in a 
region (measured as an index, i.e. 1 + growth rate) 
1995-1999  Goskomstat 
Net profit  Average net profit (profit – loss) of all region’s 
organizations, bln. RUR 
1995-1999  Goskomstat 
Oil & gas share  Average share of oil extraction in the region in the 
total oil extraction in Russia plus share of the gas 
extraction in the region to the total gas extraction 
in Russia over two 
1995-1999  Goskomstat 
Population  Log average population of the region, mln. People  1995-1999  Goskomstat 
Power (Jarocinska)  Index of power of regional governors, based on 
data like years in office, share on regional 
elections, control of parliament etc. The higher 
value of index represents a higher influence of 
regional governor. 
1995-2000  Jarocinska, 2004 
Regulatory capture 
(log number) 
Log number of acts assesses as contradicting the 
federal legislation 
2006  Ministry of Justice 
Regulatory capture 
(number) 
Number of acts assesses as contradicting the 
federal legislation 
2006  Ministry of Justice 
Regulatory capture 
(share) 
Number of acts assessed as contradicting the 
federal legislation over total number of acts 
assessed as either contradicting or conforming the 
federal legislation 
2006  Ministry of Justice 
Resources I  Ranking of regions from 1 (highest resources) to 
42 (lowest resources) based on the deposits of oil, 
gas, coal and gold 
1998  Vainberg and 
Rybnikova, 2006 
Resources II  Ranks regions from 1 (highest resources) to 6 
(lowest resources) depending upon the value of 
their explored natural resource deposits (USD) 
1996  Vainberg and 
Rybnikova, 2006 
Retail trade  Log average total retail trade revenue (current 
prices), bln. RUR 
1995-1999  Goskomstat 
Share of Russians   Share of ethnic Russians in the region’s population  2002  Russia’s Census, 2002 
State capture  Index of regulatory capture: residual average 
preferential treatment concentration after 
controlling for the number of preferential 
treatments 1995-2000. The higher value of index 
represents a higher degree of capture 
2000  Slinko, Yakovlev and 
Zhuravskaya, 2005 
Tax revenue  Log average total tax revenue from the region’s 
territory 
1995-1999  Goskomstat 
                                                           
55 In 1998 the Russian rubl was denominated; therefore all indicators for previous years were divided by 1000. 63  
 
Name  Description  Period  Source 
Tensions (MFK)  Index of tensions between the federal and the 
regional governments, ranging from 1 to 5, higher 
value indicates higher level of tensions. 
Components of index: number of critical 
statements of governors against president, 
electoral support of the president in the region and 
existence of power-sharing agreement 
1997 
 
MFK Renaissance  
Tensions (RUIE)  Index of tensions between the federal and the 
regional government, ranging from 1 to 3, higher 
value indicates higher level of tensions 
1996   Russian Union of 
Industrialist and 
Entrepreneurs 
Territory  Territory of the region, mln. sq.km, 0 for Moscow 
and St. Petersburg 
n.a.  Goskomstat 
TI perceived  Transparency International index, measuring the 
perception of corruption in the region, from 0 
(very low) to 1 (very high) 
2002  Transparency 
International and 
INDEM 
TI real  Transparency International index, measuring the 
actual level of corruption in the region, from 0 
(very low) to 1 (very high) 
2002  Transparency 
International and 
INDEM 
Total acts  Log total number of acts in the Federal Register  2006  Ministry of Justice 
Urbanization  Average share of urban population, % / 1000 (for 
representational purposes) 
1995-1999  Goskomstat 
 
Table A3: Correlation matrix, excluding republics 
  Fiscal decentralization  Regulatory decentralization 
Constitutional 
decentralization 
  Revenue 
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(0.101)  1 
 
Note: see Table 164  
 
 
Table A4: Correlation matrix, excluding outliers 
  Fiscal decentralization  Regulatory decentralization 
Constitutional 
decentralization 
  Revenue 
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(0.876)  1 
Note: see Table 1 
 
Table A5: Correlation matrix, excluding republics and outliers 
  Fiscal decentralization  Regulatory decentralization 
Constitutional 
decentralization 
  Revenue 
























































(0.270)  1           





























































(0.101)  1 
 
Note: see Table 165  
 
 
Table A6: Correlation matrix, controlling for population, income, territory and education 
  Fiscal decentralization  Regulatory decentralization 
Constitutional 
decentralization 
  Revenue 
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(0.663)  1 
Note: see Table 1 
 
Table A7: Correlation matrix, controlling for population, income, territory and education, dummy 
republic, dummy autonomous okrug and distance 
  Fiscal decentralization  Regulatory decentralization 
Constitutional 
decentralization 
  Revenue 
























































(0.871)  1         





























































(0.226)  1 
Note: see Table 166 
 
Table A8: Index of constitutional decentralization – regional constitutions 

















Evreyskaia                0 
Aginsk Buriat    Х          Х  2 
Chukotka    Х            1 
Evenk    Х            1 
Khanty Mansi    X      X      2 
Komi-Perm    Х  Х          2 
Koriak    Х      X      2 
Nenets    X      X      2 
Taimyr    Х            1 
Ust Ordyn Buriat                0 
Yamal Nenets    Х            1 
Moscow (Dity)    X            1 
St. Petersburg      Х          1 
Altai (Krai)  Х  Х      X      3 
Khabarovski    X          X  2 
Krasnodar  Х  X          X  3 
Krasnoiarsk  Х  X            2 
Primorski  Х  Х          Х  3 
Stavropol  Х  Х            2 
Amur    Х            1 
Arkhangelsk  X  X            2 
Astrakhan  X  X      X    X  4 
Belgorod    Х      X    Х  3 
Briansk  Х              1 
Cheliabinsk    X      X    X  3 
Chita  X  X      X      3 
Irkutsk    X            1 
Ivanovo    X            1 
Kaliningrad                0 
Kaluga    X            1 
Kamchatka  Х  Х            2 
Kemerovo  Х  Х  Х        Х  4 
Kirov    X        X    2 
Kostroma  X  X            2 
Kurgan    Х      X  X    3 
Kursk    Х            1 
Leningradskaia    X            1 
Lipetsk    X          X  2 
Magadan  Х  Х            2 
Moscow (Obl.)    X      X      2 
Murmansk                0 
Nizhny Novgorod    X            1 
Novgorod    X          X  2 
Novosibirsk  X  X      X      3 
Omsk    X      X      2 
Orel    Х            1 
Orenburg  X  X      X      3 
Penza  Х  Х      X      3 
Perm    Х            1 
Pskov  Х              1 
Rostov    Х            1 
Riazan  Х  Х            2 
Sakhalin  Х  Х            2 
Samara  Х  Х            2 
Saratov  Х  Х        X  Х  4 
Smolensk  Х  Х          Х  3 
Sverdlovskaia  Х  Х      X    Х  4 
Tambov  Х  Х      X    Х  4 
Tomsk  Х  Х      X    Х  4 
Tula  X  X          X  3 
Tver  X  X      X      3 
Tiumen    X            1 
Ulianovsk    X          X  2 
Vladimir                NA 
Volgograd    X  X    X      3 
Vologda                0 
Voronezh    Х          Х  2 
Yaroslavl                0 
Adygeia  X  X  X      X    4 
Altai (Rep.)  X  X            2 
Bashkortostan  X  X  X    X    X  5 
Buriatia  X  X  X          3 
Chuvashia  X  X  X          3 
Dagestan  X  X  X  X    X    5 
Ingushetia  X  X  X      X    4 
Kabardino-Balkaria  X          X    2 
Kalmykiya  X          X    2 
Karachaevo-Cherkessia  X  Х            2 
Karelia  X  X  X          3 
Khakassia      X          1 
Komi    X  X      X    3 
Mariy El    X        X    2 
Mordovia    X            1 
Northern Ossetia  X  X  X      X    4 67 
 

















Sakha  X  X  X    X  X  X  6 
Tatarstan  X  X  X    X  X    5 
Tyva  X  X  X    X  X  X  6 
Udmurtia  X    X          2 
 
Notes: the dimensions include: 
 (1) property on natural resources (regions, in spite of the federal regulation, declare natural resources – mostly 
mineral – their possession or take over the right to regulate the resources access regime); any claim on natural 
resources as property or estate (“dostoyanie”) of the peoples of the region is counted as “X”, as well as any 
official claims of the right of regional government to monitor and control the resource use and any restrictions on 
resource use against the interests of the regional population. 
(2) international agreements (regions, in spite of the federal regulation, declare their right to sign international 
agreements with other countries independently from the Russian Federation); any claim of the region to be an 
independent subject of international or external economic relations, as well as its right to sign international 
agreements is counted as “X”. 
(3) state of emergency (the region takes over the right to declare the state of emergency, or restricts the right of 
the federation to declare the state of emergency on its territory); 
(4)  restrictions  on  regional  branches  of  federal  government  (this  feature  applies  basically  to  one  region, 
Dagestan,  which  restricts  the  right  of  federal  agencies  to  establish  their  local  branches  on  its  territory  by 
requiring a special agreement); 
(5) independent monetary policy; any claim of the region to implement its own monetary policy is counted as 
“X”, as well as existence of the regional National bank. 
(6)  restrictions  on  validity  of  federal  acts  (the  region  requires  federal  acts  to  be  ratified  by  the  regional 
legislature; declares its right to (temporary) put federal law out of action; declares the priority of regional law at 
least in the area of shared responsibility of the federation and the region and / or reserves the right to take over 
the federal responsibilities if the federation does not implement them); any restrictions on federal law (including 
the right of the regional government to put it out of effect in several cases) are counted as “X”. 
(7) special regime of interbudgetary relations (Bashkortostan and Sakha reserve their right to determine the share 
of the federation in the over tax revenue from the region; Tyva maintains its own customs service); independent 
customs  policy;  right  of  the  region  to  request  compensation  from  the  federal  government  for  its  actions 
influencing the region; requirement to negotiate the split of federal taxes between budgets of the region and the 
federation are counted as “X”. 68 
 
Table A9: Index of constitutional decentralization – power sharing treaties 

























rules  Index 
Amur  0  1  0  0  2  1  0  2  1  1  8 
Cheliabinsk  1  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  9 
Irkutsk  0  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  0  1  6 
Ivanovo  1  1  0  0  2  1  0  2  1  1  9 
Kaliningrad  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  2  1  0  6 
Kirov  0  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  8 
Leningradskaia  0  0  0  0  2  1  0  2  1  1  7 
Magadan  0  1  0  0  2  1  0  2  1  1  8 
Moscow City  1  1  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  10 
Murmansk  0  1  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  9 
Nizhniy 
Novgorod  0  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  8 
Omsk  0  1  0  0  2  1  1  2  0  1  7 
Orenburg  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  2 
Perm  1  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  9 
Rostov  0  1  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  9 
Sakhalin  0  1  0  0  2  1  0  2  1  1  8 
Samara  0  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  8 
Saratov  1  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  9 
St. Petersburg  0  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  8 
Sverdlovsk  1  1  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  10 
Tver  1  0  0  0  2  1  0  2  1  0  7 
Ulianovsk  0  1  0  0  2  1  0  2  1  1  8 
Vologda  0  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  8 
Voronezh  1  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  9 
Briansk  1  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  9 
Astrakhan  1  1  0  0  2  1  0  2  1  1  9 
Yaroslavl  0  0  0  0  2  1  0  2  1  1  7 
Kostroma  1  1  0  0  1  2  0  2  1  1  9 
Altai (Krai)  1  0  0  0  2  1  0  2  0  0  6 
Khabarovsk  0  0  0  0  2  1  1  1  1  1  7 
Krasnodar  0  1  0  0  2  1  0  1  0  0  5 
Krasnoyarsk  0  1  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  9 
Bashkortostan  2  2  2  1  2  2  1  2  0  0  14 
Buriatia  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1 
Chuvashia  0  0  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  8 
Kabardino-
Balkaria  2  2  0  1  2  2  0  2  1  0  12 
Komi  0  2  0  0  2  1  0  2  0  0  7 
Mariy El  0  1  0  0  2  1  1  2  1  1  9 
Northern 
Ossetia  0  2  0  1  2  2  1  2  0  0  10 
Sakha  0  1  0  0  2  1  0  2  1  0  7 
Tatarstan  2  1  2  1  2  2  2  2  1  0  15 
Udmurtia  0  1  0  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  5 
 
Notes: 2 = sole responsibility of the region, 1 = joint responsibility of the region and of the federal government. 
The dimensions include (1) the right of the region to regulate alternative conscription (in many cases used as a 
legal tool to avoid the draft to the Russian military forces for the region’s population); (2) control over law 
enforcement agencies and migration; (3) power of pardon; (4) control over monetary policy; (5) control over 
regional taxes and budget; (6) control over natural resources (including oversight over the federal resources); (7) 
control over the conversion process for the military enterprises; (8) control over region’s international relations 
and customs; (9) co-work of the regional administration by the appointments of the federal staff in the region and 
(10) priority rules, which include explicit rules allowing the regional government to declare federal acts null and 
void and the regulation automatically extending any general improvement of the status of the regions through the 
federal law beyond the treaty rules on the region signing the treaty. Data include the main treaty and (when 
possible) supplementary treaties. Table includes only regions with a treaty: regions without a treaty excluded; 
autonomous okrugs excluded 69 
 
APPENDIX B: WITH AND WITHOUT REPUBLICS 
Table B1: Determinants of fiscal decentralization, 1995-1999, the sample of republics 










































Territory  -0.089  0.331  -0.700  0.152  0.096  0.127  -0.140  0.003 
  (0.227)  (0.295)  (0.603)  (1.187)  (0.074)  (0.084)  (0.198)  (0.169) 
Population  -0.007  0.108  0.627  0.603  0.038  0.032  0.115  0.053 
  (0.197)  (0.157)  (0.833)  (0.856)  (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.137)  (0.156) 
Oil and gas  -2.497  -1.771  -6.276  0.159  2.936**  0.972  -0.285  0.54 
  (4.944)  (2.530)  (15.873)  (14.057)  (0.976)  (1.519)  (5.153)  (4.156) 
Income per capita  -0.027    0.988    -0.125    0.174   
  (0.383)    (1.227)    (0.118)    (0.247)   
Distance from 
average income    -1.309    -1.259    -0.276    -0.061 
    (0.909)    (2.594)    (0.232)    (0.153) 
Share of Russians  0.041  -0.100  -1.277  -1.032  0.095  -0.051  0.241  0.287 
  (0.333)  (0.308)  (1.372)  (1.299)  (0.105)  (0.112)  (0.230)  (0.201) 
Distance from 
Moscow  0.043  -0.014  0.173  0.095  0.002  -0.010  -0.009  -0.007 
  (0.054)  (0.051)  (0.155)  (0.254)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.040)  (0.049) 
Dummy border 
region non-CIS  0.001  0.038  0.130  0.281  -0.024  -0.074**  -0.023  0.005 
  (0.157)  (0.109)  (0.574)  (0.598)  (0.051)  (0.033)  (0.097)  (0.089) 
Dummy border 
region CIS  0.012  0.070  0.167  0.287  -0.010  -0.046  -0.080  -0.034 
  (0.167)  (0.154)  (0.523)  (0.512)  (0.045)  (0.039)  (0.124)  (0.098) 
Urbanization  4.024  0.405  -27.286  -21.064  0.962  -1.539  5.662  8.256** 
  (5.985)  (6.969)  (18.016)  (15.939)  (1.889)  (2.004)  (3.170)  (3.110) 
Fiscal transfers  0.016  -0.137      -0.079  -0.023  0.522**  0.408** 
  (0.451)  (0.527)      (0.134)  (0.089)  (0.193)  (0.172) 
Retail trade  0.095  -0.011  0.008  -0.040      0.011  0.044 
  (0.197)  (0.119)  (0.558)  (0.603)      (0.140)  (0.140) 
Net profit  0.000  -0.020  -0.125*  -0.140*      0.009  0.009 
  (0.020)  -0.026  (0.056)  (0.070)      (0.008)  (0.007) 
Constant  0.239  1.233  2.736**  3.395  0.799***  1.047***  -0.085  -0.122 
  (0.356)  (0.879)  (1.046)  (2.088)  (0.137)  (0.200)  (0.218)  (0.239) 
Observations  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
R
2  0.61  0.693  0.716  0.697  0.804  0.827  0.85  0.839 
J.-B. test  1.481  0.659  0.227  0.290  0.836  1.626  1.005  2.996 
Notes: see Table 2 70 
 
 
Table B2: Determinants of regulatory and constitutional decentralization, 1995-1999, the sample of 
republics 
 
Regulatory decentralization  Constitutional decentralization 








































Treaties  Treaties  
Territory  0.054  -0.006  0.029  0.546  0.078  0.461  2.941  6.197  5.823  5.297 
 
(0.047)  (0.065)  (0.740)  (0.672)  (0.517)  (0.474)  (2.004)  (8.768)  (5.037)  (8.641) 
Population  -0.023  -0.015  -0.205  -0.258  -0.242**  -0.272**  0.507  0.169  3.437  2.571 
 
(0.016)  (0.012)  (0.194)  (0.189)  (0.109)  (0.117)  (0.760)  (0.588)  (2.407)  (2.897) 
Oil and gas  1.390  1.431  6.873  4.607  6.699  4.445  185.647**  214.897**  -51.937  -66.535 
 
(1.047)  (1.283)  (10.813)  (12.175)  (5.314)  (7.246)  (91.863)  (109.368)  (148.363)  (154.282) 
Income per 
capita  -0.046    0.186    0.100    4.088    -16.097*   
 
(0.092)    (1.554)    (1.146)    (3.606)    (8.851)   
Distance from 








Russians  0.060  0.062  -0.062  -0.192  -0.068  -0.163  -23.869  -22.348  -20.556*  -27.108** 
 
(0.061)  (0.060)  (0.693)  (0.589)  (0.477)  (0.362)  (16.431)  (16.999)  (10.702)  (9.730) 
Distance from 
Moscow  -0.004  0.002  0.013  -0.048  -0.006  -0.053  -0.072  -0.369  0.282  -0.245 
 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.122)  (0.128)  (0.065)  (0.077)  (0.344)  (0.783)  (1.019)  (1.583) 
Dummy border 
region non-CIS  0.026  0.022  0.002  0.000  -0.007  -0.006  6.878  7.529  -0.187  -3.195 
 
(0.040)  (0.038)  (0.421)  (0.406)  (0.236)  (0.191)  (5.747)  (6.269)  (3.668)  (3.667) 
Dummy border 
region CIS  0.076*  0.066*  0.593  0.676  0.531**  0.604**  -3.833**  -3.572**  1.902  -1.918 
 
(0.035)  (0.033)  (0.432)  (0.518)  (0.240)  (0.304)  (1.764)  (1.794)  (6.010)  (5.592) 
Urbanization  -3.060 
-
3.090*  -23.665  -26.287  -19.941  -23.030*  150.662**  183.734**  843.328***  571.240* 
 
(1.768)  (1.653)  (21.124)  (20.092)  (13.264)  (13.922)  (63.100)  (79.472)  (240.925)  (304.546) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.190* 
-
0.175*  -0.796  -0.977  -0.618  -0.808  10.791**  11.122**  -5.191  2.371 
 
(0.103)  (0.096)  (1.373)  (1.523)  (0.728)  (0.892)  (4.628)  (5.126)  (14.036)  (14.47) 
Total acts    1.259*  1.212*  1.321***  1.248***  1.259*         
 
  (0.554)  (0.631)  (0.364)  (0.448)  (0.554)     
   
Constant  0.262  -2.914  -1.516  -3.539  -2.118  0.262      -28.825*  -10.006 
 
(0.197)  (5.282)  (6.546)  (3.391)  (4.705)  (0.197)      (14.080)  (27.235) 
Observations  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
R
2  0.627  0.635  0.636  0.652             
Pseudo R
2          0.082  0.084  0.497  0.487  0.336  0.308 
Wald Chi-test          448.881***  427.941***         
LR 
proportional 
odds              30.14  29.96 
   
J.-B. test  1.008  1.157  6.364**  4.870*             
Notes: see Table 3. Outlier in regressions (B11) and (B12) is Mariy El; all significant variables hold their sign 
and significance after exclusion of outliers 71 
 
Table B3: Determinants of fiscal decentralization, 1995-1999, excluding republics 










































Territory  0.068**  0.066**  -0.050  -0.039  0.000  0.000  0.064  0.063 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.101)  (0.096)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Population  -0.056  -0.055  0.055  0.013  -0.007  -0.007  -0.081  -0.077 
 
(0.048)  (0.036)  (0.287)  (0.252)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.093)  (0.083) 
Oil and gas  0.016  0.022  -0.501**  -0.494**  0.121**  0.125**  -0.155  -0.155 
 
(0.063)  (0.063)  (0.205)  (0.199)  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.114)  (0.116) 
Income per capita  -0.012    0.087    0.002    -0.022   
  (0.034)    (0.130)    (0.010)    (0.043)   
Distance from 
average income    -0.016    0.084    0.000    -0.024 
    (0.024)    (0.130)    (0.009)    (0.041) 
Dummy 
autonomous okrug  -0.030  -0.026  -0.290  -0.286  0.040  0.041  0.039  0.043 
 
(0.055)  (0.050)  (0.271)  (0.265)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.092)  (0.095) 
Share of Russians  0.147  0.147  0.017  0.010  -0.121  -0.124  0.353**  0.344** 
 
(0.099)  (0.095)  (0.443)  (0.449)  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.167)  (0.171) 
Distance from 
Moscow  0.003  0.003  0.050***  0.051***  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.004 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Dummy border 
region non-CIS  0.018  0.018  -0.101  -0.104  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.004 
 
(0.020)  (0.020)  (0.136)  (0.138)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Dummy border 
region CIS  0.017  0.017  -0.088  -0.088  -0.021  -0.021  0.054*  0.053* 
 
(0.016)  (0.016)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
Urbanization  -0.425  -0.428  -13.491***  -13.151***  -1.151*  -1.094*  0.843  0.876 
 
(0.799)  (0.722)  (4.318)  (4.228)  (0.634)  (0.623)  (1.592)  (1.592) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.012  0.001      -0.255***  -0.257***  -0.264  -0.256 
 
(0.110)  (0.112)      (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.168)  (0.171) 
Retail trade  0.014  0.014  -0.269  -0.231      -0.002  -0.004 
 
(0.045)  (0.033)  (0.234)  (0.201)      (0.081)  (0.074) 
Net profit  -0.002  -0.002*  0.015***  0.014***      0.000  0.000 
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.005)      (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant  0.523***  0.519***  2.164***  2.125***  1.029***  1.030***  0.417*  0.408* 
  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.490)  (0.461)  (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.218)  (0.224) 
Observations  68  68  68  68  68  68  68  68 
R
2  0.600  0.602  0.796  0.797  0.522  0.521  0.440  0.441 
J.-B. test  15.79***  15.55**  78.79***  81.49***  14.79***  14.93***  17.42***  16.92*** 
Notes: see Table 2. Outliers in regressions (B19) and (B20) are Taimyr, Aginsk Buriatski, Lipetsk and Vologda; 
in  (B21)  and  (B22)  Evenkia  and  Ust  Ordyn  Buriatski,  in  (B24)  and  (B25)  Briansk,  Rostov,  Tula  and 72 
 
Novosibirsk, in (B26) and (B27) Taimyr and Tomsk. After exclusion of outliers in regressions (B24) and (B25)  
urbanization becomes insignificant, but holds its sign, dummy border region CIS in regressions (B26) ad (B27) 
becomes insignificant, but holds its sign. 73 
 
Table B4: Determinants of regulatory and constitutional decentralization, 1995-1999, excluding republics 
 
Regulatory decentralization  Constitutional decentralization 








































Treaties  Treaties 
Territory  -0.007  -0.009  0.051  0.037  0.068  0.054  -0.666*  -0.693*  3.874  3.834 
 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.131)  (0.130)  (0.125)  (0.122)  (0.386)  (0.410)  (2.761)  (2.753) 
Population  0.008  0.010  0.132  0.138  0.154*  0.165**  0.624  0.671*  2.370  2.429 
 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.081)  (0.078)  (0.382)  (0.391)  (1.572)  (1.590) 
Oil and gas  0.049  0.056  0.425  0.554  0.258  0.317  -0.829  -1.084  -38.563  -38.812 
 
(0.057)  (0.056)  (0.784)  (0.803)  (0.504)  (0.491)  (1.458)  (1.535)  (52.615)  (54.567) 
Income per 
capita  -0.021    -0.029    -0.084    -0.691*    -0.896   
 
(0.014)    (0.159)    (0.116)    (0.370)    (2.146)   
Distance from 









okrug  0.076*  0.082**  -0.026  0.038  0.182  0.226  0.510  0.441 
   
 
(0.038)  (0.039)  (0.369)  (0.370)  (0.333)  (0.327)  (1.246)  (1.277) 
   
Share of 
Russians  0.037  0.036  -0.191  -0.218  -0.370  -0.396  -1.681  -1.717  -20.676  -20.744 
 
(0.054)  (0.053)  (0.693)  (0.684)  (0.524)  (0.513)  (2.499)  (2.520)  (12.636)  (12.573) 
Distance from 
Moscow  0.007*  0.006*  0.065**  0.066**  0.058**  0.056***  0.237**  0.202**  -0.531  -0.569 
 
(0.004)  (0.003)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.105)  (0.097)  (0.455)  (0.455) 
Dummy border 
region non-CIS  0.011  0.012  -0.091  -0.100  0.019  0.016  -1.367  -1.261  2.675  2.713 
 
(0.031)  (0.031)  (0.229)  (0.229)  (0.227)  (0.225)  (1.054)  (1.079)  (3.249)  (3.243) 
Dummy border 
region CIS  0.003  0.003  -0.041  -0.047  0.125  0.124  0.120  0.155  3.563*  3.578* 
 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.269)  (0.272)  (0.137)  (0.137)  (0.734)  (0.733)  (2.103)  (2.098) 
Urbanization  -0.195  -0.239  -3.223  -2.526  1.300  1.478  -17.065  -21.943  272.648**  269.810** 
 
(0.521)  (0.506)  (8.007)  (7.585)  (5.028)  (4.935)  (24.08)  (24.755)  (112.606)  (107.294) 
Fiscal transfers  0.016  0.039  0.444  0.486  0.549  0.658  -3.357  -2.657  6.030  6.921 
 
(0.057)  (0.055)  (0.707)  (0.698)  (0.530)  (0.498)  -2.829  -2.717  (11.479)  (11.783) 
Total acts      0.388**  0.413**  0.439**  0.459**         
 
    (0.190)  (0.191)  (0.200)  (0.199)     
   
Constant  0.058  0.051  2.319  2.099  1.823  1.634      -1.463  -1.626 
 
(0.060)  (0.061)  (1.455)  (1.460)  (1.583)  (1.588)      (14.142)  (14.139) 
Observations  68  68  68  68  68  68  68  67  59  59 
R
2  0.441  0.313  0.321  0.138             
Pseudo R
2          0.025  0.025  0.069  0.066  0.074  0.074 
Wald Chi-stat          2669.537***  2659.325***         
LR proportional 
odds              50.65**  45.60** 
   
J.-B. test  33.47***  31.53***  1260***  1282***             
Notes: see Table 3. Outlier in regression (B27) and (B28) is Primorski, in regression (B29) and (B30) Saratov. 
After exclusion of outliers distance from Moscow in regression (B27) and (B28) becomes insignificant, but 
holds its sign. 74 
 
APPENDIX C: INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF DECENTRALIZATION 
Table  C1:  Determinants  of  fiscal  decentralization,  1995-1999,  dep.var.:  retention  rate,  controlling  for 





























Territory  0.036**  0.042**  0.035**  0.028  0.049**  0.046**  0.039**  0.039***  0.039*  0.054***  0.066***  0.041**  0.038** 
  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Population  -0.118  -0.114  -0.123  -0.075  -0.100  -0.095  -0.117  0.010  -0.064  0.015  0.095  -0.080  -0.085 
  (0.081)  (0.079)  (0.080)  (0.092)  (0.078)  (0.072)  (0.081)  (0.038)  (0.098)  (0.062)  (0.078)  (0.103)  (0.104) 
Oil and gas  0.102  0.113  0.097  -0.260  0.115  0.111  0.103  0.116  0.308**  0.066  0.048     
  (0.100)  (0.097)  (0.092)  (0.297)  (0.096)  (0.095)  (0.100)  (0.079)  (0.134)  (0.086)  (0.113)     
Income per capita  -0.096*  -0.094*  -0.097*  -0.020  -0.091*  -0.087*  -0.090*  -0.025  -0.020  -0.002  0.028  -0.075  -0.079 
  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.067)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.070)  (0.069)  (0.084)  (0.072)  (0.073) 
Dummy 
autonomous okrug  0.093  0.093  0.095  0.060  0.089  0.099  0.075  -0.078**           
  (0.085)  (0.086)  (0.087)  (0.105)  (0.083)  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.039)           
Dummy republic  0.038  0.044  0.04  0.040  0.046*  0.046*  0.013  0.058*  0.054*  0.138**  0.119*  0.052*  0.050* 
  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.043)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.051)  (0.059)  (0.028)  (0.027) 
Distnce from 
Moscow  0.009**  0.010**  0.010**  0.007  0.012**  0.012**  0.010**  0.006  0.008  -0.002  -0.004  0.007*  0.007 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Dummy border 
region non-CIS  0.005  0.005  0.007  0.031  0.002  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.019  0.055  0.019  0.019  0.017 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.040)  (0.028)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.028)  (0.029) 
Dummy border 
region CIS  0.001  -0.003  -0.001  -0.004  -0.009  -0.003  -0.002  0.011  0.000  0.036**  0.033  0.014  0.015 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Urbanization  1.225  1.345  1.243  -0.021  1.219  1.357  0.949  2.418  1.983  0.649  2.159*  1.681  1.665 
  (1.117)  (1.100)  (1.141)  (1.062)  (1.012)  (1.080)  (1.233)  (1.561)  (1.235)  (1.035)  (1.230)  (1.329)  (1.321) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.105  -0.113  -0.111  -0.102  -0.155  -0.14  -0.109  -0.08  -0.057  0.255  0.247  -0.060  -0.056 
  (0.133)  (0.134)  (0.132)  (0.124)  (0.132)  (0.129)  (0.138)  (0.086)  (0.139)  (0.165)  (0.165)  (0.121)  (0.121) 
Retail trade  0.103  0.099  0.108  0.075  0.086  0.084  0.104  -0.022  0.067  -0.003  -0.065  0.075  0.077 
  (0.087)  (0.085)  (0.086)  (0.093)  (0.084)  (0.078)  (0.086)  (0.030)  (0.095)  (0.056)  (0.063)  (0.101)  (0.102) 
Net profit  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.006*  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003*  -0.002  -0.007*  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Democracy  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.004**  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003     
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)     
Power (Jarocinska)    -0.019      -0.046*  -0.045  -0.020  -0.010  -0.024*  0.003  -0.002     
    (0.014)      (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)     
Power (RUIE)      -0.015                     
      (0.015)                     
Power (UI)        -0.005                   
        (0.009)                   
Tension (RUIE)          0.025                 
          (0.016)                 
Tension (MFK)            0.013               
            (0.013)               
Declarations              0.031             
              (0.031)             
Regulatory capture                -0.032           
                (0.058)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.001         
                  (0.001)         
TI perceived                    -0.133**       
                    (0.047)       
TI real                      -0.094**     
                      (0.039)     
Resources I                        0.002   
                        (0.008)   
Resources II                          0.000 
                          (0.001) 
Constant  0.543***  0.659***  0.582***  0.601***  0.822***  0.809***  0.607***  0.713***  0.638***  0.635***  0.624***  0.435***  0.453*** 
  (0.133)  (0.148)  (0.123)  (0.134)  (0.161)  (0.181)  (0.157)  (0.112)  (0.144)  (0.158)  (0.159)  (0.156)  (0.145) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.331  0.343  0.34  0.298  0.358  0.354  0.35  0.49  0.337  0.755  0.714  0.254  0.254 
J.-B. test  70.28***  62.11***  51.47***  111.3***  55.12***  50.87***  66.51***  1.566  84.49***  1.256  5.256*  66.7***  68.43*** 
 
Note: see Table 2. Outliers in regression (C1), (C3), (C7) are Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Altai Rep. and  Aginsk Buriatski, in (C2) 
Ingushetia,  Kalmykia,  Altai  Rep.,  Aginsk  Buriatski,  Vologda,  Taimyr,  Tatarstan  and  Bashkortostan,  in  (C4)  Ingushetia, 
Kalmykia,  Aginsk  Buriatski,  Tatarstan,  Bashkortostan  and  Vologda,  in  (C5)  Ingushetia,  Kalmykia,  Altai  Rep.,  Aginsk 
Buristaki,  Tatarstan,  Taimyr,  Bashkortostan,  Vologda  and  Kemerovo,  in  (C6)  Tatarstan,  Ingushetia,  Kalmykia.,  Altai 
Republic  and  Aginsk  Buriatski,  in  (C9)  Ingushetia  and  Kalmykia,  in  (C11)  Udmurtia,  in  (C12)  and  (C13)  Kalmykia, 
Ingushetia, Altai Rep., Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. After exclusion of outliers average income per capita in (C2) becomes 
insignificant and changes its sign, in (C5) distance form Moscow and dummy republic lose their significance, but keep their 
sign, and power (Jarocinska) and income per capita are not significant and change their sign, in (C6) dummy republic and 
income per capita lose their significance, but keep their sign, in (C9) net profit and power (Jarocinska) become insignificant, 
but keep their signs, in (C11) urbanization becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign, in (C12) dummy republic and distance 
become insignificant, but keep their sign, in (C13) dummy republic becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign. 75 
 
Table  C2:  Determinants  of  fiscal  decentralization,  1995-1999,  dep.var.:  retention  rate,  controlling  for 





























Territory  0.031*  0.038**  0.031*  0.025  0.045**  0.043**  0.035**  0.039***  0.038**  0.051**  0.062**  0.039**  0.035* 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Population  -0.085  -0.083  -0.089  -0.087  -0.069  -0.066  -0.087  0.006  -0.075  0.008  0.069  -0.06  -0.062 
  (0.062)  (0.060)  (0.062)  (0.074)  (0.058)  (0.054)  (0.062)  (0.033)  (0.083)  (0.047)  (0.059)  (0.078)  (0.079) 
Oil and gas  0.108  0.124  0.102  0.027  0.129  0.124  0.115  0.068  0.225**  0.041  0.017     
  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.084)  (0.308)  (0.088)  (0.087)  (0.091)  (0.083)  (0.108)  (0.116)  (0.139)     
Distance from 
average income  -0.106**  -0.107**  -0.107**  -0.072  -0.107**  -0.102**  -0.103**  -0.059  -0.077  -0.022  -0.008  -0.095  -0.095 
  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.063)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.077)  (0.076)  (0.083)  (0.070)  (0.071) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  0.105  0.108  0.107  0.048  0.105  0.115  0.091  -0.051           
  (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.084)  (0.105)  (0.080)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.036)           
Dummy republic  0.039  0.047*  0.041  0.041  0.049*  0.049*  0.018  0.062**  0.056**  0.136**  0.116*  0.053*  0.052* 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.043)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.052)  (0.061)  (0.028)  (0.027) 
Distance from 
Moscow  0.006  0.008*  0.007  0.007  0.009**  0.009**  0.007*  0.005  0.007  -0.003  -0.004  0.005  0.005 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Dummy border 
region CIS  0.008  0.008  0.01  0.027  0.004  0.003  0.006  0.002  0.016  0.059  0.025  0.018  0.016 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.039)  (0.030)  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Dummy border 
region non-CIS  0.001  -0.003  -0.001  -0.004  -0.01  -0.004  -0.003  0.012  0.001  0.038**  0.034  0.013  0.014 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Urbanization  1.047  1.21  1.056  -0.021  1.101  1.260  0.854  2.533*  2.122*  0.742  2.381*  1.443  1.384 
  (1.094)  (1.077)  (1.114)  (1.068)  (0.988)  (1.051)  (1.203)  (1.477)  (1.195)  (0.912)  (1.214)  (1.388)  (1.375) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.040  -0.048  -0.045  -0.048  -0.094  -0.079  -0.047  -0.046  -0.024  0.276  0.279*  -0.004  -0.003 
  (0.132)  (0.132)  (0.130)  (0.130)  (0.129)  (0.125)  (0.137)  (0.085)  (0.139)  (0.167)  (0.157)  (0.125)  (0.123) 
Retail trade  0.079  0.076  0.084  0.082  0.064  0.064  0.082  -0.02  0.071  0.001  -0.046  0.059  0.06 
  (0.070)  (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.078)  (0.066)  (0.061)  (0.069)  (0.025)  (0.082)  (0.042)  (0.047)  (0.080)  (0.081) 
Net profit  -0.003*  -0.002  -0.003*  -0.004  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003*  -0.001  -0.004  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Democracy  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004*  -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.005**  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003     
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    -0.022      -0.052**  -0.049*  -0.023*  -0.013  -0.027*  0.003  -0.001     
    (0.014)      (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.014)     
Power (RUIE)      -0.014                     
      (0.015)                     
Power (UI)        -0.007                   
        (0.009)                   
Tensions (RUIE)          0.028*                 
          (0.016)                 
Tensions (MFK)            0.014               
            (0.013)               
Declarations              0.029             
              (0.031)             
Regulatory 
capture                -0.040           
                (0.058)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.001         
                  (0.001)         
TI perceived                    -0.133**       
                    (0.047)       
TI real                      -0.092**     
                      (0.039)     
Resources I                        0.005   
                        (0.009)   
Resources II                          0.000 
                          (0.001) 
Constant  0.559***  0.690***  0.597***  0.597***  0.867***  0.843***  0.639***  0.728***  0.659***  0.632***  0.595***  0.426***  0.453*** 
  (0.121)  (0.132)  (0.111)  (0.125)  (0.147)  (0.166)  (0.140)  (0.111)  (0.141)  (0.128)  (0.136)  (0.156)  (0.139) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.354  0.369  0.362  0.314  0.388  0.382  0.376  0.499  0.349  0.756  0.712  0.268  0.266 
J.-B. test  53.64***  44.31***  39.54***  96.73***  37.45***  37.54***  47.56***  1.692  66.34***  1.01  4.277  49.62***  51.58*** 
 
Notes: see Table 2. Outliers are Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Altai Rep. and Aginsk Buriatski in (C14), (C15), (C16), (C18), (C19), 
(C20), Ingushetia, Kalmykia and Aginsk Buriatski in (C17), Ingushetia and Kalmykia in (C22), Kalmykia, Ingushetia, Altai 
Rep. and Tatarstan in (C25) and (C26). After exclusion of outliers in (C14) and (C16) net profit becomes insignificant, but 
keeps its sign, in (C18) power (Jarocinska) and tensions (RUIE) become insignificant, but keep their signs, in (C19) power 
(Jarocinska) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign, in (C20) power (Jarocinska) and  net profit become insignificant, but 
keep their signs, in (C22) power (Jarconska), urbanization and oil and gas variable become insignificant, but maintain their 
signs, in (C25) and (C26) dummy republic becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign. 76 
 
Table C3: Determinants of fiscal decentralization, 1995-1999, dep.var.: retention rate including fiscal 





























Territory  -0.083  -0.084  -0.083  -0.057  -0.036  -0.066  -0.08  -0.09  -0.09  0.054  0.067  -0.106  -0.1 
  (0.062)  (0.067)  (0.062)  (0.076)  (0.061)  (0.052)  (0.064)  (0.076)  (0.088)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.071)  (0.073) 
Population  -0.058  -0.059  -0.067  0.091  0.007  -0.004  -0.054  0.201  0.061  0.115  0.089  0.032  0.04 
  (0.287)  (0.286)  (0.292)  (0.411)  (0.328)  (0.368)  (0.295)  (0.531)  (0.449)  (0.184)  (0.188)  (0.373)  (0.370) 
Oil and gas  -0.409  -0.411  -0.415  -2.065  -0.387  -0.412  -0.395  -0.063  -0.009  0.245  0.272     
  (0.261)  (0.266)  (0.256)  (1.716)  (0.264)  (0.267)  (0.272)  (0.415)  (0.500)  (0.178)  (0.191)     
Income per 
capita  -0.015  -0.015  -0.017  0.171  -0.004  0.004  -0.022  0.198  0.184  0.267  0.248  0.088  0.094 
  (0.180)  (0.179)  (0.181)  (0.342)  (0.182)  (0.203)  (0.173)  (0.438)  (0.419)  (0.157)  (0.164)  (0.287)  (0.286) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  0.074  0.074  0.079  0.344  0.074  0.098  0.103  -0.369           
  (0.293)  (0.296)  (0.299)  (0.490)  (0.289)  (0.296)  (0.341)  (0.342)           
Dummy 
republic  0.118  0.117  0.121  0.126  0.119  0.119  0.166  0.218*  0.192*  0.147**  0.149*  0.257**  0.257** 
  (0.132)  (0.130)  (0.135)  (0.125)  (0.128)  (0.130)  (0.302)  (0.123)  (0.112)  (0.064)  (0.073)  (0.109)  (0.106) 
Distance from 
Moscow  0.058***  0.057***  0.058***  0.041**  0.061***  0.060***  0.058***  0.036**  0.038**  0.024**  0.024*  0.043***  0.043*** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Dummy border 
region non-CIS  -0.025  -0.025  -0.021  0.072  -0.045  -0.04  -0.022  0.022  0.049  -0.041  -0.054  0.065  0.069 
  (0.135)  (0.136)  (0.137)  (0.129)  (0.141)  (0.146)  (0.136)  (0.119)  (0.120)  (0.070)  (0.063)  (0.111)  (0.114) 
Dummy border 
region CIS  0.033  0.034  0.031  0.037  0.000  0.032  0.032  0.098  0.084  0.038  0.026  0.110  0.108 
  (0.095)  (0.097)  (0.095)  (0.090)  (0.086)  (0.095)  (0.094)  (0.074)  (0.071)  (0.053)  (0.050)  (0.070)  (0.071) 
Urbanization  -13.545**  -13.576**  -13.486**  -14.979*  -13.431**  -13.245**  -12.941**  -7.994  -7.470  -3.258  -3.129  -8.416  -8.343 
  (6.336)  (6.511)  (6.387)  (8.360)  (6.075)  (6.317)  (5.791)  (8.491)  (8.921)  (3.306)  (3.709)  (6.714)  (6.712) 
Retail trade  -0.065  -0.064  -0.056  -0.170  -0.112  -0.102  -0.072  -0.251  -0.144  -0.146  -0.134  -0.103  -0.108 
  (0.223)  (0.222)  (0.230)  (0.290)  (0.242)  (0.265)  (0.231)  (0.404)  (0.314)  (0.138)  (0.134)  (0.264)  (0.265) 
Net profits  0.008  0.008  0.009  -0.002  0.008  0.008  0.009  -0.004  -0.007  -0.016*  -0.015*  -0.002  -0.003 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.020)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Democracy  -0.005  -0.005  -0.006  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004  -0.005  -0.007  -0.007  -0.002  -0.002     
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.004)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    0.004      -0.133  -0.072  0.006  0.023  0.029  -0.051  -0.049     
    (0.045)      (0.119)  (0.139)  (0.047)  (0.050)  (0.052)  (0.039)  (0.042)     
Power (RUIE)      -0.023                     
      (0.047)                     
Power (UI)        0.073                   
        (0.061)                   
|Tensions 
(RUIE)          0.127                 
          (0.114)                 
Tensions 
(MFK)            0.039               
            (0.077)               
Declarations              -0.049             
              (0.194)             
Regulatory 
capture                -0.283           
                (0.231)           
Industrial 
concentration                  -0.002         
                  (0.002)         
TI perceived                    -0.081       
                    (0.086)       
TI real                      0.030     
                      (0.073)     
Resources I                        -0.010   
                        (0.028)   
Resources II                          0.000 
                          (0.003) 
Constant  2.003***  1.980***  2.059***  1.923***  2.648***  2.361***  2.058***  1.623***  1.442***  1.490***  1.421***  1.504**  1.459** 
  (0.395)  (0.376)  (0.402)  (0.452)  (0.738)  (0.857)  (0.519)  (0.436)  (0.388)  (0.283)  (0.271)  (0.593)  (0.575) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.623  0.623  0.624  0.649  0.636  0.626  0.624  0.464  0.495  0.717  0.711  0.468  0.467 
J.-B. test  561.4***  559.8***  556.4***  368***  461***  525***  523.6***  2223***  1541***  0.985  1.412  1493***  1496*** 
 
Notes: see Table 2. Outliers are Ust Ordyn Buriatski, Evenkia, Tyva and Dagestan in regressions (C27)- (C33), 
as well as Kabardino-Balkaria and Northern Ossetia in regression (C33), Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and 
Altai Krai in (C34), Dagestan, Tyva, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chukotka and Altai Krai in (C35), Dagestan, Tyva, 
Kabardino-Balkaria, Northern Ossetia, Adygeya, and Evreiskaya in (C38) and (C39). After exclusion of outliers 
in regressions (C27), (C28), (C29), (C30), (C32) urbanization becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign; dummy 
republic in (C38) and (C39) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign. 77 
 
Table  C4:  Determinants  of  fiscal  decentralization,  1995-1999,  dep.var.:  retention  rate  including  fiscal 





























Territory  -0.076  -0.078  -0.076  -0.029  -0.032  -0.059  -0.074  -0.064  -0.07  0.068  0.08  -0.073  -0.07 
  (0.057)  (0.062)  (0.058)  (0.077)  (0.061)  (0.051)  (0.061)  (0.080)  (0.091)  (0.052)  (0.056)  (0.073)  (0.073) 
Population  -0.026  -0.027  -0.034  0.074  0.023  0.016  -0.020  0.300  0.104  0.023  0.000  0.108  0.112 
  (0.240)  (0.241)  (0.245)  (0.310)  (0.271)  (0.300)  (0.253)  (0.396)  (0.345)  (0.156)  (0.166)  (0.280)  (0.282) 
Oil and gas  -0.476*  -0.479*  -0.483*  -2.856  -0.427  -0.465*  -0.467*  0.512  0.487  0.357  0.369     
  (0.270)  (0.278)  (0.262)  (1.817)  (0.263)  (0.274)  (0.278)  (0.727)  (0.807)  (0.243)  (0.262)     
Distance from average 
income per capita  0.049  0.050  0.048  0.311  0.034  0.056  0.044  0.603  0.490  0.268  0.242  0.353  0.358 
  (0.183)  (0.186)  (0.184)  (0.362)  (0.177)  (0.196)  (0.178)  (0.524)  (0.529)  (0.170)  (0.178)  (0.287)  (0.299) 
Dummy autonomous 
okrug  0.032  0.031  0.037  0.402  0.050  0.065  0.055  -0.658**           
  (0.276)  (0.280)  (0.281)  (0.480)  (0.277)  (0.281)  (0.320)  (0.306)           
Dummy republic  0.106  0.104  0.109  0.123  0.112  0.108  0.144  0.16  0.173  0.154*  0.155*  0.226**  0.224** 
  (0.129)  (0.126)  (0.132)  (0.126)  (0.126)  (0.127)  (0.293)  (0.104)  (0.105)  (0.080)  (0.088)  (0.101)  (0.097) 
Distance from Moscow  0.057***  0.056***  0.057***  0.042**  0.060***  0.060**  0.057***  0.036**  0.040**  0.030**  0.029**  0.041**  0.040*** 
  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Dummy border region 
non-CIS  -0.022  -0.022  -0.017  0.075  -0.043  -0.038  -0.019  0.035  0.062  -0.039  -0.052  0.093  0.096 
  (0.137)  (0.138)  (0.139)  (0.136)  (0.143)  (0.148)  (0.138)  (0.131)  (0.130)  (0.073)  (0.066)  (0.113)  (0.114) 
Dummy border region 
CIS  0.034  0.035  0.032  0.033  0.001  0.033  0.034  0.073  0.076  0.034  0.021  0.106  0.105 
  (0.094)  (0.097)  (0.094)  (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.095)  (0.094)  (0.062)  (0.067)  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.068)  (0.068) 
Urbanization  -13.950**  -13.990**  -13.902**  -13.797*  -13.652**  -13.493**  -13.502**  -8.374  -7.204  -2.611  -2.464  -7.686  -7.596 
  (5.982)  (6.188)  (6.038)  (7.022)  (5.742)  (5.995)  (5.615)  (7.120)  (7.139)  (2.741)  (3.139)  (5.379)  (5.340) 
Retail trade  -0.095  -0.094  -0.086  -0.138  -0.127  -0.121  -0.102  -0.288  -0.144  -0.051  -0.044  -0.145  -0.149 
  (0.182)  (0.182)  (0.189)  (0.204)  (0.193)  (0.208)  (0.191)  (0.266)  (0.217)  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.190)  (0.195) 
Net profit  0.007  0.007  0.007  -0.01  0.008  0.007  0.007  -0.025  -0.024  -0.018*  -0.017  -0.012  -0.013 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.022)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Democracy  -0.004  -0.004  -0.005  -0.001  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004  -0.001  -0.003  0.000  -0.001     
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.005)     
Power (Jarocinska)    0.005      -0.131  -0.073  0.006  0.061  0.049  -0.039  -0.038     
    (0.048)      (0.111)  (0.131)  (0.050)  (0.070)  (0.065)  (0.036)  (0.038)     
Power (RUIE)      -0.023                     
      (0.048)                     
Power (UI)        0.075                   
        (0.060)                   
Tensions (RUIE)          0.125                 
          (0.107)                 
Tensions (MFK)            0.040               
            (0.074)               
Declarations              -0.040             
              (0.188)             
Regulatory capture                -0.155           
                (0.206)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.000         
                  (0.001)         
TI perceived                    -0.091       
                    (0.091)       
TI real                      0.030     
                      (0.076)     
Resources I                        -0.016   
                        (0.032)   
Resources II                          -0.001 
                          (0.003) 
Constant  2.024***  1.997***  2.080***  1.763***  2.648***  2.370***  2.065***  1.251***  1.150***  1.286***  1.229***  1.506***  1.463*** 
  (0.338)  (0.349)  (0.351)  (0.369)  (0.620)  (0.718)  (0.474)  (0.323)  (0.344)  (0.217)  (0.212)  (0.521)  (0.486) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.624  0.624  0.624  0.656  0.636  0.627  0.624  0.507  0.516  0.721  0.713  0.490  0.489 
J.-B. test  526.2***  524.2***  520.7***  322.2***  447.1***  500.4***  496.3***  1414***  1074***  0.601  0.413  1194***  1174*** 
 
Note: see Table 2. Outliers are Dagestan, Ust Ordyn Buriatski, Tyva and Evenkia  for (C40) – (C46), Dagestan, 
Evreyskaya,  Kabardino-Balkaria  and  Adygeiya  in  (C47),  Dagestan,  Tyva,  Kabardino-Balkaria,  Chukotka, 
Northern Ossetia, Evereyskaya, Adygeya in (C48), Dagestan, Tyva, Evreyskaya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Northern 
Ossetia, Adygeya in (C51) and (C52). After exclusion of outliers oil and gas in regressions (C40), (C41), (C42), 
(C45), (C46) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign; urbanization in regression (C43) becomes insignificant, 
but keeps its sign, dummy republic in (C51) and (C52) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign 78 
 
 
Table  C5:  Determinants  of  fiscal  decentralization,  1999,  dep.  Var.:  expenditure  decentralization, 





























Territory  0.014  0.013  0.013  0.015  0.013  0.013  0.011  0.017  0.02  -0.014  -0.009  0.029*  0.025* 
  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Population  0.009  0.009  0.007  0.005  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.006  0.004  0.006  0.009  0.009  0.007 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Oil and gas  0.118***  0.117**  0.127***  0.191**  0.116**  0.116**  0.102**  0.107**  0.126***  0.116**  0.117**     
  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.039)  (0.084)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.047)     
Income per 
capita  -0.004  -0.004  -0.008  -0.001  -0.004  -0.004  -0.002  -0.011  -0.003  -0.001  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  0.113***  0.113***  0.110***  0.081**  0.113***  0.112***  0.096***  0.154***           
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.040)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.018)           
Dummy 
republic  0.029  0.028  0.028  0.023  0.028  0.028  0.001  0.032  0.029  0.080**  0.075**  0.034  0.032 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.033)  (0.035)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.000  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.000 




CIS  -0.020  -0.020  -0.024  -0.008  -0.020  -0.020  -0.021  -0.032  -0.016  -0.008  -0.017  -0.010  -0.012 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Dummy 
border 
region CIS  -0.024  -0.023  -0.021  -0.027  -0.023  -0.023  -0.022  -0.018  -0.018  -0.013  -0.015  -0.015  -0.014 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Urbanization  -0.506  -0.513  -0.559  -1.404*  -0.503  -0.514  -0.819  0.017  -0.256  -2.269  -1.878  -0.534  -0.591 
  (0.747)  (0.772)  (0.741)  (0.781)  (0.778)  (0.777)  (0.860)  (1.108)  (1.037)  (1.794)  (1.925)  (0.948)  (0.928) 
Fiscal 
transfers  -0.203***  -0.203***  -0.203***  -0.216***  -0.201***  -0.202***  -0.208***  -0.174***  -0.172***  -0.194  -0.194  -0.204***  -0.203*** 
  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.057)  (0.054)  (0.214)  (0.218)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
Democracy  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000     
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    0.002      0.004  0.003  0.000  0.005  -0.001  0.012  0.010     
    (0.013)      (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.031)  (0.031)     
Power 
(RUIE)      0.020**                     
      (0.010)                     
Power (UI)        0.001                   
        (0.008)                   
Tensions 
(RUIE)          -0.002                 
          (0.009)                 
Tensions 
(MFK)            -0.001               
            (0.006)               
Declarations              0.027             
              (0.022)             
Regulatory 
capture                0.048           
                (0.056)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.001***         
                  (0.000)         
TI perceived                    -0.040       
                    (0.043)       
TI real                      -0.019     
                      (0.042)     
Resources I                        0.004   
                        (0.008)   
Resources II                          0.000 
                          (0.001) 
Constant  0.895***  0.886***  0.840***  0.938***  0.876***  0.880***  0.851***  0.829***  0.870***  0.910***  0.890***  0.842***  0.869*** 
  (0.056)  (0.076)  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.087)  (0.092)  (0.074)  (0.088)  (0.083)  (0.225)  (0.226)  (0.083)  (0.072) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.519  0.519  0.551  0.474  0.52  0.519  0.529  0.441  0.447  0.432  0.424  0.391  0.389 
J.-B. test  11.97***  11.95***  8.13**  8.802**  12.0***  12.04***  13.22***  17.03***  12.5***  11.21***  12.54***  9.082**  9.680*** 
 
Note:  see  Table  2.  Outliers  are  Briansk,  Rostov  and  Tula  in  all  regressions.  After  exclusion  of  outliers 
urbanization in regression (C56) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign. 79 
 
 
Table  C6:  Determinants  of  fiscal  decentralization,  1999,  dep.  var.:  expenditure  decentralization, 





























Territory  0.014  0.013  0.012  0.015  0.013  0.013  0.011  0.019  0.021  -0.015  -0.01  0.031**  0.027* 
  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Population  0.010  0.010  0.009  0.006  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.008  0.005  0.006  0.008  0.01  0.008 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Oil and gas  0.129***  0.128***  0.133***  0.211***  0.127***  0.127***  0.113**  0.117***  0.133***  0.112**  0.114**     
  (0.040)  (0.043)  (0.038)  (0.076)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.048)     
Distance 
from average 
income  -0.009  -0.009  -0.01  -0.006  -0.009  -0.009  -0.007  -0.019**  -0.009  0.001  -0.001  -0.01  -0.008 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  0.118***  0.118***  0.113***  0.086**  0.118***  0.117***  0.102***  0.167***           
  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.039)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.015)           
Dummy 
republic  0.029  0.029  0.028  0.023  0.029  0.029  0.003  0.034  0.029  0.080**  0.076**  0.035  0.033 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.026)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  -0.001  0.001  0.002  0.002  -0.001  -0.001 




CIS  -0.02  -0.02  -0.024  -0.008  -0.02  -0.02  -0.021  -0.032  -0.016  -0.009  -0.018  -0.01  -0.012 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Dummy 
border 
region CIS  -0.025  -0.024  -0.022  -0.028  -0.024  -0.024  -0.023  -0.019  -0.019  -0.013  -0.015  -0.015  -0.014 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.017)  (0.016) 
Urbanization  -0.445  -0.454  -0.572  -1.308  -0.444  -0.454  -0.726  0.133  -0.163  -2.389  -2.029  -0.466  -0.540 
  (0.725)  (0.759)  (0.738)  (0.790)  (0.763)  (0.764)  (0.842)  (1.067)  (1.001)  (1.762)  (1.891)  (0.895)  (0.873) 
Fiscal 
transfers  -0.193***  -0.193***  -0.191***  -0.210***  -0.192***  -0.193***  -0.201***  -0.152**  -0.163***  -0.197  -0.199  -0.192***  -0.194*** 
  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.057)  (0.055)  (0.217)  (0.222)  (0.057)  (0.057) 
Democracy  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  0.001  0.000     
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)     
Power    0.001      0.003  0.002  0.000  0.004  -0.001  0.012  0.010     
    (0.013)      (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.031)  (0.031)     
Power 
(RUIE)      0.020**                     
      (0.010)                     
Power (UI)        0.001                   
        (0.008)                   
Tensions 
(RUIE)          -0.002                 
          (0.009)                 
Tensions (UI)            -0.001               
            (0.006)               
Declarations              0.025             
              (0.022)             
Regulatory 
capture                0.048           
                (0.056)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.001***         
                  (0.000)         
TI perceived                    -0.041       
                    (0.043)       
TI real                      -0.018     
                      (0.043)     
Resources I                        0.005   
                        (0.008)   
Resources II                          0.000 
                          (0.001) 
Constant  0.893***  0.885***  0.840***  0.935***  0.876***  0.880***  0.850***  0.830***  0.868***  0.915***  0.898***  0.829***  0.860*** 
  (0.056)  (0.077)  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.088)  (0.093)  (0.075)  (0.089)  (0.083)  (0.222)  (0.223)  (0.086)  (0.073) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.522  0.522  0.553  0.476  0.522  0.522  0.531  0.451  0.45  0.432  0.423  0.394  0.391 
J.-B. test  12.92***  12.90***  9.023**  9.565***  12.92***  12.98***  13.73***  21.08***  14.3***  10.51***  11.68***  9.643***  10.04*** 
 
Note: see Table 2. Outliers are Rostov, Tula and Briansk in all regressions, as well as Komi in regression (C73). 
There are no changes for sign and significance of significant variables after the exclusion of outliers 80 
 
Table C7: Determinants of fiscal decentralization, 1998-1999, dep. Var.: retention rate including non-





























Territory  0.043  0.052*  0.043  0.024  0.064*  0.058*  0.044  0.03  0.035  -0.090*  -0.072  0.015  0.007 
  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.022)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.022)  (0.027)  (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.029)  (0.031) 
Population  -0.161*  -0.158*  -0.168*  -0.125  -0.137*  -0.139*  -0.171*  -0.051  -0.106  -0.322*  -0.222  -0.121  -0.131 
  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.102)  (0.082)  (0.081)  (0.091)  (0.067)  (0.114)  (0.163)  (0.194)  (0.115)  (0.117) 
Oil and gas  -0.145  -0.122  -0.148  -0.147  -0.128  -0.125  -0.145  -0.056  0.098  -0.332*  -0.354*     
  (0.106)  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.433)  (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.106)  (0.107)  (0.137)  (0.162)  (0.190)     
Income per 
capita  -0.111**  -0.109**  -0.111**  -0.064  -0.106**  -0.104**  -0.104**  -0.074  -0.061  -0.252*  -0.242*  -0.085  -0.091 
  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.068)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.060)  (0.069)  (0.128)  (0.139)  (0.070)  (0.070) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  0.173*  0.175*  0.177*  0.042  0.176*  0.186*  0.131  0.068*           
  (0.101)  (0.102)  (0.104)  (0.131)  (0.100)  (0.103)  (0.095)  (0.040)           
Dummy 
republic  0.065  0.075  0.067  0.06  0.078*  0.077*  -0.002  0.100*  0.068  0.202**  0.168*  0.070  0.063 
  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.059)  (0.055)  (0.051)  (0.075)  (0.091)  (0.058)  (0.055) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.009  0.011  0.010  0.009  0.013*  0.012*  0.010  0.008  0.008  -0.002  -0.006  0.008  0.007 




CIS  -0.004  -0.003  0.000  0.026  -0.005  -0.007  -0.008  -0.032  -0.005  0.074  0.021  -0.025  -0.03 
  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.046)  (0.038)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.064)  (0.044)  (0.055)  (0.063)  (0.048)  (0.050) 
Dummy 
border 
region CIS  0.006  0.000  0.002  -0.009  -0.005  0.001  0.001  0.015  -0.010  0.066  0.056  0.005  0.006 
  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.032)  (0.038)  (0.044)  (0.048)  (0.034)  (0.033) 
Urbanization  4.112**  4.238**  4.127**  1.466  4.131**  4.287**  3.258*  4.639*  4.017*  2.023  4.332  2.682  2.728 
  (1.830)  (1.824)  (1.855)  (1.914)  (1.767)  (1.826)  (1.862)  (2.394)  (2.233)  (2.402)  (2.688)  (2.300)  (2.257) 
Fiscal 
transfers  -0.258  -0.261  -0.257  -0.273*  -0.310*  -0.279*  -0.262  -0.216  -0.146  0.512*  0.544  -0.103  -0.088 
  (0.161)  (0.162)  (0.162)  (0.148)  (0.160)  (0.165)  (0.166)  (0.136)  (0.167)  (0.286)  (0.325)  (0.145)  (0.141) 
Retail trade  0.136  0.133  0.144  0.106  0.115  0.119  0.148  0.037  0.108  0.248*  0.17  0.118  0.121 
  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.097)  (0.084)  (0.083)  (0.091)  (0.056)  (0.105)  (0.135)  (0.155)  (0.109)  (0.110) 
Net profit  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.005  0.005  -0.001  0 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Democracy  -0.007**  -0.007**  -0.008**  -0.006*  -0.007*  -0.007*  -0.007**  -0.010***  -0.007*  -0.006**  -0.008**     
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    -0.027      -0.062*  -0.054  -0.032  -0.018  -0.031  0.053  0.051     
    (0.022)      (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.033)     
Power 
(RUIE)      -0.022                     
      (0.019)                     
Power (UI)        -0.011                   
        (0.015)                   
Tension 
(RUIE)          0.032                 
          (0.025)                 
Tension 
(MFK)            0.014               
            (0.019)               
Declarations              0.077             
              (0.054)             
Regulatory 
capture                -0.050           
                (0.129)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.001         
                  (0.001)         
TI perceived                    -0.236**       
                    (0.098)       
TI real                      -0.122*     
                      (0.068)     
Resources I                        -0.006   
                        (0.013)   
Resources II                          -0.002 
                          (0.001) 
Constant  0.519**  0.683***  0.570***  0.689***  0.900***  0.841***  0.553**  0.820***  0.696***  0.232  0.188  0.409  0.431* 
  (0.214)  (0.228)  (0.204)  (0.225)  (0.249)  (0.303)  (0.258)  (0.200)  (0.234)  (0.383)  (0.387)  (0.253)  (0.233) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.334  0.345  0.344  0.24  0.356  0.351  0.365  0.346  0.267  0.717  0.654  0.197  0.210 
J.-B. test  4.133  3.174  2.458  20.12***  2.506  3.445  3.252  0.346  5.69*  0.139  0.071  3.231  3.502 
 
Notes: see  Table 2. Outliers are Kalmykia and Ingushetia in regression (C82), (C87). After exclusion of outliers 
urbanization in regression (C87) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign. 81 
 
Table C8: Determinants of fiscal decentralization, 1998-1999, dep. Var.: retention rate including non-





























Territory  0.043  0.050*  0.043  0.022  0.061*  0.055*  0.042  0.029  0.037  -0.090*  -0.072  0.008  0.002 
  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.033)  (0.035) 
Population  -0.146*  -0.142*  -0.151**  -0.153  -0.123*  -0.127*  -0.156**  -0.048  -0.151  -0.322*  -0.222  -0.161  -0.168 
  (0.076)  (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.095)  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.078)  (0.063)  (0.110)  (0.163)  (0.194)  (0.103)  (0.103) 
Oil and gas  -0.142  -0.126  -0.145  0.198  -0.131  -0.127  -0.146  -0.057  -0.028  -0.332*  -0.354*     
  (0.098)  (0.097)  (0.097)  (0.399)  (0.096)  (0.095)  (0.100)  (0.105)  (0.134)  (0.162)  (0.190)     
Distance 
from average 
income  -0.126***  -0.123***  -0.124***  -0.118*  -0.120***  -0.119***  -0.118***  -0.075  -0.127*  -0.252*  -0.242*  -0.143**  -0.147** 
  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.067)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.057)  (0.071)  (0.128)  (0.139)  (0.067)  (0.067) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  0.207*  0.208*  0.209*  0.048  0.208*  0.217**  0.164  0.070*           
  (0.105)  (0.106)  (0.107)  (0.134)  (0.105)  (0.107)  (0.099)  (0.040)           
Dummy 
republic  0.070  0.077*  0.072  0.067  0.081*  0.079*  0.003  0.104*  0.078  0.202**  0.168*  0.081  0.074 
  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.060)  (0.056)  (0.051)  (0.075)  (0.091)  (0.056)  (0.053) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.009  0.010  0.009  0.012  0.012*  0.012*  0.010  0.008  0.010  -0.002  -0.006  0.010  0.008 




CIS  -0.012  -0.011  -0.009  0.007  -0.013  -0.015  -0.016  -0.033  -0.023  0.074  0.021  -0.045  -0.049 
  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.064)  (0.046)  (0.055)  (0.063)  (0.050)  (0.052) 
Dummy 
border 
region CIS  0.005  0.001  0.002  -0.009  -0.005  0.002  0.002  0.015  -0.006  0.066  0.056  0.006  0.007 
  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.036)  (0.044)  (0.048)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Urbanization  4.365**  4.434**  4.354**  2.022  4.335**  4.479**  3.495*  4.677*  4.861**  2.023  4.332  3.395  3.469 
  (1.784)  (1.788)  (1.806)  (1.917)  (1.736)  (1.800)  (1.826)  (2.405)  (2.244)  (2.402)  (2.688)  (2.293)  (2.244) 
Fiscal 
transfers  -0.209  -0.213  -0.209  -0.229  -0.262*  -0.230  -0.215  -0.194  -0.113  0.512*  0.544  -0.053  -0.035 
  (0.158)  (0.158)  (0.158)  (0.146)  (0.155)  (0.162)  (0.164)  (0.138)  (0.166)  (0.286)  (0.325)  (0.143)  (0.139) 
Retail trade  0.123  0.120  0.129*  0.121  0.103  0.109  0.136*  0.036  0.135  0.248*  0.17  0.143  0.144 
  (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.073)  (0.088)  (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.077)  (0.052)  (0.096)  (0.135)  (0.155)  (0.093)  (0.093) 
Net profit  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.005  0.005  0.001  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Democracy  -0.007**  -0.007**  -0.008**  -0.005*  -0.007*  -0.007**  -0.007**  -0.010***  -0.007*  -0.006**  -0.008**     
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    -0.021      -0.055  -0.045  -0.026  -0.017  -0.028  0.053  0.051     
    (0.021)      (0.036)  (0.041)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.032)  (0.033)     
Power 
(RUIE)      -0.018                     
      (0.018)                     
Power (UI)        -0.009                   
        (0.015)                   
Tensions 
(RUIE)          0.032                 
          (0.025)                 
Tensions 
(MFK)            0.012               
            (0.018)               
Declarations              0.074             
              (0.053)             
Regulatory 
capture                -0.055           
                (0.126)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.001         
                  (0.001)         
TI perceived                    -0.236**       
                    (0.098)       
TI real                      -0.122*     
                      (0.068)     
Resources I                        -0.011   
                        (0.014)   
Resources II                          -0.002 
                          (0.001) 
Constant  0.424*  0.555**  0.469**  0.555**  0.770***  0.694**  0.432  0.743***  0.518*  0.01  -0.024  0.269  0.272 
  (0.221)  (0.238)  (0.213)  (0.257)  (0.256)  (0.303)  (0.265)  (0.222)  (0.263)  (0.473)  (0.482)  (0.266)  (0.249) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.374  0.381  0.381  0.289  0.391  0.385  0.399  0.348  0.313  0.717  0.654  0.256  0.272 
J.-B. test  0.769  0.580  0.413  7.404**  0.407  0.996  0.693  0.296  0.693  0.139  0.071  0.291  0.652 
  
Notes:  see  Table  2.  Outliers  are  Kalmykia  and  Ingushetia  in  regression  (C95).  After  exclusion  of  outliers 
distance from average income becomes insignificant in this regression, but keeps its sign. 82 
 
Table C9: Determinants of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. Var.: share of contradictions to 





























Territory  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.003  -0.001  0.001  0.003  0.002  -0.003  -0.014  -0.008  -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Population  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.006  0.003  0.000  0.004  0.013  0.009  0.025**  0.034**  0.007  0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Oil and gas  0.022  0.026  0.021  -0.125*  0.013  0.016  0.022  0.060**  0.055*  0.078**  0.070*     
  (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.071)  (0.049)  (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.038)  (0.038)     
Income per 
capita  -0.014  -0.014  -0.014  -0.007  -0.011  -0.012  -0.013  -0.004  -0.004  -0.012  -0.018  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  0.046  0.046  0.046  0.086*  0.046  0.035  0.043  -0.035*           
  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.045)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.018)           
Dummy 
republic  0.050***  0.051***  0.050***  0.059***  0.048***  0.047***  0.046**  0.068***  0.057***  0.055*  0.045  0.054***  0.053*** 
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.006*  0.006  0.006*  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.006  0.007**  0.007*  0.012*  0.010*  0.007*  0.007 




CIS  0.018  0.018  0.018  0.022  0.022  0.024  0.018  0.035  0.015  0.089  0.077*  0.014  0.014 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.053)  (0.042)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Dummy 
border 
region CIS  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.009  0.013  0.007  0.007  0.009  0.006  0.001  0.002  0.01  0.01 
  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Urbanization  -0.621  -0.605  -0.616  -0.09  -0.458  -0.591  -0.661  -0.225  -0.63  -0.098  0.682  -0.745  -0.741 
  (0.529)  (0.545)  (0.530)  (0.687)  (0.515)  (0.497)  (0.561)  (0.573)  (0.567)  (0.967)  (1.027)  (0.504)  (0.495) 
Fiscal 
transfers  -0.014  -0.015  -0.016  -0.013  0.018  0.008  -0.015  -0.014  -0.019  0.030  0.052  -0.006  -0.005 
  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.114)  (0.136)  (0.041)  (0.042) 
Democracy  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001     
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)     
Power 
(Jatocinska)    -0.003      0.022*  0.026**  -0.003  -0.013  -0.005  -0.012  -0.014     
    (0.009)      (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.012)     
Power 
(RUIE)      -0.003                     
      (0.006)                     
Power (UI)        -0.010                   
        (0.007)                   
Tensions 
(RUIE)          -0.023**                 
          (0.011)                 
Tensions 
(MFK)            -0.015**               
            (0.006)               
Declarations              0.005             
              (0.015)             
Regulatory 
capture                -0.035           
                (0.042)           
Industry 
concentration                  -0.000         
                  (0.000)         
TI perceived                    -0.053       
                    (0.045)       
TI real                      -0.047     
                      (0.042)     
Resources I                        -0.001   
                        (0.005)   
Resources II                          0.000 
                          (0.000) 
Constant  0.135***  0.154**  0.145***  0.122***  0.015  0.004  0.147*  0.163**  0.156**  0.132  0.099  0.120**  0.118*** 
  (0.043)  (0.071)  (0.047)  (0.044)  (0.079)  (0.074)  (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.075)  (0.098)  (0.101)  (0.052)  (0.044) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.403  0.404  0.404  0.437  0.447  0.453  0.404  0.42  0.395  0.561  0.56  0.384  0.384 
J.-B. test  38.2***  35.37***  40.08***  24.16***  22.05***  15.78***  35.56***  12.08***  33.98***  0.624  0.966  47.33***  47.9*** 
 
Note: see Table 3. Outlier is Primorski krai in all regressions with a significant Jarque-Bera test. After exclusion of the outlier 
distance from Moscow becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign in regression (C105), (C107), (C116) dummy autonomous 
okrug becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign in regression (C108), power (Jarocinska) becomes insignificant, but keeps its 
sign  in  regressions  (C109)  and  (C110),  distance  and  oil  and  gas  variable  become  insignificant,  but  keep  their  sign  in 
regression (C112) and (C113) 83 
 
Table C10: Determinants of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. Var.: share of contradictions to 





























Territory  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.002  -0.002  0.000  0.002  0.002  -0.004  -0.015  -0.009  -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Population  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.007  0.004  0.001  0.005  0.013  0.008  0.024**  0.032*  0.006  0.006 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Oil and gas  0.022  0.026  0.020  -0.131*  0.013  0.018  0.022  0.061**  0.049  0.072*  0.063*     
  (0.045)  (0.048)  (0.045)  (0.070)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.037)  (0.037)     
Distance from 
average 
income  -0.016  -0.015  -0.015  -0.005  -0.012  -0.014  -0.015  -0.006  0.002  -0.009  -0.015  0.008  0.008 
  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.084*  0.047  0.037  0.044  -0.032*           
  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.045)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.017)           
Dummy 
republic  0.050***  0.052***  0.050***  0.059***  0.048***  0.047***  0.046**  0.068***  0.057***  0.055*  0.045  0.053***  0.052*** 
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Distance from 
Moscow  0.005  0.005  0.005*  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.005  0.007**  0.007*  0.012*  0.010*  0.007*  0.007* 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Dummy 
border region 
non-CIS  0.018  0.018  0.019  0.023  0.022  0.025  0.018  0.035  0.015  0.089  0.076*  0.014  0.014 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.053)  (0.042)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
Dummy 
border region 
CIS  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.009  0.013  0.007  0.007  0.009  0.006  0.001  0.001  0.010  0.010 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Urbanization  -0.700  -0.678  -0.69  -0.177  -0.509  -0.637  -0.736  -0.218  -0.744  -0.263  0.435  -0.832*  -0.827* 
  (0.524)  (0.544)  (0.523)  (0.670)  (0.515)  (0.499)  (0.565)  (0.570)  (0.550)  (0.924)  (1.012)  (0.499)  (0.491) 
Fiscal 
transfers  -0.003  -0.004  -0.005  -0.008  0.027  0.018  -0.004  -0.010  -0.019  0.026  0.043  -0.012  -0.010 
  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.115)  (0.136)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Democracy  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001     
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    -0.004      0.022*  0.026*  -0.004  -0.013  -0.006  -0.012  -0.015     
    (0.009)      (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.012)     
Power 
(RUIE)      -0.004                     
      (0.006)                     
Power (UI)        -0.010                   
        (0.007)                   
Tensions 
(RUIE)          -0.023**                 
          (0.011)                 
Tensions 
(MFK)            -0.015**               
            (0.006)               
Declarations              0.006             
              (0.015)             
Regulatory 
capture                -0.036           
                (0.042)           
Industrial 
concentration                  -0.000         
                  (0.000)         
TI perceived                    -0.053       
                    (0.045)       
TI real                      -0.044     
                      (0.043)     
Resources I                        -0.001   
                        (0.005)   
Resources II                          -0.000 
                          (0.000) 
Constant  0.135***  0.156**  0.146***  0.124***  0.016  0.004  0.148*  0.163**  0.161**  0.144  0.116  0.128**  0.125*** 
  (0.043)  (0.071)  (0.048)  (0.045)  (0.079)  (0.075)  (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.076)  (0.095)  (0.097)  (0.055)  (0.045) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.402  0.403  0.403  0.435  0.447  0.453  0.404  0.420  0.394  0.556  0.553  0.386  0.386 
J.-B. test  38.99***  35.84***  40.90***  25.27***  22.22***  15.35***  35.94***  12.43***  37.14***  0.773  0.966  47.33***  47.90*** 
Note: see Table 3. Outlier is Primorski krai in all regressions, where the Jarque-Bera statistics is significant. 
After exclusion of the outlier distance  from Moscow in  the regression (C120), (C126), (C129) and (C130) 
becomes  insignificant,  but  keeps  its  sign,  dummy  autonomous  okrug  in  the  regression  (C121)  becomes 
insignificant, but keeps its sign; power (Jarocinska) in regressions (C122) and (C123) becomes insignificant, but 
keeps its sign; oil and gas in regression (C125) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign; urbanization in the 
regressions (C129) and (C130) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign. 84 
 
Table C11: Determinants of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. Var.: log number of 





























Territory  0.053  0.077  0.053  0.031  0.031  0.042  0.068  0.02  -0.011  -0.113  0.007  -0.018  -0.019 
  (0.088)  (0.080)  (0.088)  (0.087)  (0.080)  (0.076)  (0.077)  (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.203)  (0.211)  (0.122)  (0.117) 
Population  0.058  0.06  0.058  0.092  0.05  0.011  0.068  0.157  0.107  0.265  0.285  0.094  0.088 
  (0.088)  (0.087)  (0.089)  (0.083)  (0.082)  (0.081)  (0.086)  (0.103)  (0.099)  (0.185)  (0.220)  (0.112)  (0.113) 
Oil and gas  0.425  0.515  0.424  -1.606**  0.395  0.428  0.391  0.992*  1.024  0.814  0.982     
  (0.642)  (0.728)  (0.649)  (0.793)  (0.756)  (0.768)  (0.703)  (0.511)  (0.624)  (0.561)  (0.643)     
Income per capita  0.031  0.035  0.032  0.158  0.068  0.052  0.064  0.195  0.214  0.337  0.238  0.236  0.238 
  (0.152)  (0.158)  (0.151)  (0.137)  (0.152)  (0.152)  (0.163)  (0.168)  (0.167)  (0.347)  (0.311)  (0.158)  (0.158) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  -0.161  -0.147  -0.160  0.183  -0.147  -0.261  -0.251  -1.013***           
  (0.343)  (0.335)  (0.350)  (0.489)  (0.313)  (0.324)  (0.378)  (0.309)           
Dummy republic  0.519***  0.548***  0.520***  0.626***  0.519***  0.501***  0.404*  0.686***  0.627***  0.702*  0.565  0.543***  0.529*** 
  (0.145)  (0.179)  (0.146)  (0.160)  (0.178)  (0.175)  (0.208)  (0.195)  (0.189)  (0.366)  (0.421)  (0.145)  (0.148) 
Distance from 
Moscow  0.059**  0.063**  0.059**  0.057**  0.052*  0.046*  0.062**  0.086*  0.080*  0.186  0.172  0.059*  0.055* 
  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.122)  (0.120)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
Dummy border 
region non-CIS  -0.067  -0.066  -0.066  -0.009  -0.028  0.002  -0.071  0.042  -0.087  0.334  0.083  -0.042  -0.041 
  (0.196)  (0.195)  (0.199)  (0.179)  (0.183)  (0.181)  (0.200)  (0.261)  (0.215)  (0.467)  (0.513)  (0.210)  (0.209) 
Dummy border 
region CIS  0.019  0.004  0.019  0.014  0.056  0.006  0.010  -0.002  0.004  -0.142  -0.213  0.054  0.054 
  (0.200)  (0.224)  (0.198)  (0.206)  (0.231)  (0.222)  (0.222)  (0.272)  (0.224)  (0.437)  (0.488)  (0.204)  (0.204) 
Urbanization  -9.000  -8.619  -8.994  -4.242  -7.294  -8.452  -10.288  -8.172  -9.754  -21.946  -13.216  -9.202  -9.058 
  (6.311)  (6.034)  (6.404)  (8.264)  (5.947)  (5.729)  (6.567)  (10.038)  (7.971)  (22.978)  (19.751)  (7.836)  (7.713) 
Fiscal transfers  0.284  0.267  0.283  0.3  0.567  0.516  0.259  0.276  0.372  -1.149  -1.389  0.196  0.246 
  (0.454)  (0.470)  (0.453)  (0.439)  (0.452)  (0.444)  (0.449)  (0.627)  (0.541)  (2.239)  (2.615)  (0.520)  (0.524) 
Democracy  0.009  0.01  0.009  0.004  0.009  0.009  0.011  0.018  0.012  0.042  0.033     
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.031)  (0.029)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    -0.078      0.149  0.227  -0.086  -0.177  -0.13  -0.384  -0.43     
    (0.168)      (0.223)  (0.153)  (0.174)  (0.201)  (0.212)  (0.382)  (0.425)     
Power (RUIE)      -0.003                     
      (0.088)                     
Power (UI)        -0.115                   
        (0.101)                   
Tension (RUIE)          -0.209*                 
          (0.115)                 
Tension (MFK)            -0.159***               
            (0.056)               
Declarations              0.145             
              (0.206)             
Regulatory 
capture                0.041           
                (0.508)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.003         
                  (0.008)         
TI perceived                    -1.099       
                    (0.782)       
TI real                      -0.442     
                      (0.611)     
Resources I                        -0.041   
                        (0.063)   
Resources II                          -0.005 
                          (0.006) 
Total acts  0.511**  0.523***  0.512**  0.482**  0.515**  0.552***  0.479**  0.523**  0.549**  0.465  0.562  0.491**  0.499** 
  (0.194)  (0.191)  (0.202)  (0.198)  (0.198)  (0.198)  (0.196)  (0.207)  (0.218)  (0.368)  (0.425)  (0.194)  (0.189) 
Constant  1.305  1.681  1.307  1.463  0.486  -0.135  1.795  1.872  1.601  4.595  3.468  1.807  1.669 
  (1.554)  (2.023)  (1.556)  (1.629)  (2.153)  (1.942)  (2.028)  (2.221)  (1.936)  (4.440)  (4.375)  (1.670)  (1.632) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.280  0.285  0.280  0.299  0.309  0.323  0.288  0.328  0.308  0.444  0.400  0.285  0.287 
J.-B. test  1503***  1284***  1507***  1372***  1570***  1398***  1259***  873.2***  947.7*** 109.1*** 144.4***  1274***  1254*** 
 
 Note: see Table 3. Outlier is Saratov in all regressions with a significant Jarque-Bera statistics. After exclusion 
of the outlier distance from Moscow in regressions (C135) and (C136) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign 85 
 
 
Table C12: Determinants of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. Var.: log number of 





























Territory  0.055  0.08  0.055  0.045  0.037  0.047  0.074  0.035  0.002  -0.105  0.011  -0.007  -0.009 
  (0.086)  (0.080)  (0.087)  (0.083)  (0.081)  (0.076)  (0.078)  (0.082)  (0.084)  (0.195)  (0.208)  (0.120)  (0.114) 
Population  0.056  0.059  0.056  0.08  0.046  0.009  0.063  0.149  0.096  0.265  0.292  0.082  0.075 
  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.087)  (0.107)  (0.103)  (0.187)  (0.219)  (0.113)  (0.116) 
Oil and gas  0.495  0.593  0.494  -1.707**  0.478  0.531  0.487  1.039*  1.037  0.912  1.037     
  (0.651)  (0.751)  (0.658)  (0.830)  (0.781)  (0.787)  (0.732)  (0.550)  (0.662)  (0.614)  (0.690)     
Distance 
from average 
income  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  0.166  0.031  0.003  0.024  0.190  0.262  0.354  0.248  0.284*  0.292* 
  (0.183)  (0.188)  (0.183)  (0.134)  (0.182)  (0.182)  (0.192)  (0.148)  (0.160)  (0.319)  (0.281)  (0.158)  (0.162) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  -0.127  -0.11  -0.127  0.211  -0.109  -0.212  -0.202  -0.997***           
  (0.352)  (0.341)  (0.359)  (0.470)  (0.315)  (0.320)  (0.378)  (0.270)           
Dummy 
republic  0.523***  0.551***  0.523***  0.624***  0.521***  0.505***  0.422**  0.677***  0.618***  0.704*  0.562  0.533***  0.516*** 
  (0.144)  (0.179)  (0.146)  (0.160)  (0.179)  (0.175)  (0.207)  (0.197)  (0.189)  (0.374)  (0.429)  (0.147)  (0.150) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.061**  0.064**  0.061**  0.062**  0.055*  0.048*  0.065**  0.092*  0.088*  0.196  0.179  0.066**  0.062** 




CIS  -0.069  -0.068  -0.069  -0.013  -0.032  -0.002  -0.074  0.047  -0.086  0.336  0.084  -0.037  -0.035 
  (0.197)  (0.196)  (0.199)  (0.180)  (0.184)  (0.181)  (0.201)  (0.263)  (0.217)  (0.475)  (0.510)  (0.214)  (0.213) 
Dummy 
border 
region CIS  0.016  0.001  0.016  0.015  0.052  0.003  0.007  -0.006  0.002  -0.152  -0.217  0.052  0.052 
  (0.201)  (0.226)  (0.199)  (0.208)  (0.233)  (0.224)  (0.224)  (0.276)  (0.227)  (0.449)  (0.493)  (0.205)  (0.205) 
Urbanization  -8.329  -7.86  -8.323  -2.985  -6.364  -7.439  -9.183  -6.877  -8.687  -20.126  -11.65  -7.789  -7.67 
  (5.798)  (5.443)  (5.924)  (7.300)  (5.414)  (5.181)  (5.819)  (8.901)  (6.773)  (20.532)  (17.125)  (6.950)  (6.852) 
Fiscal 
transfers  0.278  0.261  0.277  0.163  0.530  0.502  0.233  0.178  0.234  -1.171  -1.371  0.025  0.077 
  (0.442)  (0.463)  (0.438)  (0.447)  (0.449)  (0.432)  (0.443)  (0.649)  (0.543)  (2.251)  (2.548)  (0.541)  (0.540) 
Democracy  0.009  0.01  0.009  0.004  0.009  0.008  0.011  0.018  0.013  0.044  0.035     
  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.033)  (0.029)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    -0.077      0.147  0.227  -0.084  -0.167  -0.123  -0.365  -0.417     
    (0.167)      (0.223)  (0.153)  (0.172)  (0.196)  (0.208)  (0.373)  (0.417)     
Power 
(RUIE)      -0.002                     
      (0.088)                     
Power (UI)        -0.111                   
        (0.099)                   
Tensions 
(RUIE)          -0.206*                 
          (0.115)                 
Tensions 
(MFK)            -0.158***               
            (0.055)               
Declarations              0.129             
              (0.200)             
Regulatory 
capture                0.077           
                (0.515)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.003         
                  (0.008)         
TI perceived                    -1.096       
                    (0.782)       
TI real                      -0.467     
                      (0.629)     
Resources I                        -0.050   
                        (0.064)   
Resources II                          -0.006 
                          (0.006) 
Total acts  0.525***  0.538***  0.525**  0.483**  0.532***  0.572***  0.501**  0.529**  0.546**  0.479  0.573  0.495**  0.502*** 
  (0.193)  (0.190)  (0.201)  (0.197)  (0.195)  (0.195)  (0.193)  (0.207)  (0.219)  (0.362)  (0.425)  (0.189)  (0.184) 
Constant  1.184  1.539  1.184  1.429  0.351  -0.309  1.629  1.744  1.558  4.286  3.228  1.829  1.682 
  (1.542)  (1.978)  (1.547)  (1.604)  (2.114)  (1.918)  (1.977)  (2.124)  (1.857)  (4.054)  (3.979)  (1.617)  (1.576) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
R
2  0.280  0.284  0.280  0.297  0.308  0.322  0.287  0.325  0.308  0.441  0.398  0.286  0.288 
J.-B. test  1520***  1304***  1523***  1413***  1594***  1427***  1286***  911.9***  987.9***  124***  155.9***  1322***  1298*** 
Note: see Table 3. Outlier in all regressions with a significant Jarque-Bera statistics is Saratov. After exclusion of 
the outlier distance from Moscow in regression (C149) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign, distance from 
average income in regression (C155) and (C156) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign 86 
 
 
Table C13: Determinants of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. Var.: number of contradictions, 










































Territory  0.047  0.047  0.048  0.031  -0.005  0.015  0.042  0.034  -0.01  -0.043  0.024  0.031  0.03 
  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.136)  (0.151)  (0.085)  (0.081) 
Population  0.072  0.072  0.073  0.104  0.061  0.02  0.076  0.168*  0.132  0.254***  0.278***  0.133  0.132 
  (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.066)  (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.075)  (0.094)  (0.090)  (0.085)  (0.098)  (0.101)  (0.100) 
Oil and gas  0.375  0.373  0.365  -1.651***  0.231  0.328  0.301  0.729***  0.728**  0.724**  0.732**     
  (0.423)  (0.446)  (0.418)  (0.532)  (0.450)  (0.461)  (0.452)  (0.255)  (0.325)  (0.326)  (0.374)     
Income per 
capita  -0.045  -0.045  -0.041  0.047  -0.006  -0.022  -0.029  0.053  0.064  0.068  0.024  0.107  0.108 
  (0.109)  (0.110)  (0.108)  (0.082)  (0.104)  (0.102)  (0.111)  (0.093)  (0.097)  (0.175)  (0.176)  (0.096)  (0.097) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  0.059  0.059  0.068  0.404  0.047  -0.086  -0.014  -0.824***           
  (0.253)  (0.253)  (0.250)  (0.273)  (0.219)  (0.224)  (0.269)  (0.191)           
Dummy 
republic  0.507***  0.507***  0.511***  0.615***  0.469***  0.461***  0.414**  0.660***  0.586***  0.580**  0.550*  0.562***  0.558*** 
  (0.119)  (0.134)  (0.122)  (0.127)  (0.129)  (0.132)  (0.176)  (0.143)  (0.140)  (0.270)  (0.318)  (0.122)  (0.123) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.057***  0.057***  0.057***  0.054***  0.044**  0.040**  0.057***  0.066**  0.067**  0.105*  0.097*  0.055**  0.053** 




CIS  0.037  0.037  0.048  0.035  0.042  0.058  0.036  0.162  0.015  0.500  0.333  0.071  0.073 
  (0.180)  (0.180)  (0.183)  (0.171)  (0.160)  (0.167)  (0.181)  (0.229)  (0.180)  (0.350)  (0.325)  (0.173)  (0.173) 
Dummy 
border 
region CIS  0.136  0.136  0.130  0.113  0.201*  0.132  0.140  0.155  0.129  0.105  0.093  0.174  0.175 
  (0.116)  (0.123)  (0.113)  (0.111)  (0.121)  (0.120)  (0.122)  (0.135)  (0.130)  (0.214)  (0.218)  (0.120)  (0.119) 
Urbanization  -4.699  -4.702  -4.579  -0.215  -3.049  -4.693  -5.768  -1.718  -4.689  -6.174  -1.440  -4.051  -4.003 
  (4.398)  (4.389)  (4.409)  (5.142)  (4.012)  (4.028)  (4.510)  (5.503)  (5.093)  (11.125)  (10.045)  (5.094)  (5.076) 
Fiscal 
transfers  0.285  0.285  0.281  0.289  0.700*  0.529  0.279  0.421  0.390  -0.125  -0.154  0.337  0.363 
  (0.395)  (0.396)  (0.393)  (0.375)  (0.373)  (0.374)  (0.383)  (0.522)  (0.499)  (0.978)  (1.075)  (0.488)  (0.510) 
Democracy  0.004  0.004  0.002  -0.001  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.009  0.006  0.023  0.019     
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.015)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    0.001      0.282**  0.284***  -0.005  -0.069  -0.021  -0.174  -0.177     
    (0.089)      (0.126)  (0.102)  (0.090)  (0.095)  (0.110)  (0.182)  (0.184)     
Power 
(RUIE)      -0.045                     
      (0.066)                     
Power (UI)        -0.067                   
        (0.058)                   
Tensions 
(RUIE)          -0.248***                 
          (0.091)                 
Tensions 
(MFK)            -0.146***               
            (0.041)               
Declarations              0.091             
              (0.138)             
Regulatory 
capture                -0.109           
                (0.357)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.000         
                  (0.005)         
TI perceived                    -0.579       
                    (0.411)       
TI real                      -0.247     
                      (0.379)     
Resources I                        -0.013   
                        (0.048)   
Resources II                          -0.002 
                          (0.004) 
Total acts  0.610***  0.610***  0.628***  0.561***  0.596***  0.630***  0.582***  0.560***  0.578***  0.563**  0.576**  0.552***  0.556*** 
  (0.187)  (0.186)  (0.186)  (0.185)  (0.187)  (0.183)  (0.186)  (0.196)  (0.200)  (0.244)  (0.290)  (0.192)  (0.188) 
Constant  0.502  0.496  0.494  0.739  -1.034  -1.157  0.572  0.81  0.683  1.708  1.226  0.925  0.875 
  (1.490)  (1.637)  (1.473)  (1.484)  (1.673)  (1.617)  (1.620)  (1.753)  (1.696)  (2.355)  (2.660)  (1.498)  (1.499) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 
Pseudo R





























Notes: see Table 3 87 
 
 
Table C14: Determinants of regulatory decentralization, 1995-1999, dep. Var.: number of contradictions, 










































Territory  0.043  0.043  0.044  0.033  -0.006  0.014  0.04  0.035  -0.013  -0.047  0.020  0.026  0.025 
  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.072)  (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.132)  (0.150)  (0.086)  (0.082) 
Population  0.077  0.077  0.078  0.100  0.062  0.023  0.079  0.165*  0.129  0.247***  0.266***  0.124  0.123 
  (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.066)  (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.074)  (0.095)  (0.091)  (0.083)  (0.096)  (0.101)  (0.100) 
Oil and gas  0.389  0.389  0.38  -1.791***  0.252  0.363  0.32  0.711***  0.687**  0.691**  0.696*     
  (0.415)  (0.440)  (0.410)  (0.547)  (0.446)  (0.455)  (0.448)  (0.255)  (0.330)  (0.332)  (0.379)     
Distance 
from average 
income  -0.061  -0.062  -0.057  0.075  -0.020  -0.049  -0.044  0.084  0.138  0.125  0.081  0.176  0.181 
  (0.128)  (0.128)  (0.127)  (0.088)  (0.122)  (0.122)  (0.129)  (0.093)  (0.102)  (0.162)  (0.175)  (0.119)  (0.121) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  0.072  0.072  0.081  0.398  0.060  -0.062  0.002  -0.871***           
  (0.258)  (0.258)  (0.255)  (0.270)  (0.222)  (0.224)  (0.276)  (0.183)           
Dummy 
republic  0.510***  0.510***  0.514***  0.613***  0.471***  0.464***  0.420**  0.657***  0.582***  0.594**  0.568*  0.552***  0.546*** 
  (0.119)  (0.133)  (0.121)  (0.127)  (0.128)  (0.131)  (0.177)  (0.143)  (0.139)  (0.279)  (0.330)  (0.122)  (0.123) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.056***  0.056***  0.056***  0.056***  0.043**  0.039**  0.056***  0.068**  0.071**  0.112*  0.103*  0.059**  0.057** 




CIS  0.036  0.036  0.047  0.037  0.041  0.057  0.035  0.165  0.016  0.489  0.318  0.077  0.080 
  (0.179)  (0.179)  (0.182)  (0.171)  (0.159)  (0.166)  (0.180)  (0.227)  (0.181)  (0.352)  (0.322)  (0.174)  (0.174) 
Dummy 
border 
region CIS  0.137  0.137  0.13  0.113  0.200*  0.131  0.140  0.155  0.127  0.104  0.089  0.171  0.172 
  (0.116)  (0.123)  (0.113)  (0.111)  (0.121)  (0.120)  (0.123)  (0.134)  (0.130)  (0.214)  (0.216)  (0.119)  (0.119) 
Urbanization  -4.761  -4.762  -4.608  -0.145  -2.881  -4.450  -5.707  -1.816  -5.181  -6.989  -2.639  -3.96  -3.908 
  (4.259)  (4.254)  (4.264)  (4.926)  (3.922)  (3.923)  (4.356)  (5.245)  (4.753)  (9.807)  (8.896)  (4.827)  (4.807) 
Fiscal 
transfers  0.336  0.336  0.327  0.226  0.714*  0.568  0.315  0.362  0.305  -0.196  -0.244  0.216  0.246 
  (0.397)  (0.397)  (0.394)  (0.395)  (0.369)  (0.371)  (0.386)  (0.538)  (0.507)  (0.956)  (1.033)  (0.497)  (0.516) 
Democracy  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.000  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.009  0.007  0.025  0.020     
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.015)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    0.000      0.281**  0.284***  -0.005  -0.066  -0.023  -0.169  -0.175     
    (0.089)      (0.126)  (0.102)  (0.090)  (0.094)  (0.108)  (0.172)  (0.175)     
Power 
(RUIE)      -0.045                     
      (0.066)                     
Power (UI)        -0.067                   
        (0.058)                   
Tensions 
(RUIE)          -0.247***                 
          (0.091)                 
Tensions 
(MFK)            -0.146***               
            (0.041)               
Declarations              0.088             
              (0.139)             
Regulatory 
capture                -0.107           
                (0.356)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.000         
                  (0.005)         
TI perceived                    -0.583       
                    (0.407)       
TI real                      -0.233     
                      (0.381)     
Resources I                        -0.02   
                        (0.048)   
Resources II                          -0.002 
                          (0.004) 
Constant  0.458  0.456  0.448  0.81  -1.091  -1.264  0.524  0.893  0.853  1.938  1.525  1.043  0.984 
  (1.483)  (1.619)  (1.469)  (1.478)  (1.651)  (1.615)  (1.602)  (1.732)  (1.657)  (2.170)  (2.498)  (1.472)  (1.471) 
Total acts  0.614***  0.614***  0.633***  0.552***  0.603***  0.643***  0.589***  0.549***  0.559***  0.533**  0.542*  0.546***  0.549*** 
  (0.186)  (0.184)  (0.186)  (0.185)  (0.184)  (0.181)  (0.185)  (0.197)  (0.198)  (0.246)  (0.295)  (0.188)  (0.183) 
Observations  88  88  88  81  88  88  88  73  79  40  40  78  78 





























Note: see Table 3 88 
 
 
Table  C15:  Determinants  of  constitutional  decentralization,  1995-1999,  dep.  Var.:  index  for  regional 










































Territory  0.594  0.67  0.597  0.667  0.767  0.655  0.662  0.961  0.779  -0.272  -0.201  0.226  0.186 
  (0.661)  (0.629)  (0.650)  (0.697)  (0.639)  (0.627)  (0.642)  (0.995)  (0.702)  (0.718)  (0.630)  (0.845)  (0.873) 
Population  0.978***  0.985***  0.969***  0.825**  1.017***  0.957***  0.986***  1.256***  1.092***  0.327  0.102  0.999**  0.975** 
  (0.360)  (0.361)  (0.362)  (0.417)  (0.368)  (0.370)  (0.362)  (0.478)  (0.403)  (0.878)  (1.039)  (0.396)  (0.389) 
Oil and gas  -2.883*  -2.653  -2.832*  -0.610  -2.437  -2.724  -2.695  -2.768  -2.931*  -1.733  -1.34     
  (1.681)  (1.702)  (1.657)  (3.215)  (1.736)  (1.701)  (1.668)  (1.939)  (1.513)  (1.508)  (1.981)     
Income per 
capita  -0.495  -0.482  -0.515  -0.606  -0.532  -0.473  -0.471  -0.660*  -0.790**  -1.196  -1.142  -0.698**  -0.670** 
  (0.399)  (0.392)  (0.395)  (0.388)  (0.392)  (0.392)  (0.402)  (0.389)  (0.360)  (0.762)  (0.802)  (0.341)  (0.341) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  1.692  1.716  1.657  1.084  1.694  1.651  1.664  2.928***           
  (1.041)  (1.046)  (1.059)  (1.841)  (1.077)  (1.046)  (1.202)  (0.909)           
Dummy 
republic  2.214***  2.305***  2.198***  1.976***  2.346***  2.292***  2.225**  1.867**  2.068***  3.528  3.536  1.905***  1.814** 
  (0.624)  (0.682)  (0.612)  (0.653)  (0.678)  (0.686)  (1.084)  (0.907)  (0.717)  (2.225)  (2.292)  (0.704)  (0.711) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.156  0.164  0.153  0.17  0.183*  0.155  0.164  0.212  0.178  0.219  0.238  0.213*  0.192* 




CIS  -0.146  -0.161  -0.171  -0.097  -0.213  -0.122  -0.166  -0.532  -0.344  -1.08  -1.164  -0.802  -0.817 
  (0.871)  (0.883)  (0.857)  (0.937)  (0.871)  (0.886)  (0.890)  (1.144)  (0.914)  (2.192)  (2.121)  (0.850)  (0.883) 
Dummy 
border 
region CIS  0.303  0.244  0.326  0.308  0.128  0.249  0.243  -0.318  0.023  -0.224  -0.344  0.036  0.046 
  (0.598)  (0.618)  (0.604)  (0.621)  (0.633)  (0.622)  (0.622)  (0.754)  (0.648)  (1.097)  (1.186)  (0.585)  (0.592) 
Urbanization  -8.421  -7.166  -9.387  -11.783  -11.097  -6.668  -8.105  -25.803  -14.268  -0.969  -8.611  -30.398  -30.515 
  (20.580)  (20.107)  (21.687)  (28.566)  (20.952)  (20.634)  (23.668)  (30.176)  (27.265)  (55.104)  (66.819)  (26.812)  (27.062) 
Fiscal 
transfers  -1.265  -1.32  -1.2  -2.121  -1.906  -1.17  -1.325  -0.645  -1.192  -7.161  -8.058  0.441  0.722 
  (2.190)  (2.244)  (2.184)  (2.558)  (2.204)  (2.276)  (2.266)  (2.899)  (3.153)  (6.803)  (7.346)  (2.143)  (2.102) 
Democracy  -0.082*  -0.079*  -0.077  -0.086*  -0.079*  -0.079*  -0.079*  -0.062  -0.08  -0.138  -0.134     
  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.047)  (0.057)  (0.049)  (0.089)  (0.092)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    -0.209      -0.662  -0.018  -0.215  -0.289  -0.142  -0.335  -0.323     
    (0.406)      (0.616)  (0.553)  (0.419)  (0.514)  (0.456)  (0.864)  (0.851)     
Power 
(RUIE)      0.144                     
      (0.395)                     
Power (UI)        0.063                   
        (0.298)                   
Tensions 
(RUIE)          0.424                 
          (0.425)                 
Tensions 
(MFK)            -0.103               
            (0.233)               
Declarations              0.078             
              (0.783)             
Regulatory 
capture                0.479           
                (1.666)           
Industrial 
concentration                  -0.014         
                  (0.023)         
TI perceived                    -0.442       
                    (2.131)       
TI real                      0.569     
                      (1.887)     
Resources I                        -0.217   
                        (0.323)   
Resources II                          -0.027 
                          (0.025) 
Observations  87  87  87  80  87  87  87  72  78  40  40  77  77 
Pseudo R
2  0.113  0.114  0.114  0.109  0.118  0.115  0.114  0.111  0.120  0.155  0.156  0.098  0.102 
LR 
proportional 
odds   76.88**  78.23*  79.97**  78.68*  93.62**  92.01**  99.05***  78.97*  81.17*  53.92  59.89  70.86**  83.75*** 
Note: see Table 3 89 
 
 
Table  C16:  Determinants  of  constitutional  decentralization,  1995-1999,  dep.  Var.:  index  for  regional 










































Territory  0.548  0.630  0.549  0.616  0.725  0.615  0.622  0.928  0.723  -0.281  -0.196  0.132  0.087 
  (0.661)  (0.630)  (0.649)  (0.690)  (0.641)  (0.627)  (0.641)  (0.977)  (0.688)  (0.705)  (0.616)  (0.833)  (0.853) 
Population  1.025***  1.032***  1.018***  0.877**  1.070***  1.001***  1.031***  1.295***  1.131***  0.346  0.099  0.995**  0.968** 
  (0.362)  (0.363)  (0.363)  (0.420)  (0.371)  (0.371)  (0.364)  (0.478)  (0.400)  (0.877)  (1.003)  (0.394)  (0.386) 
Oil and gas  -2.869*  -2.616  -2.823*  0.253  -2.389  -2.678  -2.664  -2.779  -3.025**  -1.958  -1.504     
  (1.721)  (1.734)  (1.699)  (3.150)  (1.781)  (1.717)  (1.707)  (1.918)  (1.498)  (1.534)  (2.010)     
Distance 
from average 
income  -0.555  -0.547  -0.574  -0.749*  -0.608  -0.546  -0.535  -0.807**  -0.887**  -1.414*  -1.359  -0.600  -0.539 
  (0.459)  (0.445)  (0.457)  (0.409)  (0.451)  (0.441)  (0.459)  (0.399)  (0.397)  (0.797)  (0.850)  (0.368)  (0.369) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  1.749  1.780  1.715  1.039  1.768  1.717  1.717  3.137***           
  (1.088)  (1.091)  (1.107)  (1.813)  (1.124)  (1.087)  (1.249)  (0.875)           
Dummy 
republic  2.230***  2.325***  2.215***  1.991***  2.368***  2.312***  2.230**  1.920**  2.094***  3.464*  3.472  1.883***  1.791** 
  (0.622)  (0.678)  (0.610)  (0.648)  (0.671)  (0.682)  (1.076)  (0.899)  (0.704)  (2.077)  (2.161)  (0.693)  (0.702) 
Distance 
from Moscow  0.137  0.146  0.134  0.149  0.164*  0.137  0.147  0.191  0.152  0.174  0.196  0.195*  0.175 




CIS  -0.131  -0.148  -0.156  -0.09  -0.195  -0.107  -0.155  -0.536  -0.34  -1.038  -1.126  -0.815  -0.828 
  (0.870)  (0.884)  (0.860)  (0.930)  (0.870)  (0.888)  (0.892)  (1.154)  (0.924)  (2.122)  (2.073)  (0.847)  (0.879) 
Dummy 
border 
region CIS  0.309  0.247  0.331  0.299  0.129  0.252  0.245  -0.307  0.035  -0.188  -0.318  0.047  0.057 
  (0.597)  (0.619)  (0.604)  (0.623)  (0.636)  (0.623)  (0.622)  (0.752)  (0.650)  (1.110)  (1.180)  (0.588)  (0.595) 
Urbanization  -10.459  -8.976  -11.528  -14.917  -13.139  -8.244  -10.034  -27.516  -18.875  -3.791  -11.496  -37.668  -37.951 
  (20.761)  (20.357)  (21.848)  (27.784)  (21.055)  (21.017)  (23.877)  (30.590)  (27.021)  (52.357)  (62.677)  (26.089)  (26.448) 
Fiscal 
transfers  -0.821  -0.886  -0.744  -1.509  -1.440  -0.724  -0.901  -0.163  -0.696  -6.892  -7.869  0.734  0.966 
  (2.145)  (2.202)  (2.136)  (2.499)  (2.162)  (2.250)  (2.238)  (2.949)  (3.110)  (6.927)  (7.319)  (2.159)  (2.125) 
Democracy  -0.086*  -0.083*  -0.080  -0.089*  -0.083*  -0.082*  -0.082*  -0.067  -0.084*  -0.151  -0.146     
  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.048)  (0.058)  (0.050)  (0.095)  (0.098)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    -0.218      -0.674  -0.01  -0.225  -0.321  -0.172  -0.414  -0.394     
    (0.409)      (0.623)  (0.562)  (0.422)  (0.509)  (0.452)  (0.849)  (0.842)     
Power 
(RUIE)      0.139                     
      (0.392)                     
Power (UI)        0.059                   
        (0.300)                   
Tension 
(RUIE)          0.426                 
          (0.429)                 
Tension 
(MFK)            -0.112               
            (0.238)               
Declarations              0.093             
              (0.776)             
Regulatory 
capture                0.349           
                (1.663)           
Industrial 
concentration                  -0.013         
                  (0.023)         
TI perceived                    -0.508       
                    (2.078)       
TI real                      0.632     
                      (1.846)     
Resources I                        -0.209   
                        (0.328)   
Resources II                          -0.027 
                          (0.025) 
Observations  87  87  87  80  87  87  87  72  78  40  40  77  77 
Pseudo R
2  0.113  0.114  0.114  0.109  0.118  0.115  0.114  0.112  0.119  0.157  0.158  0.095  0.099 
LR 
proportional 
odds  76.48**  82.36**  79.57**  77.45*  84.70*  84.24*  98.82***  78.95*  81.76*  54.84  59.26  83.80***  92.99*** 
Note: see Table 3 90 
 
 
Table  C17:  Determinants  of  constitutional  decentralization,  1995-1999,  dep.  Var.:  index  for  power-





























Territory  2.342  1.979  2.398  3.172  1.745  1.899  1.952  1.4  2.043  -0.561  -0.309  1.329  1.213 
  (2.047)  (2.044)  (2.030)  (1.999)  (2.051)  (2.034)  (1.987)  (2.071)  (2.006)  (2.980)  (2.904)  (2.144)  (2.092) 
Population  2.715*  2.645*  2.613*  2.302*  2.561*  2.415*  2.631*  2.413  2.649*  4.769**  5.937**  2.605*  2.513* 
  (1.407)  (1.381)  (1.395)  (1.329)  (1.373)  (1.404)  (1.332)  (1.462)  (1.350)  (2.202)  (2.608)  (1.501)  (1.492) 
Oil and as  -23.543  -25.471  -22.957  167.884  -26.066  -25.948  -29.285  -25.962  -23.051  -28.341  -30.603     
  (17.573)  (18.750)  (17.899)  (106.549)  (18.945)  (19.289)  (19.707)  (20.647)  (17.772)  (25.461)  (29.641)     
Income per 
capita  -1.695  -1.869  -1.973  -1.335  -1.641  -1.754  -1.742  -1.808  -1.426  -0.258  -0.872  -2.320  -2.256 
  (2.202)  (2.174)  (2.201)  (2.115)  (2.174)  (2.165)  (2.096)  (2.237)  (2.148)  (2.256)  (2.299)  (2.180)  (2.169) 
Dummy 
republic  5.875***  5.252**  5.764***  4.536**  5.006**  5.051**  -0.170  4.184*  5.440**  5.700*  4.889  5.820**  5.628** 
  (2.187)  (2.219)  (2.168)  (2.194)  (2.221)  (2.219)  (3.792)  (2.495)  (2.194)  (3.339)  (3.364)  (2.255)  (2.271) 
Distance 
from Moscow  -0.116  -0.200  -0.160  -0.306  -0.288  -0.300  -0.339  -0.004  -0.120  0.249  0.112  0.011  -0.045 




CIS  -0.382  -0.192  -0.517  0.117  0.204  0.215  0.030  -3.289  -0.331  -1.612  -2.064  -1.167  -1.236 
  (2.882)  (2.830)  (2.849)  (2.758)  (2.855)  (2.873)  (2.729)  (3.586)  (2.788)  (4.217)  (4.021)  (2.953)  (2.941) 
Dummy 
border 
region CIS   3.703*  3.837*  3.790*  4.247**  4.072**  3.876*  3.964**  2.998  4.015**  3.168  3.510  3.046  3.085 
  (1.983)  (1.964)  (1.971)  (1.932)  (1.980)  (1.953)  (1.917)  (2.105)  (1.940)  (2.566)  (2.594)  (1.986)  (1.975) 
Urbanization  343.231***  329.909***  349.264***  348.568***  327.088***  329.392***  299.370***  298.098**  338.792***  -17.258  62.825  337.914***  337.180*** 
  (115.841)  (114.251)  (115.451)  (110.697)  (112.656)  (113.399)  (111.542)  (126.769)  (112.630)  (152.848)  (168.602)  (111.559)  (110.746) 
Fiscal 
transfers  -1.651  -0.119  -0.821  5.374  2.031  1.14  2.524  3.315  3.909  -7.66  -3.359  -0.117  0.487 
  (8.443)  (8.412)  (8.401)  (8.828)  (8.849)  (8.553)  (8.530)  (8.936)  (8.618)  (17.835)  (18.511)  (8.474)  (8.498) 
Democracy  -0.049  -0.062  -0.023  0.043  -0.064  -0.068  -0.076  -0.010  -0.065  -0.035  -0.080     
  (0.168)  (0.166)  (0.169)  (0.165)  (0.165)  (0.165)  (0.162)  (0.179)  (0.163)  (0.190)  (0.186)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    1.401      2.688  2.685  1.445  1.853  0.989  2.712  2.544     
    (1.314)      (2.176)  (2.233)  (1.277)  (1.376)  (1.320)  (1.805)  (1.783)     
Power  
(RUIE)      1.143                     
      (1.164)                     
Power (UI)        -0.160                   
        (0.914)                   
Tensions 
(RUIE)          -1.129                 
          (1.526)                 
Tensions 
(MFK)            -0.667               
            (0.940)               
Declarations              4.932*             
              (2.946)             
Regulatory 
capture                9.003           
                (6.248)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.093         
                  (0.062)         
TI perceived                    -3.068       
                    (5.074)       
TI real                      -4.649     
                      (4.599)     
Resources I                        -0.231   
                        (0.829)   
Resources II                          -0.044 
                          (0.071) 
Constant  -22.241**  -30.459**  -25.847***  -26.377***  -37.185**  -37.082**  -41.012***  -33.196***  -30.626***  -15.981  -19.8  -21.796**  -21.491** 
  (8.583)  (11.667)  (9.364)  (8.534)  (14.898)  (15.034)  (13.566)  (12.316)  (11.389)  (16.125)  (16.560)  (9.936)  (8.799) 
Observations  79  79  79  75  79  79  79  72  79  40  40  78  78 
Pseudo R
2  0.086  0.089  0.089  0.090  0.091  0.091  0.097  0.085  0.096  0.116  0.119  0.071  0.072 
 
Notes: see Table 3 91 
 
 
Table  C18:  Determinants  of  constitutional  decentralization,  1995-1999,  dep.  Var.:  index  for  power-





























Territory  2.164  1.788  2.178  2.995  1.565  1.725  1.783  1.171  1.865  -0.815  -0.574  1.068  0.931 
  (2.012)  (2.017)  (1.996)  (1.971)  (2.019)  (2.005)  (1.961)  (2.048)  (1.979)  (2.971)  (2.905)  (2.111)  (2.056) 
Population  2.746*  2.675*  2.651*  2.284*  2.582*  2.433*  2.676*  2.388  2.647*  4.508**  5.482**  2.643*  2.538* 
  (1.420)  (1.395)  (1.409)  (1.344)  (1.386)  (1.415)  (1.346)  (1.487)  (1.363)  (2.196)  (2.576)  (1.526)  (1.517) 
Oil and gas  -24.101  -26.068  -23.690  169.264  -26.623  -26.494  -29.84  -26.691  -23.638  -29.183  -31.266     
  (17.625)  (18.776)  (17.941)  (107.327)  (18.970)  (19.370)  (19.773)  (20.455)  (17.726)  (25.072)  (28.781)     
Distance 
from average 
income  -1.582  -1.646  -1.759  -0.874  -1.431  -1.611  -1.609  -1.235  -1.011  0.873  0.342  -2.134  -1.968 
  (2.534)  (2.498)  (2.520)  (2.432)  (2.488)  (2.478)  (2.414)  (2.603)  (2.480)  (2.583)  (2.608)  (2.526)  (2.514) 
Dummy 
republic  5.865***  5.267**  5.757**  4.507**  5.005**  5.056**  -0.201  4.202*  5.442**  5.768*  5.017  5.800**  5.608** 
  (2.188)  (2.224)  (2.172)  (2.202)  (2.225)  (2.223)  (3.791)  (2.514)  (2.199)  (3.329)  (3.361)  (2.267)  (2.287) 
Distance 
from Moscow  -0.169  -0.252  -0.217  -0.343  -0.339  -0.358  -0.391  -0.048  -0.155  0.333  0.203  -0.051  -0.100 
  (0.422)  (0.424)  (0.421)  (0.406)  (0.436)  (0.445)  (0.423)  (0.444)  (0.421)  (0.655)  (0.668)  (0.428)  (0.439) 
Dummy 
border region 
non-CIS  -0.414  -0.232  -0.545  0.106  0.187  0.205  0.008  -3.355  -0.364  -1.895  -2.411  -1.228  -1.298 
  (2.884)  (2.834)  (2.855)  (2.763)  (2.857)  (2.877)  (2.732)  (3.595)  (2.791)  (4.216)  (4.031)  (2.956)  (2.945) 
Dummy 
border region 
CIS  3.705*  3.842*  3.792*  4.265**  4.091**  3.881*  3.971**  3.027  4.035**  3.162  3.410  2.999  3.041 
  (1.985)  (1.968)  (1.974)  (1.936)  (1.983)  (1.956)  (1.920)  (2.108)  (1.944)  (2.560)  (2.588)  (1.988)  (1.977) 
Urbanization  324.707***  308.598***  326.177***  327.986***  308.521***  310.777***  280.465***  272.571**  318.368***  -53.826  13.177  312.147***  310.207*** 
  (108.047)  (107.058)  (107.479)  (103.720)  (105.471)  (106.270)  (104.481)  (122.021)  (105.613)  (149.619)  (162.935)  (103.892)  (103.003) 
Fiscal 
transfers  -0.746  0.729  0.122  5.938  2.883  2.075  3.404  3.769  4.434  -9.429  -6.062  1.058  1.484 
  (8.638)  -8.618  (8.609)  (8.912)  (8.995)  (8.752)  (8.728)  (9.233)  (8.741)  (17.957)  (18.614)  (8.751)  (8.747) 
Democracy  -0.049  -0.060  -0.023  0.052  -0.062  -0.067  -0.075  -0.003  -0.058  -0.005  -0.050     
  (0.171)  (0.169)  (0.172)  (0.168)  (0.167)  (0.168)  (0.164)  (0.182)  (0.166)  (0.196)  (0.193)     
Power 
(Jarocinska)    1.335      2.701  2.714  1.383  1.778  0.931  2.729  2.540     
    (1.313)      (2.178)  (2.240)  (1.275)  (1.377)  (1.318)  (1.807)  (1.789)     
Power 
(RUIE)      1.068                     
      (1.159)                     
Power (UI)        -0.215                   
        (0.910)                   
Tension 
(RUIE)          -1.192                 
          (1.522)                 
Tension (UI)            -0.713               
            (0.940)               
Declarations              4.984*             
              (2.949)             
Regulatory 
capture                8.651           
                (6.242)           
Industrial 
concentration                  0.094         
                  (0.062)         
TI perceived                    -3.200       
                    (5.069)       
TI real                      -4.135     
                      (4.547)     
Resources I                        -0.184   
                        (0.846)   
Resources II                          -0.040 
                          (0.073) 
Constant  -21.777**  -29.519**  -25.038***  -25.813***  -36.738**  -36.708**  -40.295***  -32.031**  -29.786**  -14.444  -17.490  -21.368**  -20.849** 
  (8.506)  (11.543)  (9.234)  (8.454)  (14.881)  (15.036)  (13.494)  (12.198)  (11.273)  (15.875)  (16.226)  (10.053)  (8.830) 
Observations  79  79  79  75  79  79  79  72  79  40  40  78  78 
Pseudo R
2  0.085  0.088  0.088  0.090  0.090  0.090  0.097  0.084  0.095  0.116  0.119  0.070  0.071 
Note: see Table 3 92 
 
APPENDIX D: EDUCATION AND TAXATION 
 
Table D1: Determinants of fiscal decentralization, 1995-1999, controlling for education 








































Territory  0.034**  0.031*  -0.039  -0.040  0.007  0.011  0.017  0.020 
  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.030)  (0.029) 
Population  -0.143*  -0.113*  -0.038  0.009  0.014*  0.011  -0.234**  -0.218*** 
  (0.080)  (0.063)  (0.282)  (0.236)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.095)  (0.078) 
Oil and gas  0.125  0.134  0.030  -0.076  0.047  0.072*  -0.132  -0.109 
  (0.092)  (0.088)  (0.304)  (0.306)  (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.106)  (0.109) 
Income per capita  -0.080*    -0.065    0.023*    -0.088**   
  (0.044)    (0.174)    (0.012)    (0.043)   
Distance from average 
income    -0.086**    -0.001    0.012    -0.103*** 
    (0.038)    (0.171)    (0.009)    (0.039) 
Dummy autonomous 
okrug  0.068  0.074  0.065  0.027  0.111***  0.115***  0.114  0.142 
  (0.075)  (0.072)  (0.292)  (0.272)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.094)  (0.098) 
Dummy republic  0.072**  0.073**  0.114  0.102  0.031  0.032  0.126**  0.128** 
  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.130)  (0.127)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.051)  (0.050) 
Distance from Moscow  0.009**  0.007*  0.061***  0.058***  0.000  0.002  0.008  0.009 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Dummy border region 
non-CIS  -0.023  -0.021  -0.035  -0.028  -0.025  -0.025  -0.067  -0.071 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.139)  (0.140)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.046)  (0.047) 
Dummy border region 
CIS  0.022  0.023  0.029  0.031  -0.021  -0.021  0.040  0.039 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.092)  (0.092)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.033)  (0.032) 
Urbanization  2.010*  1.762*  -14.257**  -14.790**  -0.581  -0.367  4.778***  4.905*** 
  (1.037)  (1.048)  (5.930)  (5.689)  (0.704)  (0.693)  (1.786)  (1.795) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.005  0.047      -0.155***  -0.181***  -0.087  -0.059 
  (0.126)  (0.123)      (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.138)  (0.135) 
Education  -3.623***  -3.681***  -4.208  -3.769  0.862  0.681  -4.736***  -4.913*** 
  (1.150)  (1.214)  (5.037)  (4.944)  (0.712)  (0.696)  (1.730)  (1.682) 
Education squared  6.009**  6.259**  14.352  12.966  -3.188*  -2.491*  6.134  6.950* 
  (2.356)  (2.566)  (10.795)  (10.616)  (1.621)  (1.454)  (3.728)  (3.764) 
Retail trade  0.135  0.112  -0.090  -0.132      0.213**  0.199** 
  (0.087)  (0.070)  (0.221)  (0.180)      (0.094)  (0.077) 
Net profit  -0.004**  -0.004**  0.002  0.001      0.000  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.007)      (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant  0.757***  0.772***  2.273***  2.295***  0.781***  0.798***  0.645***  0.594*** 
  (0.136)  (0.128)  (0.542)  (0.510)  (0.080)  (0.081)  (0.212)  (0.212) 
Minimum quadratic 
function   0.301  0.294            0.353 
Observations  88  88  88  88  88  88  88  88 
R
2  0.446  0.458  0.631  0.63  0.546  0.537  0.442  0.466 
J.-B. test  36.02***  27.54***  559.7***  528.1***  22.93***  19.26***  4.082  3.715 
 
Note: see Table 2. Outliers in regression (D1) and (D2) are Taimyr, Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Altai Rep., Tatarstan, Aginsk 
Buriatski, in (D3) an (D4) Dagestan, Evenkia, Ust Ordyn Buriatski, Tyva, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chukotka, Northern Ossetia, 
in (D5) and (D6) Briansk, Rostov, Tula and Novosibirsk. After exclusion of outliers in regression (D1) population, dummy 
republic, income per capita, urbanization and education squared become insignificant, but keep their sign, in (D2) population, 
dummy republic, distance from average income, urbanization and education squared become insignificant, but keep their 
sign, in (D6) oil and gas variable becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign. Minimum of the quadratic function refers to the 









Regulatory decentralization  Constitutional decentralization 








































Treaties  Treaties 
Territory  0.005  0.003  0.084  0.08  0.077  0.063  0.484  0.503  1.942  1.823 
 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.694)  (0.699)  (2.139)  (2.063) 
Population  0.001  0.003  0.052  0.058  0.058  0.073  1.091***  1.072***  3.352**  3.376** 
 
(0.009)  (0.010)  (0.078)  (0.079)  (0.070)  (0.07)  (0.357)  (0.360)  (1.505)  (1.485) 
Oil and gas  0.052  0.048  0.816  0.953*  0.686*  0.709**  -4.285** 
-
4.358***  -27.351  -28.254 
 
(0.036)  (0.033)  (0.512)  (0.493)  (0.355)  (0.323)  (1.714)  (1.609)  (18.786)  (18.639) 
Income per capita  -0.022*    -0.080    -0.148    0.205    0.660   
 
(0.012)    (0.101)    (0.099)    (0.364)    (3.289)   
Distance from average 








okrug  0.040  0.041  -0.204  -0.155  -0.023  -0.003  1.319  1.275 
   
 
(0.030)  (0.031)  (0.314)  (0.307)  (0.229)  (0.232)  (0.976)  (1.007) 
   
Dummy republic  0.053***  0.054***  0.567***  0.579***  0.548***  0.560***  2.417***  2.402***  6.707***  6.680*** 
 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.142)  (0.143)  (0.114)  (0.115)  (0.699)  (0.704)  (2.241)  (2.239) 
Distance from Moscow  0.006*  0.006*  0.069**  0.067**  0.067***  0.062***  0.140  0.147  -0.213  -0.193 
 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.102)  (0.095)  (0.431)  (0.414) 
Dummy border region 
non-CIS  0.015  0.015  -0.078  -0.082  0.032  0.025  -0.517  -0.512  -0.609  -0.571 
 
(0.023)  (0.022)  (0.199)  (0.198)  (0.170)  (0.168)  (0.780)  (0.78)  (2.821)  (2.818) 
Dummy border region 
CIS  0.010  0.010  0.044  0.043  0.159  0.163  0.472  0.468  4.440**  4.451** 
 
(0.040)  (0.041)  (0.204)  (0.155)  (0.023)  (0.003)  (1.319)  (1.275)  (2.062)  (2.059) 
Urbanization  -0.565  -0.683  -5.437  -5.440  -2.493  -3.092  -8.873  -8.339  380.965***  385.257*** 
 
(0.472)  (0.477)  (5.501)  (5.249)  (4.181)  (4.156)  (22.379)  (23.097)  (116.503)  (112.960) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.023  -0.003  0.019  0.110  0.083  0.238  0.695  0.493  2.706  1.995 
 
(0.038)  (0.041)  (0.435)  (0.453)  (0.383)  (0.392)  (2.212)  (2.167)  (8.663)  (8.575) 
Total acts      0.472**  0.482***  0.561***  0.561***         
 
    (0.182)  (0.180)  (0.181)  (0.180)     
   
Education  -0.819  -0.808  -13.946**  -14.537**  -11.107**  -11.237**  -1.411  -1.015  -26.375  -0.537 
  (0.593)  (0.595)  (6.687)  (6.870)  (5.442)  (5.370)  (21.128)  (21.052)  (145.286)  (154.228) 
Education squared  2.060*  1.968  33.217**  35.176**  26.654**  26.924**  -28.989  -29.905  -40.270  -110.498 
  (1.185)  (1.208)  (14.279)  (14.996)  (11.833)  (11.638)  (42.648)  (41.473)  (348.777)  (373.294) 
Constant  0.202***  0.198***  3.108  3.046  2.017  1.988      -23.646  -26.228 
 
(0.065)  (0.066)  (1.881)  (1.863)  (1.684)  (1.670)      (16.459)  (17.409) 
Minimum quadratic 
function      0.210  0.207  0.208  0.209     
   
Observations  88  88  88  88  88  88  87  87  79  79 
R
2  0.414  0.412  0.299  0.301             
Pseudo R
2          0.043  0.043  0.112  0.113  0.092  0.092 
Wald Chi-stat          3650.397***  3652.032***         
LR proportional odds               78.41*  79.68**     
J.-B. test  59.22***  64.89***  1581***  1591***             
 
Notes: see Table 3. Outlier in regressions (D9) and (D10) is Primorski, in (D11) and (D12) Saratov. After exclusion of 
outliers in regression (D9) income per capita and distance from Moscow become insignificant, but keep their sign, in (D10) 
distance  from  Moscow  becomes  insignificant,  but  keeps  its  sign,  in  (D11)  and  (D12)  oil  and  gas  variable  becomes 
insignificant, but keeps its sign. Minimum of the quadratic function refers to the minimum of the parabola of the function 




Table D3: Determinants of decentralization, 1995-1999, impact of total tax revenue 












































tutions  Treaties 
Territory  0.040**  0.018  0.011  0.087***  0.000  0.031  0.029  0.564  1.706 
  (0.015)  (0.060)  (0.013)  (0.030)  (0.011)  (0.081)  (0.071)  (0.699)  (2.014) 
Population  0.020  0.143  -0.002  0.079*  -0.003  -0.110  -0.059  1.340*  0.950 
 
(0.041)  (0.176)  (0.019)  (0.046)  (0.017)  (0.116)  (0.099)  (0.718)  (3.135) 
Oil and gas  0.282**  0.651*  0.092*  0.076  -0.023  -0.051  -0.132  -2.217  -28.713 
 
(0.123)  (0.384)  (0.050)  (0.127)  (0.057)  (0.729)  (0.482)  (2.369)  (18.574) 
Tax revenue  -0.191***  -0.669***  0.012  -0.271***  0.008  0.216*  0.178*  -0.549  1.668 
 
(0.050)  (0.169)  (0.020)  (0.053)  (0.013)  (0.117)  (0.101)  (0.720)  (2.913) 
Dummy 
autonomous 
okrug  0.065  0.369  0.098***  0.216**  0.027  -0.212  -0.049  1.211   
 
(0.063)  (0.290)  (0.030)  (0.089)  (0.027)  (0.272)  (0.243)  (0.896)   
Dummy 
republic  0.049*  0.166  0.028  0.122**  0.047***  0.486***  0.478***  2.269***  5.668** 
 
(0.026)  (0.118)  (0.019)  (0.051)  (0.012)  (0.133)  (0.113)  (0.675)  (2.164) 
Distance from 
Moscow  0.016***  0.064***  0.001  0.023***  0.005  0.047*  0.044**  0.182  -0.225 
 
(0.005)  (0.017)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.026)  (0.021)  (0.112)  (0.445) 
Dummy 
border region 
non-CIS  -0.028  -0.166  -0.023  -0.009  0.019  -0.003  0.090  -0.484  -0.285 
 
(0.025)  (0.114)  (0.024)  (0.041)  (0.022)  (0.183)  (0.170)  (0.747)  (2.861) 
Dummy 
border region 
CIS  -0.011  -0.048  -0.021  0.006  0.010  0.031  0.154  0.333  4.023** 
 
(0.023)  (0.060)  (0.015)  (0.030)  (0.012)  (0.212)  (0.117)  (0.604)  (2.006) 
Urbanization  1.397*  -3.508  -0.872  3.879**  -1.074**  -10.432**  -7.687*  -19.768  264.454** 
 
(0.828)  (2.655)  (0.760)  (1.531)  (0.444)  (4.655)  (4.105)  (18.55)  (103.296) 
Fiscal 
transfers  -0.524***    -0.167***  -0.811***  0.011  0.698  0.656  -1.863  1.490 
 
(0.144)    (0.056)  (0.182)  (0.043)  (0.500)  (0.443)  (2.903)  (9.949) 
Retail trade  0.115**  0.325**    0.105***           
 
(0.056)  (0.125)    (0.035)           
Net profit  -0.001  0.019***    0.001           
 
(0.002)  (0.004)    (0.001)           
Total acts            0.478***  0.528***     
            (0.172)  (0.171)     
Constant  3.249***  10.371***  0.702**  4.424***  0.027  -1.285  -1.251    -44.331 
 
(0.681)  (2.270)  (0.280)  (0.743)  (0.183)  (1.823)  (1.520)    (41.147) 
Observations  88  88  88  88  88  88  88  87  79 
R
2  0.486  0.762  0.516  0.467  0.394  0.286       
Pseudo R
2              0.041  0.101  0.085 
Wald Chi-stat              3636.091***     
LR 
proportional 
odds                81.52*** 
 
J.-B. test  24.95***  375.00***  9.629***  14.06***  56.69***  1698.00***       
Notes: see Tables 2 and 3. Outliers in regression (D19) are Tatarstan, Ingushetia and Aginsk Buriatski, in (D20) 
Dagestan, Evenkia, Chukotka, Ust Ordyn Buriatski, Aginsk Buriatski, Tyva, Koriatkia and Kabardino-Balkaria, 95 
 
in (D21) Briansk, Rostov and Novosibirsk, in (D22) Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Taimyr and Altai Republic, in 
(D23) Primorski, in (D24) Saratov. After exclusion of outliers  in regression (D19) retail trade and dummy 
republic become insignificant, but keep their signs, in (D21) oil and gas variable becomes insignificant, but 
keeps its sign, in (D22) dummies republic and autonomous okrug  and population become insignificant, but keep 
their sign, in (D24) distance from Moscow becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign. 96 
 
APPENDIX E: OUTLIER ANALYSIS 
Table E1: Determinants of fiscal decentralization, 1995-1999, excluding outlier regions with weak 
governance 
 










































Territory  0.038***  0.037**  -0.083  -0.055  0.020  0.021  0.027  0.027 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.025)  (0.026) 
Population  0.013  0.018  0.171  0.208  0.004  0.005  -0.043  -0.054 
 
(0.041)  (0.037)  (0.465)  (0.355)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.068)  (0.068) 
Oil and gas  0.111**  0.109**  -0.267  -0.191  0.102***  0.109***  -0.066  -0.066 
 
(0.043)  (0.043)  (0.167)  (0.251)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.077)  (0.079) 
Income per capita  -0.010    0.212    -0.005    -0.058*   
 
(0.027)    (0.278)    (0.010)    (0.034)   
Distance from average 
income    -0.007    0.373    -0.011    -0.069** 
 
  (0.024)    (0.263)    (0.007)    (0.035) 
Dummy autonomous 
okrug  -0.097**  -0.101**  -0.485  -0.766**  0.128***  0.138***  0.057  0.077 
 
(0.044)  (0.040)  (0.344)  (0.343)  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.053)  (0.055) 
Dummy republic  0.047*  0.046*  0.212*  0.194*  0.029  0.030  0.061  0.065 
 
(0.026)  (0.026)  (0.111)  (0.105)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.055)  (0.055) 
Distance from Moscow  0.007*  0.007*  0.045***  0.049**  0.001  0.000  0.007  0.007 
 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Dummy border region 
non-CIS  0.009  0.009  0.024  0.040  -0.020  -0.021  -0.038  -0.042 
 
(0.030)  (0.029)  (0.119)  (0.122)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
Dummy border region 
CIS  0.021  0.021  0.119*  0.111  -0.020  -0.020  0.020  0.018 
 
(0.018)  (0.018)  (0.071)  (0.067)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Urbanization  1.753  1.706  -8.010  -6.156  -0.551  -0.508  3.019  3.123 
 
(1.338)  (1.321)  (6.400)  (5.388)  (0.940)  (0.887)  (2.270)  (2.282) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.067  -0.063      -0.194***  -0.182***  -0.067  -0.050 
 
(0.088)  (0.084)      (0.056)  (0.058)  (0.135)  (0.136) 
Retail trade  -0.023  -0.027  -0.287  -0.303      0.033  0.042 
 
(0.036)  (0.031)  (0.368)  (0.265)      (0.063)  (0.064) 
Net profit  -0.003**  -0.003**  0.001  -0.004      0.000  0.000 
 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.009)      (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant  0.550***  0.553***  1.630***  1.555***  0.866***  0.860***  0.496**  0.421* 
 
(0.112)  (0.107)  (0.550)  (0.426)  (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.209)  (0.229) 
Observations  80  80  80  80  80  80  80  80 
R
2  0.360  0.360  0.513  0.535  0.488  0.491  0.154  0.165 
J.-B. test  46.23***  47.62***  1340***  1211***  8.555***  9.088***  9.546***  7.522** 
 
Note: see Table 2. Outliers in regressions (E1) and (E2) are Kalmykia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Altai Republic and Vologda, 
in (E3) Dagestan, Tyva, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chukotka, Northern Ossetia and Altai Krai, in (E4) the same as in (E3), as well 
as Evreiskaia and Adygeia, in (E5) and (E6) Briansk, Tula and Rostov, in (E7) and (E8) Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kalmykia, 
Altai Republic and Tomsk. After exclusion of outliers in regression (E1) dummy republic, oil and gas and distance lose 
significance, but keep their sign, in (E2) dummy republic and distance lose significance, but keep their sign, in (E3) dummies 
border region CIS and republic lose significance, but keep their sign, in (E4) dummy republic loses significance, but keeps its 
sign,  in  (E7)  income  per  capita  loses  significance  and  changes  its  sign,  in  (E8)  distance  from  average  income  loses 
significance, but keeps its sign 97 
 
 
Table E2: Determinants of regulatory and constitutional decentralization, 1995-1999, excluding outlier 
regions with weak governance 
 
 
Regulatory decentralization  Constitutional decentralization 
























  Share of 
acts 
Share of 










tutions  Treaties  Treaties 
Territory  -0.004  -0.005  -0.033  -0.019  -0.009  -0.008  0.649  0.589  2.287  2.098 
 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.098)  (0.094)  (0.076)  (0.077)  (0.847)  (0.841)  (2.043)  (2.009) 
Population  0.010  0.010  0.129  0.122  0.136  0.134  1.088***  1.118***  2.577*  2.589* 
 
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.086)  (0.088)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.362)  (0.364)  (1.406)  (1.418) 
Oil and gas  0.055**  0.052**  0.834***  0.877***  0.724***  0.706***  -2.908*  -3.008*  -23.538  -24.208 
 
(0.026)  (0.025)  (0.310)  (0.330)  (0.208)  (0.198)  (1.552)  (1.550)  (17.398)  (17.423) 
Income per 
capita  -0.003    0.151    0.047    -0.614**    -1.488   
 
(0.008)    (0.107)    (0.075)    (0.305)    (2.137)   
Distance from 









okrug  -0.022  -0.024  -1.018***  -1.021***  -0.798***  -0.853***  2.823***  2.930*** 
   
 
(0.021)  (0.020)  (0.291)  (0.247)  (0.190)  (0.183)  (0.719)  (0.765) 
   
Dummy 
republic  0.052***  0.051***  0.546***  0.545***  0.541***  0.540***  1.927***  1.927***  6.036***  5.999*** 
 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.138)  (0.139)  (0.117)  (0.117)  (0.668)  (0.656)  (2.175)  (2.177) 
Distance from 
Moscow  0.007*  0.007*  0.069**  0.074**  0.063***  0.065***  0.210*  0.192*  -0.115  -0.158 
 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.115)  (0.113)  (0.418)  (0.417) 
Dummy border 
region non-CIS  0.017  0.017  -0.033  -0.033  0.053  0.056  -0.628  -0.636  -0.551  -0.567 
 
(0.020)  (0.020)  (0.185)  (0.189)  (0.163)  (0.163)  (0.821)  (0.825)  (2.846)  (2.848) 
Dummy border 
region CIS  0.003  0.003  -0.015  -0.017  0.112  0.112  0.053  0.061  3.862*  3.866* 
 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.221)  (0.224)  (0.124)  (0.124)  (0.627)  (0.626)  (1.976)  (1.977) 
Urbanization  -0.664  -0.710  -7.751  -6.492  -3.626  -3.522  -29.829  -34.467  325.253***  306.076*** 
 
(0.469)  (0.463)  (6.984)  (6.292)  (4.810)  (4.620)  (26.398)  (25.843)  (107.697)  (100.327) 
Fiscal transfers  -0.008  -0.007  0.208  0.122  0.32  0.268  0.106  0.491  -1.086  -0.515 
 
(0.038)  (0.040)  (0.489)  (0.503)  (0.437)  (0.449)  (2.238)  (2.254)  (8.234)  (8.521) 
Total acts      0.538***  0.543***  0.618***  0.610***         
 
    (0.180)  (0.177)  (0.184)  (0.183)     
   
Constant  0.111***  0.112***  1.144  1.088  0.345  0.418      -22.625***  -22.034*** 
 
(0.036)  (0.036)  (1.549)  (1.508)  (1.485)  (1.479)      (8.125)  (8.064) 
Observations  80  80  80  80  80  80  79  79  78  78 
R
2  0.386  0.386  0.305  0.304             
Pseudo R
2          0.044  0.044  0.106  0.105  0.083  0.082 
Wald Chi-stat          3359.014***  3353.738***         
LR 
proportional 
odds              70.78**  83.41*** 
   
J.-B. test  44.0***  45.09***  1496***  1529***             
Note: see Table 3. Outlier is Primorski in regressions (E9) and (E10), Saratov in regressions (E11) and (E12). 
After exclusion of outliers distance in regression (E9) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign, distance from 
average income in regression (E12) becomes insignificant, but keeps its sign. 98 
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